SCF, Meet Loss and Damage

Posted on April 12, 2016 by achristian

The Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) on Loss and damage (L&D) is going on a somewhat surprising date this year with the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). The job of the SCF is to assist the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP) in conducting its climate finance functions. The job of the WIM is to enhance action and support to address loss and damage in developing countries particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts. (We’ve covered the WIM and L&D extensively, e.g., here, here and here.)

The reason this ‘date’ is interesting is that nowhere in any COP decisions is the SCF directly instructed to engage the issue of L&D or pursue a close relationship with the WIM. Climate finance language is strictly aimed at mitigation, adaptation, and building capacity and enabling environments for those. Yet, sometime in mid-2016, the SCF will hold its annual Forum designed to advance communication and information exchange as well as linkages. And, this forum’s topic will be: “Financial instruments that address the risks of loss and damage.”

It is true that, at COP19, Parties asked the SCF to “further enhance its linkages with the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the thematic bodies of the Convention.” It is also true that, at COP21, Parties decided to endorse the SCF’s 2016-2017 workplan, which included this year’s Forum. But the guardian may not realize what seriousness (mischief?) might come of this liaison between two of its wards.

The WIM’s Executive Committee actually made the first move at SCF’s 11^th meeting in October 2015, requesting the ‘date’ based on an aspect of its 2-year workplan approved by COP20. And, while the WIM might not have looked like the SCF’s type, there apparently was enough chemistry for a quick “Yes.” Earlier this month, at the SCF’s 12^th meeting, the 20 Committee members reviewed input from multiple stakeholders and got the plans rolling.

What makes this kind of engagement between the SCF and the WIM important, is that, even though the Paris Agreement includes a distinct article on L&D (quite a significant outcome), it contains no provision for financing efforts to address this critical climate change issue. Thus, the SCF giving its attention to L&D could be extremely influential.

One clear way this can happen beyond the exposure and focus of the forum, is through the 2016 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows (BA), on which the SCF began work during its 12th meeting. The BA is a comprehensive compilation used to support the COP’s climate finance responsibilities. Not surprisingly, L&D received no attention in the 2014 edition. It most certainly will in the 2016 BA, with the Forum’s attention to this substantive issue.

Where Parties take it from there will tell a lot about the prospects for these two. Will the SCF and WIM really bond? Will they decide to go steady? Might there be a real future for L&D under the climate finance wing of the climate regime? Some are undoubtedly dreaming of wedded bliss!

Climate Policy For Sale?

Posted on April 11, 2016 by achristian

A newly released study from the UK-based, non-profit InfluenceMap reveals that just 5 oil industry entities collectively spend an estimated nearly $115 million every year through lobbying and influence to obstruct climate policy. And the report’s team considers this a conservative estimate. Topping the list are the American Petroleum Institute (API) ($65 mill), ExxonMobil ($27 mill) and Shell ($22 mill). The new assessment is built from InfluenceMap’s September 2015 release of a much larger assessment of 100 leading industrial corporations and 30 powerful trade associations.

This study, which also included the Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA) and the Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association (APPEA), is no stab in the dark exercise. InfluenceMap offers an open platform and transparent methodology, and utilizes well-established data sources of publicly available information, along with original research. A big reason InfluenceMap’s analysis is considered conservative is that it can’t count the monies these entities direct to anti-climate think tanks. Current disclosure requirements mean that information doesn’t have to be made public.

In addition to direct lobbying, the assessment covers the multiple ways corporations exert influence in today’s world – advertising, PR, social media, and access to certain circles. The application of these methods toward climate science and policy in the U.S. has been well documented.

InfluenceMap’s performance rankings are reported in grades A+ through F. Each entity’s grade is based on both its direct influencing efforts as well as its strength of relationships with policy influencers (e.g., trade associations, chambers of commerce, and advocacy groups) and the importance of those influencers. The results? API, WSPA, and APPEA all got Fs, ExxonMobil got an E-, and Shell received a D-.

This report is designed to help investors assess and manage climate risk. It also assists shareholders seeking corporate change, and climate-progressive corporations seeking competitive advantage. For advocates of climate-smart policy, it may advance the effort to quench fossil fuel’s already smoldering fire.

Take note, Big Oil. You are selling out of good will.

The GCF – Can We Count On It?

Posted on April 1, 2016 by achristian

In 2009, as we reported earlier, developed country Parties to the UNFCCC committed to jointly mobilize $100 billion/year by 2020 to help developing countries address their climate change needs. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) – the designated heavy lifter for this goal – was created by COP16 in 2010. Its purpose is to fund developing country efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change through “low-emission and climate-resilient development.” (See our coverage of the private sector role in the GCF here, and co-financing efforts toward the $100 billion goal here.)

