Seas the Day

Living along the bottom of the seabed are the hydrothermal vents. These vents exist in environments under immense pressure, with volatile temperatures, toxic minerals, and devoid of sunlight. As the tectonics plates spread and magma rises, hydrothermal vents form. They are created when seawater circulates through fissures in the ocean’s crust and becomes super-heated by magma. After the mineral-rich waters reemerge, the minerals solidify to to form vents. These vents are the homes of biodiverse ecosystems and valuable mineral deposits. Thus, it is a target for scientific research, the biotechnology industry, and mining companies.download

Even these deep sea communities are affected by climate change. Ocean temperatures are rising because the ocean acts as a buffer, sequestering excess heat in the atmosphere. The rising temperature stresses food chains that deep sea organisms rely upon, increases ocean acidification, and deoxygenates the ocean. Deep sea hydrothermal vents have unique properties that are especially relevant to mitigating climate change impacts.

Hydrothermal vents are a cornucopia of scientific potential in addressing climate change. These vents have evolved a plethora of uniquely evolved organisms that advance mitigation efforts in the climate change arena, aid in the clean-up of oils spills, and have potential applications to the medical field. For example, vent organisms have the ability to consume consume 90% of the released methane. In the atmosphere, methane is 25 times more potent than carbon dioxide. These qualities have been put to use in creating industrial carbon-scrubbers.

While hydrothermal vents pose a significant aid in mitigating climate change, it is under threat from exploration and mining. Deep seabed mining involves exploiting mineral deposits from the seabed, such as though primarily found at hydrothermal vent sites. This “deep sea gold rush” has driven many industries to begin see the deep sea as a source of profit. As a result, Companies from around the world have claimed almost all of the Atlantic ridge, spanning from below the equator up to the polar caps. Seabed mining requires highly disruptive and damaging processes that have the ability to irreversibly alter hydrothermal vent ecosystems.DSM-infographic

 Currently, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) has granted numerous exploration licenses for the ocean floor. The ISA requires “responsible” exploration of the seabed and applies new technologies to monitor the environmental impacts of mining. However, even if the best available science were applied to mining the deep seabed, it is virtually certain that deep sea mining “would be disproportionately high relative to terrestrial mining.” This is because a complete mining project would require the killing of invertebrate communities and create sediment plumes that would disturb thousands of miles of seafloor.

Thus, a more robust governing system is needed. Luckily, international organizations have stepped up in this arena. One such organization is the Deep Ocean Stewardship Initiative (DOSI). DOSI works to identify priority management needs for resources in the deep ocean, is developing a set of best practice standards for sustainable use and development, raise awareness, and compile scientific date. DOSI focuses upon aiding developing countries in generating policies that protect and manage deep ocean resources like hydrothermal vents. Organizations like DOSI provide feasible alternatives policies and management strategies for development. These alternatives are crucial when dealing with sensitive, valuable, and unique ecosystems.download (1)


COP23 Moves the Oceans from the Blue Zone to the Green Zone

Oceans Action Day. The one day in a climate change conference where the oceans become the center of discussion. Considering that 75% of the Earth’s surface is composed of oceans and that oceans absorb 25% of carbon dioxide emissions and 90% of heat associated with climate change, it was a wonder that the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties did not put much emphasis on oceans until present. But, now it has and it ended with a bang.

The Original Signatories: Aruba, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, France, Guinea, Bissau, Kiribati, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Senegal, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden.

The Original Signatories: Aruba, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, France, Guinea, Bissau, Kiribati, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Palau, Peru, Senegal, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden.

After a full day of side events on Resilience of Fisheries and Aquaculture, Blue Carbon, and Ecosystem-based Adaptation in Ocean and Coastal Zones, among other things, the Oceans Action Day at COP23 concluded with four more countries signing the Because The Ocean” Declaration. Today, the UK, Finland, Honduras, and Romania signed the declaration, committing themselves to work on three common objectives: A Special Report on the Ocean by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change, the U.N.Sustainable Development Goals Conference in Fiji in June 2017, and the elaboration of an ocean action plan under the UNFCCC. These countries, along with 22 others, also commit themselves to achieving Sustainable Development Goal 14: Conserve and Sustainably Use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources for Sustainable Development. This Declaration stems from all Parties’ obligation under the UNFCCC to “promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate.”

