Bipolar on Climate Change at COP24

Posted on December 17, 2018 by christashute

Choose one word to describe the results of COP24 and the state of climate change today. Bipolar … dramatically bipolar. We find ourselves torn between despair and hope, between optimism and realism, between real progress and a Paris rulebook with no rules. Though Polish officials declared success, really the Paris rulebook that came from COP24 is an agreement to disagree and try again later.

The good news is that after weeks of marathon, overnight negotiating sessions the parties came to a 133 page agreement reflecting years of work since the Paris Agreement. What the agreement does do is affirm the Paris Agreement and allow parties to move forward. What it purports to do, but really does not do, is establish the framework, the rulebook as it is called. Yes, there is progress in the agreement, but to call it the rulebook it was supposed to be – that just stretches too far.

The World Resources Institute identified four key elements needed for a Paris Agreement rulebook: 1) common timeframes; 2) reporting and accounting methodologies; 3) transitioning to the new transparency framework; and 4) effective peer review processes. On common timeframes the agreement states that they agree there should be common time frames, they should discuss it in June 2019, and then approved by the COP with even a reference to what year it should be approved by deleted from the final text. The development of a registry that would hold all the NDCs is critical to transparency and access by the public which helps hold Parties accountable. Here again the agreement agrees to have the UNFCCC work on a prototype, but it is subject to confirmation at the COP in November 2019 – another indicator that there were a couple of issues, particularly regarding a search function, that the parties could not agree on. Parties could not agree on the features each NDC should have and pushed consideration of further guidance out until 2024. The Parties did agree (per the Paris Agreement) that they would submit the NDCs based on common information in Annex I and be held accountable via common information in Annex II. However, they could not agree on how “target” should be defined and so the final text simply states – “general description of the target.” Still these Annex’s do call for the information required to at least have a skeleton framework for transparency.

The real big failure at COP24 was a complete breakdown on Article 6. All of the work on cooperative approaches and Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes, (see my earlier blog posts here and here) the work that enables the investment by developed countries into developing countries that is needed to accelerate progress, all of these sections were tabled until next year. They will use the progress in negotiations as a starting point, but without some agreement we cannot begin to create global markets that investors will trust enough to invest in.

Fundamentally, they agreed – thus moving the Paris Agreement forward – to disagree – thus hampering acceleration and progress. As the Assistant Secretary General Elliot Harris quoted Vermont’s Bill McKibben: “If we don’t win very quickly in climate change, then we will never win. … Winning slowly is the same as losing.”

Despair and Hope: Throughout the week there was an endless stream of somber information regarding the reality we are facing. The new UN Emissions Gap Report indicates the gap between what is being done and what is needed has grown significantly while countries fail to perform to their commitments. From estimates that climate change will drive 140 million people to move within a little over 50 years as projected in the World Bank Group Report to entire countries and cultures being obliterated in the Marshall Islands. From the Unites States government report of a 10% impact on the economy double that of the recent great recession that will exacerbate environmental, social and economic inequalities – to the sad reality that we most likely cannot save our coral reefs and arctic ice is disintegrating at a faster pace that scientists had ever predicted. AND YET, we must have hope to move forward – we cannot be crippled by despair. Climate change action is also predicted to yield direct economic gains of $26 trillion according to the New Climate Economy Report.

Frankly that is the world we face now. One where we must simultaneously face the extreme consequences of our apparent failure while maintaining hope that if EVERY ONE OF US does our part we might, just might, avoid catastrophic failure.

“Once you choose hope, anything is possible.” Everyday we will face and experience despair, and every day we must be bipolar and choose hope.

“This is not a choice between one word or another.”

Posted on December 8, 2018 by amandac

Today was the last day of the first week of COP24. The SBSTA plenary meeting began late, as expected. Many Parties are still attempting to find common ground on texts, which has delayed start times for plenaries.

During the SBSTA plenary, many Parties spoke about the need to accept the IPCC 1.5°C Report and make sure that the world does not see warming to 3°C. The report is part of SBSTA’s agenda item #6 on research and systematic observation. To the dismay of many countries in the room, paragraph 11 only “noted” the IPCC report. Thus the Maldives, on behalf of AOSIS, proposed to “welcome” it instead. Parties discussed this language for more than an hour, because “note” connotes a weaker way of accepting this report.

This back and forth debate is what climate negotiators do: sit in meetings and small rooms all over the world to discuss the specific language that makes the international law of climate change.

Tonight, one negotiator spoke out about considering the lives of everyone. Rueanna La Toya Tonia Haynes, of Saint Kitts and Nevis, made a brilliant intervention about the IPCC and the acceptance of the report. Part of her speech is below:

“This is not a choice between one word or another. This is us, as the UNFCCC, being in a position to welcome a report that we requested, that we invited the IPCC to prepare…If there is anything ludicrous about the discussion that is taking place, it is that we, in this body, are not in a position to welcome this report.”

After her intervention, she received a well-deserved round of applause. We, as lawyers, are often so caught up in language that we forget what brought us together in the first place. Sometimes we need an upfront and real speech to remind us of the important things. The UNFCCC is the body to help everyone confront and slow down the pace of climate change. To argue about this language in a report that essentially says we are running out of time is ludicrous. The UNFCCC should move forward and accept the report. After all, the UNFCCC did request it.

Ms. Haynes was steadfast and showed fearlessness while addressing her colleagues. Her tenacity and courage is what I hope others would show. I, too, am giving her a big round of applause. Well said, Ms. Haynes.

You can view the entire plenary here.