The GCF, now with pledges of just $10.3 billion, became fully operational in 2015. However, as of the start of 2016, only $1.6 billion was reported actually in hand, and none of the $168 million the GCF Board approved for the first 8 projects at its November meeting had been distributed. (We reported on the U.S.’s $3 billion pledge here, the first $500 million of which has now been deposited into the Fund.)

The Fund’s goal for 2016 is to distribute $2.5 billion. Its press release also reports a package of current proposals worth $1.5 billion, with 22 projects totaling $5+ billion in the proposal pipeline. (A conflicting update from the Asian People’s Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD) reports $6.2 billion in 124 proposals and concepts in the 2016 pipeline, including 22 that are approval ready.) In either case, that 2016 goal is a high bar.

The GCF Board made some foundational progress at its 12^th meeting in early March in Songdo, Korea, including adopting its first Strategic Plan (SP) and a 2016-2018 action plan. (The final SP had not been released as of this posting, but the draft can be found here.) It also accredited 13 new entities (some with pending status), which will bring the total accredited to 33. Additionally, the Board authorized its first Project Preparation Facility grant ($1.5 million to Rwanda). This new and evolving facility is designed to support developing country accredited entities in creating highly fundable projects.

The Green Climate Fund has its critics. Hallway talk at COP20 in Lima buzzed about the potentially reckless pace UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres had set for the Fund’s scaling up. Governance questions arose soon after. Now, Small Island Developing States and others are facing onerous and highly bureaucratic accreditation hurdles for accessing it. Leading up to the March meeting, civil society voiced strong objections to the limited meeting access, and to the potential accreditation of international banking giants HSBC and Crédit Agricole.

Unfortunately, the Board’s emerging accreditation strategy, intended to address concerns, wasn’t ready for prime time by the March meeting. In related action, the Board awarded pending accreditation to HSBC and Crédit Agricole – both with substantive conditions to be met before final approval. One of these for HSBC, according to APMDD, is getting a positive report from the U.S. federal monitor’s review of the corporation’s money laundering reforms. (That report’s release is currently delayed until a federal appeals court ruling). Interested readers can find the accreditation assessments in appendices of the report of the Board’s decisions.

On a definite positive note, after considerable discussion, the Board ultimately agreed to live webcasting of its meetings in an 18-month experiment, beginning in June

As the GCF story unfolds, let’s hope for lots of transparency and lots of pledges turning to lots of cash. The developing world is counting on it.

Climate Change influences extreme weather events, but by how much?

Posted on March 25, 2016 by achristian

We know that our climate system is changing as global temperatures rise. It is also now possible, in many cases, for science to credibly speak to the influence of climate change on the likelihood and/or the extent/severity of a certain type of event. However, according to a pre-publication version of a new National Academies of Sciences (NAS) report, there is still a long way to go to make credible claims about how much and in what ways a particular extreme weather event was affected by climate change.

The NAS report, Attribution of Extreme Weather Events in the Context of Climate Change (free pdf download available), is the work of the Committee on Extreme Weather Events and Climate Change Attribution. To create it, the Committee drew on more than 300 published papers, and conducted a 3-month process of multiple webinar meetings and a community workshop with leading scientists and other researchers working in the arena of event attribution.

The report provides the most up to date assessment of current capabilities in event attribution, guidance on presenting and interpreting studies, and priorities for both future research and its application (operationalization). While the report notes significant gains in the science of extreme event attribution, especially over the past decade, it cautions that this science is still emerging, and substantially more study is required.

On methodology, the report identifies two classes of approaches to event attribution – observational-based and model-based – noting that most studies use both to varying degrees. The model-based approach must, of course, account for multiple uncertainties, and the report looks at how those have been quantified. The suite of “individual classes of extreme events” examined includes extreme heat and cold events, droughts, wildfires, extreme rainfall, cyclones, and more.

The authors assign a confidence level (high, medium, low) to the attribution science for each of these event classes by evaluating three different measures:

“the capabilities of climate models to simulate an event class,
the quality and length of the observational record from a climate perspective, and
understanding of the physical mechanisms that lead to changes in extremes as a result of climate change.”

The attribution analyses of extreme heat and cold events garner the highest level of confidence. There is medium confidence in those of hydrological drought and heavy precipitation, and little or no confidence in those of severe convective storms and extratropical cyclones. (See Fig. S.4) (Severe convective storms are severe thunderstorms, often characterized by hail, lightning, and/or high wind gusts. Extratropical cyclones are low pressure, generally mid-latitude systems associated with cold or warm fronts, e.g., blizzards, Nor-easters.)