Five countries, in the face of increasingly devastating hurricanes, do not seem much in terms of number. However, they demonstrate that Parties under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement are aware that oceans are an integral part of addressing the effects of global climate change. It would seem that Fiji has delivered, at least through COP 23, on its promise to emphasize the importance of oceans. Hopefully, this new energy will translate into nations moving “further, faster together.”

 


Protestors as Nonparty Stakeholders

Today at COP23, the United States Climate Action Center event “America’s Pledge on Climate Change,” had speakers that included Walmart’s Senior Vice President of Sustainability, the Mayor of Pittsburgh, California Governor Jerry Brown, and New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg. They reassured the world that America’s Paris contribution would be met regardless of inaction at the federal level. Pittsburgh Mayor Bill Peduto showcased Pittsburgh’s work to turn around its recession by creating new opportunities for industry workers in a post-industrial city; he cited the BlueGreen Alliance, which was formed between the United Steelworkers and the Sierra Club on a mission that there should not be a choice between jobs and the environment.

Germany US Climate CampaignGovernor Jerry Brown was the star of the morning because of the immense leadership role he and the State of California have taken on climate. However, he was interrupted by groups of vocal protesters who stood up from the crowd with big banners shouting, “Keep it in the ground.” The protest was organized by the It Takes Roots delegation, a group of indigenous and marginalized peoples working on climate justice issues, who were speaking out against local industry pollutants in communities. This head-to-head confrontation immediately chilled the room, which was enjoying the congratulatory atmosphere of the event. Before long, someone attempted to initiate a pro-Governor Brown chant.

Making sure the world recognizes that American cities, states, and businesses are committed to tackling climate change is a worthwhile endeavor. This strengthens negotiations, especially when there has been emphasis placed at the COP on increasing ambition before 2020. However, the way the protesters were approached at this morning’s event was not in the true spirit of COP23. The ‘Pacific COP’ is a COP that prides itself on hearing Indigenous voices and nonparty stakeholders. This would have been an opportunity to showcase this effort. This also serves as a reminder that in the face of not only climate change but also a transition to a low-carbon economy, it is imperative that vulnerable communities are not left behind.


Shining a Light on Sustainable Fisheries Management

Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal

Back in October before COP23 began, I made the prediction that Fiji’s leadership at the COP would lead the focus towards ocean sustainability. Today, the Food and Agricultural Organization sponsored a series of side events in the Bonn Zone on ocean and coastal zone management. One side event, in particular, discussed the adaptation techniques of countries to climate change, particularly regarding fisheries and aquaculture. Natural fisheries are plummeting and sustainable ocean management is the best step forward. Senegal, in particular, has taken a hard stance on fisheries management with the strict appliance of its fisheries laws both domestically and to non-domestic actors within its jurisdiction. Senegal also saw an increase in marine protected areas with a total coverage of roughly 306,000 hectares while also an increase in their aquaculture programs to fight food scarcity.

Ernesto Peña-Lados the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in the European Commission emphasized that the forward movement for sustainable fisheries management was not new laws but better programs. Mr. Peña-Lados made the insightful statement that there are several countries with good laws and poor management while those with less stringent laws maintained good management practices. This, he pointed out, was due to how the laws were implemented, enforced, and understood in the countries that undertook them. The laws were the same but the application is different.8794127-13911266

This is a bright light for our future. Oceans are finally receiving the interest they deserve and concern beyond that of rising sea levels and warmer waters. Fisheries sustain such a large portion of our population and if the laws are good enough, there is nothing to stop us from implementing them better.


We are still in

wearestillinWith President Trump announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in June 2017, it’s no surprise that the administration refused to fund a country pavilion at COP 23. However, that didn’t stop the U.S. Climate Action Center from establishing its presence in Bonn and on social media (#wearestillin).

The Climate Action Center goes to show that, despite Trump’s announcement, the American people are still committed to taking action against climate change. For example, the crowd gathered at the Center booed on cue this morning when Former Mayor of New York Michael Bloomberg critically pointed out that the U.S. delegation to COP touts coal as an example of sustainability.

Given the current administration’s stance, non-state actors will play a pivotal role in tackling climate change in the United States. One of the biggest tools at their disposal is the fact that investors can no longer ignore the effects of climate change. According to Carroll Muffett, President and CEO for the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), climate change poses at least four risks to most investments, particularly those steeped in fossil fuel.

First, investors have to take physical impact risks into account. After all, even the fossil fuel industry isn’t impervious to the destruction caused by hurricanes or other inclement weather.