(AP Photo/Tony Gutierrez)

In particular, the authors caution that, “there is no single best method or set of assumptions for event attribution.” How the question is framed and the time constraints imposed on a study play a significant role in the choices made for such parameters as: defining event duration, setting geographical area affected, identifying the physical variables to study, and choosing methodology. Natural variability is also always a player in an extreme event. Instead of “Did climate change cause this event?”, the authors suggest reasonable questions might be: “Are events of this severity becoming more or less likely because of climate change?” and “To what extent was the storm intensified or weakened, or its precipitation increased or decreased, because of climate change?”

The report recommends more study of 9 specific areas of weather and climate extremes, suggests the creation of standards based on event classes, and proposes ways to improve systemic evaluation.

While policymakers and the public need the science in order to better manage the risks around these events and enhance our adaptive capacity, those most vulnerable to climate change are looking toward the day that blame for these events can be apportioned and thus restitution sought. That day is getting closer, but it is definitely not here yet.

How “well below 2°C” flew well-below the radar

Posted on March 20, 2016 by achristian

On December 12, when the Paris Agreement was adopted by consensus, it contained bold new language on the long-term global temperature goal. Article 2 reads:

“Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels…” (Article 2.1(a))

But, from where did this language come?

All through the ADP’s final year of negotiations, from Lima to Geneva to Bonn and back to Bonn, it never appeared in the successive drafts. The “well below 2°C” finally emerged in brackets at the last negotiating session before COP21, on the final day of ADP2-11.

The likely source? Something called the structured expert dialogue (SED).

The story begins back at COP16 in 2010, when Parties agreed to reduce emissions so that global temperature would not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. They also agreed to periodically review this goal to determine whether it was sufficient to meet the UNFCCC’s objective, and whether the Parties were achieving it. Importantly, the Parties decided at COP16 to consider strengthening the 2°C goal, “including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C.”

This mandated review happened between June 2013 and February 2015 at a Joint SBSTA/SBI meeting. It was supported by a structured expert dialogue (SED) to “ensure the scientific integrity of the review through a focused exchange of views, information and ideas.” The SED involved more than 70 experts and Parties over 4 sessions. The group released its final report last May for all UNFCCC Parties to consider it at the 42^nd session of the subsidiary bodies in June.

Two of the SED’s key messages were:

“The world is not on track to achieve the long-term global goal, but successful mitigation policies are known and must be scaled up urgently.” (Message 8)
“While science on the 1.5°C warming limit is less robust [making it difficult to compare differences between 2°C and 1.5°C], efforts should be made to push the defence line as low as possible.” (Message 10)

Message 10 also suggested that Parties consider a precautionary path: “aiming for limiting global warming as far below 2°C as possible, reaffirming the notion of a defence line or even a buffer zone keeping warming well below 2°C.”

While not offering the exact language on 1.5°C found in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, the SED report clearly articulates climate change impacts already being experienced, limits to adaptation, and certain and non-linear increases in those impacts expected between 1.5 and 2°C.

Both IISD’s Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) and the Third World Network (TWN) reported strong differences at the June UNFCCC meeting about what action Parties should take on the Review and SED report. AOSIS, the LDCs and others pushed for sending a draft decision to COP21 for a new long-term global temperature goal of “limiting warming to below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.” Saudi Arabia and China were both firmly against changing the long-term goal, and sought language simply acknowledging and appreciating the work/report. Though most Parties supported crafting a substantive conclusion and decision, the lack of consensus on content meant postponement to the SB43 (December 1-4) meeting in Paris. With Saudi Arabia and China (joined by Oman) continuing to block action at SB43, the COP Presidency was ultimately called on to shepherd its direct consideration by the COP.

On the ADP front, the Review and SED report found no apparent foothold in June. By Paris, though, its “well below 2°C” was in the draft and part of the hot debate on long-term temperature goal. The LDCs, AOSIS, the Africa Group and the 40+ country-strong Climate Vulnerable Forum (on which we’ve reported), fought hard for the goal to reference only 1.5°C. The “High Ambition Coalition” (on which we reported here), which included the EU and the U.S., offered strong support. The Saudis, backed by India and China, and unchallenged by the rest of OPEC, firmly blocked it, along with any reference to the SED report. The final compromise language was, in the end, a big step toward acknowledging the climate change dangers already present and the peril posed by a 2°C change.

COP21 did close with a decision (10/CP.21 para 4) that referenced the Review, “took note of the work of the structured expert dialogue,” and offered appreciation for those who participated in it. It also stated the new long-term temperature goal utilized in the Paris Agreement’s Article 2.1(a). “Well below 2°C” is well beyond what could have been.

U.S. INDC Pledge Just Wishful Thinking Without CPP?

Posted on March 11, 2016 by achristian

Last year, when the U.S. made its INDC pledge to reduce net GHG emissions 26-28% below 2005 by 2025, it was built on Obama’s 2013 Climate Action Plan with the proposed Clean Power Plan (CPP) among its key elements. At the time, a range of climate policy observers, including Climate Action Tracker, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Climate Advisors, and the World Resources Institute, noted that additional policies would be needed to meet this pledge.

New information and developments compel another look at the gap:

Congress extended the 30% Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for solar and $0.23/kWh Production Tax Credit (PTC) for wind.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released its 2015 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO), and the U.S. submitted its second UNFCCC Biennial Report.
As we blogged in February, the Supreme Court issued a stay on the CPP’s implementation.

The Rhodium Group released a report in January – Taking Stock: Progress Toward Meeting U.S. Climate Goals – that accounts for the first two when analyzing if and how the U.S. can achieve its pledge. Its analysis considers various uncertainties (different paths for future economic growth, potential shifts in transportation demand, and different rates at which the cost of renewable energy and battery storage technology will decline) and integrates these with a set of climate and energy policies, including:

The Clean Power Plan
Pending methane (CH₄) emissions standards for new oil and gas sources
Pending heavy-duty vehicle (HDV) efficiency standards revisions
Pending hydroflourocarbon (HFC) phasedown efforts under the Montreal Protocol

The report also considered the sizeable uncertainty in sequestration pathways for LULUCF, as identified in the U.S.’s second Biennial Report. (The use of the “net” approach in GHG accounting indicates the inclusion of land use, land use changes, and forestry (LULUCF) as carbon sinks to offset emissions.)

The Rhodium Group concluded that emissions reductions of 10%-23% would be expected by 2025, when incorporating the Biennial Report’s wide range of uncertainty on LULUCF sequestration potential, the full range of uncertainties for economic and technology outcomes, and uncertainties in CH_4, HFCs, and HDVs reductions. To move beyond the most optimistic prediction will require building on existing policy frameworks, targeting industrial CO₂ emissions, creating additional CH₄ reduction pathways, and “enhancing the forest sink,” all within the next 5-10 years.

But, what do things look like without the CPP? While we can’t understand all the permutations, two CPP analyses (both assuming optimal implementation) help us get a glimpse. EPA, in its August 2015 Regulatory Impacts Analysis, estimates that the CPP would provide a 9-10% reduction in power sector CO₂ emissions below the 2005 level by 2025 as compared to its base case (Table 3-6). Another Rhodium Group report, co-authored with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Assessing the Final Clean Power Plan, projects a 17-18% reduction compared to its base case. A number of factors (e.g., different modeling frameworks and historical data) made EPA’s base case significantly more optimistic. Still, both calculated total power sector change from 2005 of 28-29% by 2025. Notably, these figures were derived before the recent passage of the solar and wind tax credits.Extrapolating using this range of figures, EIA historical date, and the Biennial Report for other sector reductions, the CPP would likely have a roughly 4-11% impact on overall net emissions in 2025. (There are many nuances in doing such a calculation; but, as calibration, the Rhodium Group’s Taking Stock report projects a combined 15% reduction with the CPP and the ITC/PTC.)

At a 4%-11% benefit, the CPP would provide somewhere between 15% and 40% of the reductions needed to meet the INDC pledge. Without it, the U.S.’s intention likely moves beyond optimism to just wishful thinking.

The weaving of the Paris Outcome

Posted on December 10, 2015 by achristian

The unfolding Paris Outcome is a web of complexities, in both the package and the process. In the package itself, there are cross cutting issues; there are a myriad of details; and there are interlocking linkages among Articles and Decision sections that make multiple circles back to each other. It can be a dizzying endeavor to really grasp it all. And there are plenty of threads under a lot of tension.

The process, too, is multi-layered and multi-faceted. We’ve done the in-depth reporting here and here on its various parts, and how it all spins together, and shared a description of this week’s ministerial level action.

After last night’s Party and negotiating group comments on the December 9 draft text, the ministerial-led informal consultations were shifted into open-ended indaba-type consultations (a South-African consensus building approach), on the three key political issues: Differentiation, Support and Ambition. Alongside those consultations were open-ended informal ones on Loss and Damage, Cooperative approaches and mechanisms, Forests, and the Preamble. At this point, we are waiting for a December 10 draft that compiles the work of those early morning negotiations.

For those nervous about getting lost in the web of it all, a short, simple construction of where we are now comes to us today compliments of seasoned South African delegate, Alf Wills:

Reaching a Paris Outcome requires that 3 interrelated levels be addressed:

1) Those High level political issues = Differentiation (how to fairly account for differing levels of development, capacity, and financial resources between Parties for determining responsibilities), Support (how much, from whom, to whom, for what purpose), and Ambition (how much in emissions reduction, toward what goal, and when)

2) Medium level issues = including cycles (for reporting/reviewing/increasing ambition and support), non-market mechanisms, and adaptation

3) Technical issues related to the rules.