Second, investors must assess the carbon asset risk of certain investments. As the world recognizes the urgent need to reduce emissions (with or without the U.S.), massive quantities of oil and other fossil fuels will eventually be “unburnable,” and thus left in the ground. This could leave millions of dollars on the books of major fossil fuel companies. One need only look to the widespread bankruptcy of the coal industry this past decade to imagine a realistic example.

The third risk is transition risk. Companies that fail to adapt to the increasing use of clean energy run a substantial risk of being left behind in the market.

Fourth, companies can no longer ignore the risk of expensive climate change litigation–particularly since federal district courts are becoming more willing to recognize injury resulting from climate change. These courts don’t just recognize the claims of present victims: they are starting to acknowledge the claims of those exposed to the future risk of climate change, as well.

While most litigation names major oil companies as defendants, the United States government is another potential target for litigation. For example, an Oregon district court recently faced a landmark case where a group of children sued the American government, alleging its failure to take aggressive action against climate change violates their constitutional rights. Last Monday, two children from Philadelphia sued the government for the Trump administration’s inadequacies in addressing climate change.

When it comes to climate, it’s in no one’s interest to be left behind. As the COP 23 President Frank Bainimarama articulated at the COP 23 opening plenary, “we are all in the same canoe.” And despite what President Trump would have the world think, Americans are still in that canoe, trying to row along.


Financing Loss and Damage from Climate Change

Loss and Damage (L&D) encompasses both sudden and slow onset events and is an incredibly important issue to developing countries at COP23. Although the economic costs of slow onset events have yet to materialize, sudden onset events have proved deadly and costly for developing countries. It is estimated that hurricanes wipe out 1% of the Caribbean’s GDP each year. From Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017, the devastation has been so extensive on islands such as Barbuda and Dominica that many people cannot return or have lost their homes. This displacement adds to countries’ L&D from climate change.

Financing for L&D has overshadowed COP23’s discussions around the slow but steady work of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss & Damage (WIM) Executive Committee. According to Julie-Anne Richards with the Climate Justice Program, the WIM has a “clear mandate” to enhance Action and Support for loss and damage but as yet, the WIM has largely focused on financial instruments, like insurance, rather than finance mobilization. Richards posits that while insurance mechanisms for sudden onset events may assist developing countries in addressing L&D, insurance mechanisms simply cannot address slow onset events (SOEs).

Causes-and-Effects-of-DesertificationDavid Simmons of Willis Towers Watson risk management company explains that the insurance industry currently focuses on short-term risk – the only type of insurance that deals with long-term, inevitable risk is life insurance. However, for this reason, Simmons argues that insurance could be reconfigured to address SOEs. Julie-Anne Richards, on the other hand, argues that other instruments such as funds or levies are more appropriate ways to finance SOEs. An example of a fund working on an SOE is the Land Degradation Neutrality Fund, which pools capital from the public and private sector to finance projects that both prevent land degradation and support revitalization of degraded land. The UN Convention on Combating Desertification estimates that 12 million hectares of land are degraded each year, which is around a third of Germany’s land area. This adds to the bank of 2 billion hectares of already degraded land, which is around the size of the South American continent. Desertification, soil degradation, and the loss of ecosystem services that comes from degraded land are all considered slow onset L&D.

Julie-Anne Richards and the Climate Justice Program are currently working on a new form of finance for L&D – the “Carbon Levy Project.” A tax would be placed on the extraction of fossil fuels, which would then be distributed based on the level of development of the country. If the fossil fuel is extracted by a developing country, the money from the tax would be kept for use domestically. However, if the tax is collected from a developed country, a large percentage of the funds would be placed into a global L&D Fund managed by the WIM.

There is general agreement that L&D needs to be addressed and that this will take money. However, there is divergence on how to finance L&D. From insurance mechanisms and global funds to more innovative approaches, there is momentum behind this issue.


Don’t You Forget CGE

Before Nationally Determined Contributions and Capacity-Building, there was the Consultative Group of Experts. The Consultative Group of Experts was established by the 5th Conference of the Parties under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. The CGE is the key technical support element under the UNFCCC that assists developing country Parties in meeting their reporting obligations. It provides developing country Parties with technical advice and support to improve their national communications (NCs) and biennial update reports (BURs).

The CGE, being mandated by the UNFCCC in 1999, was supposed to terminate by 2009. After getting reconstituted once (2009 to 2012) and extended twice (2012 to 2013, 2014 to 2018), will reach the end of its mandate next year, when the Implementing Guideline for the Paris Agreement are intended to go into effect. Its Five-Year Work Programme from 2015-2018 focused on five key priorities: (1) Building the capacity of developing country Parties to facilitate implementation of Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) arrangements under the UNFCCC; (2) enhance the sustainability of the national communications of the national communications and biennial update report process; (3) enhance collaboration and cooperation with other global initiatives; (4) enhance communication and outreach; and (5) enhance availability of resources and optimal working arrangements for the operations of the CGE.

Thus far, the CGE has conducted successful regional workshops in Africa and in Asia, involving 52 non-Annex I parties in total. These workshops were organized in collaboration with the Global Support Program. The CGE has also held webinars in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee (AC), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These webinars covered a wide range of topics relevant to non-Annex I Parties’ NCs and BURs, such as the MRV Framework and climate change scenarios. The CGE also has a free e-learning course on national GHG inventory systems, mitigation assessment, and vulnerability and adaptation assessment. These projects have allowed non-Annex I Parties like Indonesia and Uruguay to submit their respective NCs and BURs to the UNFCCC Secretariat.

Yet, despite all of CGE’s good work, non-Annex I Parties—now developing country Parties under the Paris Agreement—still lack important capacities that will put them in par with the reporting capabilities of the Annex I parties. The CGE’s 2017 Survey revealed that this lower capability in non-Annex I parties is a result several factors, the most prominent of which are insufficient resources and ineffective institutional arrangements. Governments in developing countries have tight purse strings and often suffer from high turn-over rates. Moreover, they often do not have local institutions that manage the entire reporting process. Financial concerns aside, the CGE attempts to address ineffective institutional arrangements by encouraging and helping developing countries establish these institutions and train their people. For countries with very limited capacity, assistance for the CGE is invaluable.

After all the beneficial work of the CGE, does it have a role to play under the Paris Agreement? The answer to that is simple: We do not know. Once the CGE’s Five-Year Mandate ends, the CGE ceases to operate, unless it is renewed for another period.

The Paris Agreement builds on the UNFCCC and will eventually supersede it. There is no provision in the Paris Agreement that bestows a role on the CGE. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation included this issue on its provisional agenda, but ultimately decided to hold it in abeyance. Therefore, the Parties will not discuss the fate of the CGE in COP 23. Unless the Parties decide to include the role of the CGE in its agenda for SBI 48, the CGE will not be featured in the Paris Agreement’s Implementation Guidelines. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement asks Parties to submit nationally determined contributions. This means that Parties decide on what to submit and how to submit, subject to the basic requirements laid out in the Agreement. Whether the CGE evolves to serve the Parties’ needs under the Agreement depends on whether the Parties remember that the CGE exists to help them.

This does not mean that the CGE will have absolutely no hand in the Parties’ progress towards their goals. The CGE trained some of the developing country Parties. They created material that get passed on from one developing country Party administration to the next. However the CGE’s story ends, the Parties should know that the Paris Agreement would not have been as successful without it.


Al Gore’s Global Turning Point

OIMG_2260nce again, Former Vice President Al Gore made an impactful appearance at the COP. He forewarned the crowd that the first half of his presentation may be rather disheartening, but that the second half would bring to light the points we must truly focus on to move forward. Scientists and politicians alike have emphasized at COP23 that the world is facing some of the most frequent and devastating ‘natural’ disasters since the recordation of history. Gore stated that the UN has determined this time the “worst humanitarian crisis since 1945.”

While Gore remained upbeat and lighthearted with his inclusion of slides such as flooding in England having little effect on the operation of a local pub, or the presidential implications of a wildfire in Wyork-floodsashington having no effect on a game of golf: his speech was impassioned. He decried the subsidization of fossil fuels in comparison to renewable energy. And his voice nearly roared on the cost climate change has wrecked on the global economy. He stated that the amount is “unacceptable and cannot be maintained.”

But once his speech reached the dismal humanitarian crisis in Syria, he skillfully lightened the crowd’s mood with different countries’ initiatives to curb the negative impacts of climate change. He spoke of India’s commitment to introduce only electric cars in 2025; of Germany’s commitment to wind power; and the unilateral transition from coal and fossil fuels to renewable energy.

oregon wildfireGore emphasized that “we’re at a tipping point on a global basis.” The world can choose to move forward with clean initiatives, implementing the world’s commitment to the Paris Agreement; or we can sit in our big houses and tweet about it.