According to Mr. Wills, the ministers must solve the top level issues before they can unlock the medium level issues, which will then inform the technical issues. Other negotiators seemed to agree.

Certainly, Mr. Wills construction is a bit simplistic. Among other things, it doesn’t locate loss and damage. Still, it offers a short-hand way to think about the unfolding process, so it doesn’t unravel in your brain.

Update on progress toward a Paris Outcome

Posted on December 9, 2015 by achristian

The second stocktaking of the Comité de Paris was held yesterday afternoon for facilitators to report on consultations and bilateral meetings they had held with Parties during the day. The purpose of these meetings was to identify areas of convergence on key elements for the Paris Outcome.

Highlights: Terms heard repeatedly throughout the stocktaking were “progress,” “flexibility,” and “constructive engagement.” The following list provides a few report highlights, and illustrates the breadth of issues that will be part of the Paris Outcome:

Support: finance, technology, and capacity building – Parties made headway on capacity building and convergence on all of Article 7. Technology development and transfer, and its related decisions.
Differentiation- Divergence remains (this is a key political issue that pervades the entire text.)
Ambition, including long-term goals and periodic review – Discussions are continuing on the possible 1.5 degrees Celsius limit, and 2 possible framings have been articulated for the global mitigation goal.
Acceleration of pre-2020 action – No convergence is yet being achieved.
Adaptation and loss & damage – Compromise is emerging on a global goal, links between adaptation and mitigation, and adaptation efforts/actions. Loss and damage remains a sticking point, with some Parties insisting on clear protection against liability and compensation.
Facilitating implementation and compliance – Ideas are forthcoming on essential elements, though whether and how differentiation will be referenced remains a key topic.
Cooperative approaches and mechanisms – Mixed results, with uncertainty on whether provisions of, for instance, integrity and avoiding double counting will be included.

The informal consultation groups on the Preamble, Forests, and Response Measures were just launched yesterday, so had no report outs.

Next Steps: Evening consultations were held, with a midnight deadline for co-facilitators to submit recommendations to the COP Presidency based on Party input. A “clean” version of the text will be released today at 1pm. A reconvening of the Comité de Paris at 5pm today to receive Parties’ first reactions to the “clean text.”

More to come!

Civil Society keeps the heat on for climate ambition

Posted on December 8, 2015 by achristian

As countries seek to arrive at a mutually acceptable text for the Paris Outcome this week, there is a lot of focus on ambition to reduce emissions, and on financial support to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change. In fact, these are among the key high-level political issues that must be resolved. It is hoped that tomorrow’s new draft text from minsters will bring some clarity on these issues.

Civil society has been working hard to help move the needle in favor of stronger ambition and greater equity through action leading up to and at this COP.

As we reported earlier (here and here), among its contributions to the conversation is a recent report by a powerhouse group of NGOs in climate change work – Fair Shares: A Civil Society Equity Review of INDCs. INDCs are countries’ intended nationally determined contributions, statements of planned actions for mitigation (and, in some cases, adaptation) covering the next 10 or 15 years, that they voluntarily submitted prior to COP21, in keeping with COP Decision 1/CP.19 in 2013 and 1/CP.20 in 2014. (See our last week’s and previous posts related to INDCs)

With negotiations on “level of ambition” in a seemingly precarious state, we thought it helpful to reiterate the stark reality of the shortcoming of the INDCs. These pledges represent wide-ranging levels of commitment that together, according to UNEP and others, won’t achieve the emissions reductions essential for a habitable planet. There is, in fact, a deeply alarming gap. The Fair Shares report is not alone in stating that, “even if all countries meet their INDC commitments, the world is likely to warm by a devastating 3°C or more.”

The report’s assessment is based on the maximum carbon we can have in the atmosphere to provide the world “a minimal chance of keeping warming below 1.5°C and a 66% chance of keeping it below 2°C.” Its INDC analysis utilizes 2 parameters: 1) historical responsibility (based on the cumulative emissions of a country); and 2) capacity (based on national income “over what is needed to provide basic living standards”) – with these given equal weight in the calculation. The methodology appropriately accounts for “a breadth of perspectives” related to income and time benchmark complexities.

Key findings for the 10 countries covered in the report are that Russia is not contributing at all to its fair share, and that Japan, the U.S., and the EU are all falling short at levels of just 10%, 20%, and slightly more than 20% of their fair shares, respectively. Conversely, the mitigation pledges of most developing countries “exceed or broadly meet their fair share,” even though the pledges of many of those are conditional.