Draining the Swamp

Peatlands contain peat soil, which is wet, thick, and made of partially-decomposed plant materials. The International Peatland Society (IPS) cover approximately 3% of the Earth’s surface. Tropical peatlands in Asia, the Caribbean, Central and South America, and Southern Africa contain 10-12%of the total peatland resource. Peatlands are also extremely valuable ecosystems because they foster biodiversity, are a habitat for multiple species, provide quality drinking water, support local economies, and minimize flood risk.

Figure-1-Global-peatland-distribution-Riccardo-Pravettoni-UNEPGRID-Arendal.As the plants in the peatlands remain saturated with water and fail to decompose, carbon gets trapped within the plants. Due to this process, the soil acts as a carbon storage. When peatlands are drained, the plants complete the decomposition process and release copious amounts of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. Approximately 15% of peatlands have been drained, which contributes nearly 16 million tonnes of carbon dioxide per day. The remaining 85% of peatland contains approximately 550 gigatons of carbon. In 2016, the draining and burning of peatland accounted for 5% of anthropogenic carbon emissions.

peat_presentation300pxUsing international climate policies, it is important to conserve and rehabilitate peatlands globally. International cooperation towards more sustainable use of peatlands began at the 2011 Durban Forum which recognized “wetland drainage and restoration,” as a focus area. The Durban Forum later identified peatlands as “hotspots” of greenhouse gas emissions in 2013. Moving up to this past year, at COP 22, a new global initiative was launched in Marrakech to reduce GHGs by protecting peatlands. The Global Peatlands Initiative, led by the UN Environmental Program, aims to increase conservation, restoration, and sustainable management. The initiative aids national governments in meeting Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  (UNFCCC). From this structure, countries are more incentivized and have the ability to address peatland conservation and restoration in their mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development goals.

In addition, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has presented strategic action plans to ensure peatlands are used effectively and efficiently. The FAO facilitates action by guiding nations through their “strategic actions.” The FAO actions include assessment, monitoring, protecting, and resorting of peatlands. It also has broader goals of ensuring sustainable care of the peatlands such as engaging with local communities, generating effective economic governance, stimulating market-based mechanisms to support the peatlands, and information exchange on peatland care. The IUCN has also bolstered the FAO’s actions and further recommends peatlands be considered in forestry agreements relatingto climate change and a moratorium on peat exploitation.

downloadThe United Kingdom have both taken active steps towards conservation and rehabilitation of peatlands within their territory. Peatlands cover 12% of the UK’s total territory, but 80% are in poor condition due to drainage or extraction. In response to this issue, the Wildlife Trusts have taken on the mission of restoring the peatlands on a regional basis called the “Million Hectare Challenge.” As a part of this, more than ten regions in the UK have adopted individual long-term rehabilitation programs. Regional programs such as the UK’s Million Hectare Challenge and FAO’s international initiatives provide foundations for other counties.

Peatland restoration remains an ongoing issue, but it is has become a recognized method for nations to satisfy their sustainable goals and meet their obligations under the UNFCCC. Overall, peatlands represent an opportunity for significant reduction of greenhouse cases if managed correctly. Luckily, as the standards and methods are being developed, it is likely restoration will become increasingly efficient and effective.


Points of Divergence: Linkages and Differentiating Obligations under the Transparency Framework

The Transparency Framework under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement covers all components. At least, that is what the Agreement seems to say at first blush. However, as Parties begin to flesh out specific procedures, it is obvious that they disagree with the extent of the Transparency Framework’s coverage.

The Philippines, speaking for the G77 and China negotiating group, emphasized the importance of linking the procedures of the Framework with the provisions on financing. The Philippines went so far as to suggest that such a linkage should receive its own section. Article 9 of the Paris Agreement specifies the reporting requirements for developed country parties, which includes providing qualitative and quantitative information on financial resources to assist developing country Parties in their mitigation and adaptation efforts. The Philippines urged the Parties to consider incorporating the developed country Parties’ obligation under Article 9.1 into the procedures of the Framework.

Credit to the World Resources Institute

Credit to the World Resources Institute

Not surprisingly, the European Union opposed conflating the developed country Parties’ obligations under different articles, stating that Parties come into dangerous fields when they do so. In the European Union’s perspective, the language in Article 9 that refers to biennial reporting obligations is referenced only in party submissions. At most, the procedures in the Transparency Framework can include the Article 9 provisions as an inherent part of the information to be reported under Article 13.9. It does not warrant its own section with subsequent provisions.

Another point of contention is the difference between the reporting requirements for developed country Parties that are mandated to provide support to developing country Parties and the reporting obligations of developing country parties that choose to provide such support. Article 13.9 of the Paris Agreement obligates developed country Parties to provide information on financial, technology transfer, and capacity-building support they provide. It does not impose the same obligation on developing country Parties. Parties do not dispute this. However, they disagree on whether developing country Parties that choose to provide support to fellow developing country Parties should report the same types and quantity of information as their developed country counterparts.

Unlike the issue of linkages mentioned above, developing country Parties negotiating this issue do not all believe that they should be subject to different reporting requirements for the support they provide. Brazil, in particular, stated that developed and developing country Parties should be subject to the same reporting obligations. However, developing country Parties should be afforded some amount of flexibility. Though the Parties are far from agreeing to this proposal, this seems to be a reasonable way of interpreting the text of Article 13.9, especially given Article 13’s emphasis on flexibility.

Further from this proposal is the view of some developed country Parties that the developed and developing country Parties should be subject to the same reporting requirements without any reference to flexibility or common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities (CBDR-RC). Developing country Parties are under no obligation to provide support to others. Their decision to extend support is purely discretionary. Such discretion removes special considerations. While this interpretation is logically sound, it moves further away from the language of the Agreement and is unlikely to meet any significant support.

Overall, progress in establishing the procedures for the Article 13 Transparency Framework has been moving at a glacial pace. Yet, move it has. After much grandstanding in the last few days, it would seem that Parties have calmed enough to openly express agreement on some simple areas. Momentum and urgency will continuously build as Parties approach the end of this negotiating session.


A Caffeine Constrained World

At the 23rd Conference of Parties (COP 23), Denise Loga, Co-founder and Managing Director of the Sustainable Food Academy, brought to light the issue of food security in changing climate. She recognized that the earth cannot sustain humanity’s current food systems. Unsustainable patterns of human consumption paired with climate change lends kindling to an already robust fire.

Climate change is resulting in sea level rise, increased extreme weather variability, and fluctuating temperatures. These characteristics of climate change affect crop yields and survival, threaten the livelihoods of farmers, disrupt economic production and supply chains, and threaten food security within vulnerable countries. According to State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI), approximately 815 million people are undernourished. This number is likely to rise as climate change decreases food security, which puts pressure on government food security strategies.

For example, coffee is a particularly climate-sensitive plant and is already experiencing decreased yield due to climate change. In a joint study by the the International Center for Tropical Agriculture under the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security, coffeedownload production in Brazil is predicted to see a drop by 25% by 2050 and Indonesia production is likely to drop by 37% by 2050. The loss of the valuable coffee trade is likely to impact developing countries disproportionally as coffee as a key export of developing nations. These countries are also tend to have the highest malnourishment and poverty rates. Adding economic pressure to countries in this position would further exacerbate domestic issues. This is one example among many in which the loss of a food resource has drastic impacts upon humans.

Loss of food security is an natural consequence of a rapidly changing climate. Due to the disproportionate impact upon developing countries, measures should be taken to ensure food security within those countries most vulnerable. This requires countries to take action to mitigate the effects of climate change and provide relief and aid to those countries in need. Without action on a significant scale, impacts on food security will be felt globallymap_c3_a3_50map_c1_a1_50


Adaptation Communication Website: Broken Links

A key focal point of the Pabroken linkris Agreement (PA) that came out of COP21 was the issue of transparency. While the Kyoto Protocol (KP) created the mechanisms for mitigation and eventually adaptation, it wasn’t until the Paris Agreement that accountability was implemented so that Parties would reach their proposed contributions. For the first few years of the UNFCCC, adaptation was not a major focus. Instead, mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions retained the majority of the negotiator’s time. But now that adaptation has received it’s due from the Marrakesh Accords, Parties found it worthwhile in the Paris Agreement to emphasize transparency of adaptation communication. Article 7 of the PA  focuses on adaptation and paragraph 10 and 12 of that article discuss the creation of a public registry to house adaptation communications. One might think the formation of a website would be of little concern to countries, but the implications of this website run through numerous items that countries find of value.