Enter climate finance! Notably, the “fair shares” of many of the wealthy countries are beyond what they can achieve domestically. To ‘balance the books,’ so to speak, developed countries could ramp up actions to meet their own fair share, and make clear commitments to aid developing countries in achieving theirs.

It will take scaled-up and fair cooperation among countries to address the inequitable distribution across countries’ emission reduction pledges and close the emissions reduction gap. It is uncertain if COP21 Parties will achieve this.

Thankfully, civil society is keeping the pressure on.

What story will COP21 tell?

Posted on December 7, 2015 by achristian

Everywhere you turn at COP21 there are exciting stories – stories of unprecedented financing partnerships to ramp up renewable energy technologies; stories of global knowledge exchanges on successful strategies for adapting to climate impacts; stories of cities leading breakthrough initiatives in energy efficiency; and more.

Behind the scenes, though, in rooms open only to official country delegates, there are negotiations (now at the ministerial level) on a draft text of the Paris Outcome that still has many issues, even at this late date. The results will impact every single person on the planet, and it could be a very sad story. In fact, according to Stuart Scott, host of Climate Matters, a video series covering COP21, “[i]f you’re paying attention to what’s going on here, you can’t talk about the negotiations as an honest effort.”

Scott’s guests today offered a piece of that sad story already unfolding- the one of vulnerable individuals, communities and nations suffering heartbreaking impacts of climate change right now all around the world. His focus was the Pacific Islands.

To the backdrop of powerful images, Tinaai Teaua of Kiribati and Maina Talia of Tuvalu both spoke of the physical and emotional losses they’ve experienced and witnessed in the face of king tides, cyclones and water shortages. Teaua described how the king tides wipe out homes, how coastal erosion is destroying the tree fruit crops on which her people depend, and how people are scared. They don’t want to leave home. “Without our land, we are nothing. Our land is our identity.”

Talia’s home of Tuvalu is a group of 8 islands with no land at more than 2 meters above sea level. Climate change is forcing many to relocate; nearly 5,000 have already moved to New Zealand. He echoed Teaua’s words.

Another guest, Maria Tiimon Chi-Fang of the NGO Pacific Calling Partnership articulated the climate justice reality permeating the room: “It is not just about moving people to a safer place. It is very unjust for developed countries to keep doing what is so wrong, to keep jeopardizing the lives of our people.”

“The youth look into my eyes, saying ‘Why must we move?’ This is where we were born. Our ancestors are buried here.”

The message Kiribati’s Teaua has been taking to the delegates is clear: “You are not immune, no matter where you live. If you save me and my future, you save the world.”

Now that’s the story we need.

What’s next and who makes it happen at COP21?

Posted on December 7, 2015 by achristian

At COP21 on Saturday, December 5, the ADP transmitted the draft Paris Outcome (the Agreement, as we’ve called it all year) and its accompanying Decision to the COP. The text still contains many bracketed phrases (choices to be made), and there are key outstanding issues, such as on long-term goal, the timing of review of pledges, the provision of support to developing countries, loss and damage, and principles of equity and differentiation. (Be sure to see our posts from Week 1 for more details).

In its first action, the COP established the Comité de Paris (the Paris Committee), chaired by COP21 President, Laurent Fabius, to conduct informal consultations to facilitate achieving agreement by mid-week. These “informals” will cover thematic areas, and thus help to tackle cross cutting issue concerns such as differentiation, ambition, and adaptation/loss&damage. These launched on Sunday, and resumed today with closed meetings, along with bi-lateral meetings arranged by co-facilitators of each issue area to pursue compromise.

We will get a sense of the potential for progress at the Committee’s first Plenary tonight, where facilitators will share today’s outcomes by articulating their “assessment[s] of the possible concepts for solutions.”

The agreed upon facilitators, ministers from member Parties, are being paired for these consultations, and have received guidance from the COP President. Their mandate is clear: “Bridge differences with a focus on issues that require solutions to enable a timely and successful conclusion of the Paris Outcome.” And each duo has been given its “key issues.”

Stay tuned!

Research: Current institutions inadequate to address climate migration. Will Paris deliver?

Posted on December 3, 2015 by achristian

It is becoming increasingly common knowledge that citizens of island countries are already experiencing climate change impacts such as sea level rise, drought, salt water intrusion, cyclones and more. Earlier yesterday, the New York Times illustrated that well, with an in-depth look at the disappearing Marshall Islands. According to a new study being conducted by the UN University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) across 3 Pacific Island nations (neighbors of the Marshall Islands), these impacts have begun to drive migration as an adaptation strategy, which in turn is revealing serious and complex issues about mobility.

It is not yet clear whether such information might influence the Paris Agreement. As of 8:00 am Paris time today, Article 5. in the draft Agreement addressing Loss and Damage, and containing a provision to create a climate change displacement coordination facility, remained an option on the table.