afr-modernizing-meteorological-services-to-build-climate-resilience-across-africa-780x439Article 4 of the Paris Agreement calls for the creation of a nationally determined commitments (NDCs) registry where countries can deposit iterations of their documents. This language closely follows the language in the Art. 7 public registry mandate and several countries have taken up the torch of proposing the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)  combine the two registries. These countries claim that by combining the two registries they would be more economical and draw the distinction between mitigation. Within NDCs there is already a section labeled adaptation for most countries; this section states what countries intend to implement in to improve their resilience to climate change. These adaptation plans usually require some form of funding, which can be acquired through direct donations from countries and organizations or application through the Adaptation Fund or Green Climate Fund. Most developing countries want to draw that clear line between their adaptation and mitigation, especially because the focus in most developed countries is on mitigation.

The counterargument, though, is that adaptation communications deserve their own repository. NDCs compromise one complete document. There is currently an interim NDC registry to house the NDCs that have already been submitted by the 169 Parties that have ratified the Paris Agreement. This interim NDC registry is a placeholder for the permanent registry currently undergoing negotiations at COP23 under the SBI. This repository houses one document per country, and only one. Opponents to the one registry plan argue that adaptation communications involve numerous documents, would be updated frequently, and are of a more complex nature than an NDC. In sum, the website would lose transparency and undermine the mandate from the Paris Agreement. Concerns also arose from the unbalanced progression of the NDC registry in comparison as the facilitators of the discussion are already promulgating an informal note to sum the takeaways from negotiations. The Parties in the adaptation registry, on the other hand, refused to agree upon the promulgation of an informal note because of the complete lack of points of convergence. Developed countries and developing countries sticking to their sides with no intention of crossing the divide.
AOR_6There was, however, a light at the end of the tunnel. In a session today, Canada proposed a series of compiled ideas from both sides that would lead to further discussion. While this didn’t lead to an informal note, it created a more facilitative discussion that laid more points of divergence on the table that countries could address. The hope is that these ideas will lead to one idea that reflects the numerous ideas of the Parties, drawing a clear link between mitigation and adaptation and fixing the broken communications.


Money doesn’t grow on trees

moneytreeWalking into the COP, observer and party delegations alike are given a bar of chocolate. And while the candy bar does not give its holder a Golden Ticket, it does draw chocolate-lovers’ attention to an important message for the Trillion Tree Campaign. That campaign is spearheaded by Plant-for-the-Planet, an NGO launched in 2007 by a nine-year-old boy to plant a trillion trees on the world’s degraded forest land. Such efforts are priceless when it comes to climate change: trees are the only “machines” on earth that can store carbon. Plus, they provide invaluable resources (like cacao for the COP’s beloved chocolate).

The Paris Agreement highlights the importance of forests, as well. Article 5 of the Agreement calls for parties to take action in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and to conserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases. Programs like REDD+ aim to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Working under the UNFCCC, REDD+ provides technical and financial support for developing countries to reduce emissions and enhance the removal of greenhouse gases.

The biggest challenge for REDD+ is now moving to implementation. At the COP, parties are discussing–and will soon decide–what implementation should look like in terms of governance: should the UNFCCC create a new body or structure to govern REDD+ implementation, or do the existing structures suffice? Should parties continue to meet in voluntary meetings that support implementation of activities that contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector, or have these meetings already served their purpose?

One argument put forth by many developed countries–who are against future voluntary meetings–is the Green Climate Fund’s (GCF) recent decision to allocate $500 million to results-based financing for REDD+ activities. This decision, as the argument goes, shows that the financial landscape for REDD+ implementation is now in place, and that parties and entities have taken the Paris Agreement (particularly Article 5) quite seriously.

Under the program, the GCF pays at most $5 per ton of CO2eq of emissions reduced. The pilot program applies to projects showing results between 2013-2018, and thus is still open for developing countries.

The decision is a result of multilateral negotiations, which were not–and are never–perfect or easy. But the decision took into account a large spectrum of national interests. Many countries do not want to compromise this decision by reaching alternative conclusions in future voluntary meetings for REDD+.

With a scorecard indicating the highest standard for REDD+ activities, developing countries now have a gold standard for the program that sets the bar high for financing. For the sake of REDD+ and the Paris Agreement, it is important that results-based financing has become a part of GCF’s portfolio: this provides GCF with the opportunity to test the waters of this approach while also inspiring a race to the top in implementing REDD+.


Where Parties Agree: Governance as an Overarching Issue in the Global Stock Take

The Global Stock Take is a collective assessment of the Parties’ progress in capping carbon emissions to 1.5°C. Article 14 provides that the Global Stock Take should take place first in 2023 and then every five years after that. However, the Global Stock Take cannot happen if there are no modalities, procedures, or guidelines (MPGs) that dictate how it works. The MPGs are what Parties have set themselves to establish by COP24. So far, they have only agreed on one thing: that governance is an overarching issue in the GST.

IPCC Climate Change Synthesis Report 2014Governance in the context of the GST pertains to managing the information collected from the Parties. Such information range from the Green House Gas Inventories to information provided for the reporting requirements under the Transparency Framework. Recently, the Subsidiary Body for Science and Technological Advice (SBSTA) recommended that Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) should include the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) reports and assessments among the information to be considered in the GST. The addition of information from constitutive bodies enhances the GST, but also complicates potential modalities: Who bears the burden of evaluating this information? To make matters even more complicated, Parties are considering splitting the GST process into two phases: the technical phase and the political phase. Should there be two separate governing bodies for each phase?

Some parties are of the view that the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMA) should evaluate the information, regardless of the phase in which the information was submitted. However, the CMA only meets once a year. The GST needs a governing body that can meet whenever there is a requirement to meet. Other parties are of the view that the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and SBSTA should evaluate the information submitted in the technical phase of the GST. However, other constitutive bodies are already reviewing information on mitigation, adaptation, and their respective modes of implementation. Asking SBI/SBSTA to then review the same information for GST seems redundant.

Carlos Fuller (Belize), Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Science and Technological Advice

Carlos Fuller (Belize), Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Science and Technological Advice

Tomasz Chruszczow (Poland), Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation

Tomasz Chruszczow (Poland), Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation

Discussions over technical matters are already fraught with underlying tension. This is likely because the GST touches on the Principle of Equity. The GST will reveal who is doing what and by how much, which means that Parties will know whether they are all shouldering their “fair share” of advancing the collective goal. As Parties begin considering equity and its impacts on the GST, the proposals on who should govern the GST process may become contentious.


Blue Carbon: A Solution

Coastal ecosystems such as tidal salt marshes, seagrass meadows, and mangrove forests, are “blue carbon ecosystems” because they act as carbon sinks. Blue ecosystems have the ability to sequester copious amountsmangrove-forest-1 of carbon. However, if they are destroyed, they increase GHG emissions. Scientists estimate approximately 1.02 billion tons of carbon dioxide is emitted per year by degraded coastal ecosystems. In addition, these ecosystems support coastal water quality, fisheries, provide recreational activities, support the tourism economy, and protect against extreme weather events.

Under the Paris Agreement countries must submit Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and National Determined Contributions (NDCs). In these, parties include information on the scope and impact of their mitigation and adaptation programs. Blue carbon 5054ee8189f79.imageecosystems are included in 28 countries’ NDCs for mitigation and in 59 countries’ adaptation strategies. While these numbers are growing, there is enormous potential benefit to incorporating blue ecosystems into NDCs. The blue carbon ecosystems are a significant part of countries’ NDCs as they act as a carbon sink, contribute to coastline protection, and food security. If coastal wetlands loss was halted by 50%, the equivalent would offset the emissions of Spain.

There are two main ways to address effective management of blue ecosystems to achieve this goal. The first is avoiding coastal wetland conversion by creating protected areas. Countries can also restore coastal wetlands. In order to facilitate these activities, multiple blue carbon institutions have been founded. The Blue Carbon Initiative works to restore and pr107397_webomote sustainable use of coastal and marine blue ecosystems by partnering governments, research institutions, NGOs, and local communities. The International Partnership for Blue Carbon works at building awareness, exchanging knowledge, and accelerating practical action. In addition the Nature Conservancy’s Blue Carbon program is also invested in this issue. The Nature Conservancy has been building a scientific foundation for conservation, identifying demonstration sites where wetlands can be conserved, and leveraging policy and financial mechanisms to ensure action.

Overall, blue carbon presents an area of great potential impacts upon GHG emissions. While the UNFCCC does not yet recognize “blue carbon,” it has been increasingly used in countries’ mitigation and adaptation strategies. With increased action being taken by international organizations, it is likely that blue carbon will play a significant role in lowering carbon emissions in the future.