It would behoove the climate policy community to pay attention to this unprecedented new research that is seeking to understand current and future scenarios for people vulnerable to climate change displacement impacts. The ultimate goal is to “improve the capacity of Pacific Island countries to better plan and manage the impacts of climate change on migration.” And yesterday at COP21, the project director, Dr. Koko Warner, Senior Expert at UNU EHS, presented her team’s findings to date.

The study, funded by EuropeAid, has involved more than 6,000 surveys of nearly 900 households in Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru, utilizing local citizens who received training in the survey method. These surveys have made clear that movement is no longer just because of economics or persecution, and that both mobility and adapting in place are constrained by multiple factors. Those surveyed have serious concerns about leaving and staying.

Climate change was independently and specifically cited as a reason for migration by 23% of migrants in Kiribati and 8% in Tuvalu, without it being introduced in the questions. And, significant numbers of households surveyed (>70% in Kiribati and >35% in Nauru) indicated they would likely choose migration, if droughts, sea level rise, and floods worsen. Yet, many Pacific Islanders face visa issues, and education and financial constraints that prevent them from using migration as a way to manage climate change risks. Nor has internal migration, which is far easier and less expensive than international movement, served as a durable solution for climate change. In Kiribati, many residents of the outer atolls have moved to the capital island, only to experience overcrowding, high unemployment, and limited fresh water, without reduced vulnerability to climate change. For Pacific Islanders seeking to or forced by economics to adapt in place, the toolbox is still pretty empty – insufficient weather data, incident early warning systems, and fresh water protection strategies, among other issues.

The larger, more fundamental issue being revealed is that even though managed migration could increase the capacity to adapt, the concept is absent from current legal and institutional frameworks. Conventional 20^th century tools used for mobility are not workable for 21^st century climate migrants. For Warner, “the lesson is how unprepared we are and how ill equipped our current … arrangements are” for this increasing challenge.

Warner’s work could well begin to erode the credibility of some policymakers who insist that existing institutions can be employed to face this challenge, and may make inroads toward keeping the loss and damage Article and its climate change displacement coordination facility in the Paris Agreement. We are watching closely.

CAN International flashes climate movement’s teeth on Day 1

Posted on November 30, 2015 by achristian

CAN (Climate Action Network) International’s COP21 opening press conference this morning delivered strong words for the leaders and negotiators. (CAN International is a recognized “network of NGOs working on climate change from around the world.” Member groups well known in the U.S. include 350.org, Union of Concerned Scientists, World Resources Institute, and World Wildlife Fund.) Four organizations presented:

Keya Chatterjee of US CAN praised the climate movement’s hard work since COP15 in Copenhagen that has achieved today’s powerful level of engagement. She noted that 2 of the 3 key ingredients for a just transition to a livable world have been met: 1) an activist base -“check;” and 2) a permissive majority – “check.” The third requirement, political leadership, is being demanded at COP21 where leaders are called to reveal “if they are with the world or not.” Activists clearly feel that Obama’s political credibility is on the line.

Mohamed Adow of Christian Aid decried the current inadequate offerings of developed countries on mitigation and adaptation that will result in the sacrifice of the most vulnerable countries to climate change. He shared that the INDCs will deliver a too high 2.7°C increase, and called on the Parties to complete a strong agreement that provides for robust adaptation help, a loss & damage mechanism, and the climate finance to make these happen.

Tim Gore from Oxfam predicted that the negotiations will be brutal, and could get nasty. Three of the flash points he anticipates:

Current commitment questions- $100Bill/year by 2020. Will this happen and will there be enough adaptation finance from it? The Africa Group has put a proposal on the table to ensure $32 billion for adaptation from GCF by 2020.
Loss & Damage- “a David & Goliath issue,” with the US not wanting to move on it at all, and the other developed countries happy for the U.S. to take the hard line position.
Post 2020 finance- “the great known unknown” at these talks. There is a serious need to for a new commitment on finance. The key tradeoff is between getting new numbers on the table and getting others at the table. But who goes first?

Pierre Cannet of WWF France called upon Parties to reach a solid, inclusive, transparent agreement that also provides for a role by civil society. He congratulated France’s efforts to make this COP a real success. Pierre’s primary message was to stay in the negotiators’ ears in Paris, and keep the messages coming through demonstrations and marches, predicting that civil society’s vital role in building a strong response will serve “to change course and make history.”

One of the most impassioned statements of the press conference came during the Q&A, when Keya Chatterjee (USCAN), expressing the commitment of the massive climate movement in the U.S. to hold the country’s leaders accountable to mitigation targets, nearly shouted, “I promise you, over our dead bodies, will these targets not be met!”

The Movement is unapologetically here. Let’s hope the political will is.

Please note: Press conferences at the COP are a great way for remote followers to get real time news and views. You can tune in via the UNFCCC webcast page and catch the live action before it reaches your favorite news feeds.

Loss and Damage – Hot Topic for Climate Negotiations

Posted on September 25, 2015 by achristian

Through multiple meetings this year, the ADP (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform) is seeking to craft a viable negotiating text for a new, legally binding and long-lasting international climate change accord for consideration at the 21^st meeting of the UNFCCC Conference of Parties meeting (COP21), being held in Paris in December. By all accounts, there was far less progress than hoped for at ADP2-10, held in Bonn, Germany from Aug. 31-Sept. 4. Climate Action Network (CAN) International characterized it as “incremental.” The Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) noted the unresolved “deep differences” on the Paris package elements, structure, and approaches to crosscutting issues. And, ActionAid, calling the progress “fragile,” concluded that the week’s work shortchanged poorer countries on key issues.

One of those key issues was Loss and Damage (L&D). (For a refresher on L&D within the UNFCCC, please see our coverage over the last two years.) L&D has become an exceedingly hot button issue for the poorest and most vulnerable countries, given what they are already facing, and even more so, what’s ahead.

The 3,253 hydrometeorological (weather, climate and water) hazards reported around the globe between 2005 and 2014 caused more than 283,000 deaths and more than $980 million in economic losses. According to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, nearly 3.4 million people were affected by drought between mid-2014 and mid-2015, with Haiti and Honduras topping the list; the heat waves in India and Pakistan led to 3,700 deaths in the first half of 2015; and, storms and floods in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Malawi and Bangladesh impacted a reported 2 million citizens over that same period.

Support to address these losses has been and continues to be insufficient, and the need for far more help is widely predicted. This situation, combined with the glaringly inadequate global mitigation of GHGs to date, creates an urgency that developed countries are no longer able to ignore in the climate negotiations.

Discussions on L&D did deepen during ADP2-10, primarily focusing on institutional arrangements and technical support, crystallizing as the week went on around a nagging sticking point – will L&D be substantively addressed in the core agreement (developing countries’ position), or not (most developed countries’ position)? Specifically, the G77+China and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) called for “[p]lacing a loss and damage mechanism with a climate displacement coordination facility in the [core] agreement,” to replace the Warsaw International Mechanism for L&D (WIM) after 2020. Developed countries pushed back, not wanting to grant L&D such prominent status from which the spectre of compensation could more credibly arise. The Sept. 4 Working Document from the ADP2-10 break-outs on Adaptation and Loss and Damage gives a summary.

Our VLS delegation head, Tracy Bach, reported that continued brainstorming and strategizing yielded a discussion proposal from the U.S. and several other developed countries on the final day. It suggested making the WIM permanent through a COP decision and having it serve the new agreement after 2020. In this way, L&D would be kept from a place in the core agreement, even as it is recognized.

This proposal may pave the way for compromise on location of institutional arrangements. However, the issues of current and long-term sustainable funding for L&D and for any institutional arrangements will likely continue to haunt the road to Paris.

Photo credits:

1) <a href=”http://www.flickr.com/photos/38709469@N08/8699594602″>Dais</a> via <a href=”http://photopin.com”>photopin</a> <a href=”https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/”>(license)</a>

2) <a href=”http://www.flickr.com/photos/27825503@N04/10962769056″>Destroyed</a> via <a href=”http://photopin.com”>photopin</a> <a href=”https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/”>(license)</a>

3) <a href=”http://www.flickr.com/photos/65162298@N07/6029132512″>Ethiopische nomadevrouw met haar dochter</a> via <a href=”http://photopin.com”>photopin</a> <a href=https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0.(license),/a>

4) Bing images

Loss and Damage “in,” but with little meaningful impact.

Posted on December 21, 2014 by achristian

If you’ve followed our coverage of “loss and damage” at COP20, you’ll recall that the last process we were watching regarded its future in the decision establishing the trajectory for “the protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome” that is to be completed at COP21 in Paris next year. As it turns out, “loss and damage” did make into the the text of the final decision now dubbed the “Lima call for climate action.” Unfortunately, and deeply disappointing for the most vulnerable people and countries, it is captured only in the preamble in the form of “welcoming the progress made in Lima, Peru, towards the implementation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts” (WIM).

As reported earlier, loss and damage appears in the “Elements for a draft negotiating text,” annexed to this Lima call for climate action, but without clear positive prospects.

Overall, we can state that the North-South divide so apparent within UNFCCC, continues to haunt the already emerging tragic future of those most vulnerable to, yet least responsible for the growing climate change impacts.