Adapting the Adaptation Fund under the Paris Agreement

Posted on November 28, 2018 by achristian

The future of the Adaptation Fund (AF) is among the dicey climate finance issues to watch as Parties seek to complete negotiations on the Paris Agreement Rulebook over the upcoming 2 weeks. While it is small, with total cumulative receipts of only $737 million, the AF is highly regarded and widely celebrated for the “relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of its work” and its “contribut[ion] to transformational change.”

The AF was created under the Kyoto Protocol, and thus subject to the CMP, not the COP. The requisite decision to have it serve the Paris Agreement came in 2017 at CMP13.

On the eve of the Katowice climate change conference, concerns remain about whether, in its new life, the AF will retain the unique and innovative features that have made it so vitally important to developing countries. In particular, developing countries want to preserve:

Direct access (not having to access funds through multilateral institutions)
Grants-based funding
Full cost accounting of country-driven projects/programmes, and
A developing country majority on the AF board.

Negotiators have been grappling with two divisive issues that will impact these characteristics: 1) the AF board composition, and 2) how the Fund will be resourced.

The 16-member AF board currently includes 2 representatives from the 5 UN regional groups, 1 each from the small island developing states (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and 2 each from the UNFCCC’s Annex I Parties and non-Annex-I Parties.

A proposal to eliminate the differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties and expand donor country representation on the board emerged during APA 1-6 in Bangkok in September. Developing country Parties want the make-up to remain unchanged and are pushing back hard. They fear undue donor country influence not only on funding decisions, but also on multiple other important aspects of governance and operations.

As for resources, a percentage of proceeds from the marketable emission reduction credits of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) initially funded the AF. With CDM proceeds drying up in recent years, the Fund has had to seek voluntary contributions – not a sustainable mode. Currently, the Fund has only ½ of the resources needed to meet the amount requested in the most recent round.

While, across the board, Parties support establishing new innovative mechanisms to serve as revenue sources, most developing countries also want to continue the original model and link AF resourcing to the Article 6 international crediting mechanism(s) that will emerge from negotiations. Developed country Parties, don’t want to give up any value of the credits they secure from funding mitigation projects in other countries, and some have wondered why the Adaptation Fund should be continued at all, given that the Green Climate Fund provides adaptation financing. That perspective has little traction, and we are likely to see some rich engagement about resourcing.

Two just-released publications will certainly impact any climate finance negotiations: 1) the 2018 Biennial Assessment (BA) and Overview of Climate Finance Flows * (from the Standing Committee on Finance), and 2) the 2018 Emissions Gap Report of the UN Environment Program (Executive Summary is here).

According to the BA, climate finance flows to non-Annex I Parties reached a new high of $74.5 billion in 2016, still far short of the $100 billion per year by 2020 developed countries committed to provide and mobilize. Characteristically, too, adaptation funding remained less than 40% of that for mitigation in public climate finance flows for 2015-2016, with adaptation funding a rarity in private finance.

The emissions gap is the difference between the GHG emission levels needed to keep global temperature rise below 2°C or 1.5°C in 2100 (compared to pre-industrial levels) and the global GHG emission level the NDCs are expected to achieve if fully implemented by 2020.

Two of the many key messages from the Emissions Gap Report giving the climate community pause are that:

The “gap has increased significantly in comparison with previous estimates” and
“Global greenhouse gas emissions show no signs of peaking.”

Given the prospects ahead, poorer countries are expected to be unwavering on a strong funding foothold for the Adaptation Fund and a path to grow it.

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Photo credits: 1) https://www.adaptation-fund.org/; 2) Leolintang/iStock by Getty Images; 3) http://www.famu.edu/index.cfm?PreMed&ADVISORYBOARD; 4) https://www.customtermpapers.org/free-term-papers/term-paper-emissions-trading/; 5) https://indicaonline.com/blog/ways-marijuana-dispensaries-save-money/; 6) https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018. Featured image: https://grist.org/climate-change/2011-08-25-neoliberalism-and-climate-change-adaptation/

(*The 2018 BA is a complex compilation that covers climate finance flows in 2015 and 2016, examines trends from 2011-2014, explores gains in measurement, reporting and verification of these flows, and considers the implications for global goals and efforts.)

A stumbling block at COP 23 – Finance

Posted on November 18, 2017 by yasin

The cost of mitigating climate change is estimated at 200-350 billion Euros (236-413 Billion USD) per year by 2030. It is a manageable sum in terms of a global burden, only 1% of global GDP. In terms of who pays and how much to pay, however, it becomes a disputed figure. For example, developed countries agreed in 2010 to “mobilize” 100 billion USD annually by the year 2020 in paragraph 98 of the COP16 decision 1/CP.16. Unresolved issues regarding this commitment remain, even in 2017.

Philosophically, this divide has on one side the developed countries as having the ability and the responsibility to pay. Developed countries use more energy than under developed countries. On the other side, the underdeveloped countries need financing and the know-how to ensure that future development in their countries is environmentally friendly and sustainable.

At COP23, this issue came to the forefront where it stopped the APA closing plenary dead in its tracks on Wednesday afternoon, the day the APA was scheduled to close. Negotiations lasted through the night. The underdeveloped countries, led by the G77, wanted developed countries to make concrete commitments through the biennial communication requirements as required by Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement. The G77 also referred to Paris Agreement Articles 13 (transparency) and 15 (compliance) to make this requirement enforceable.

In response the developed countries argued that Article 9.5 is a procedural matter and that the G77 countries want to discuss the dollar commitments. They argued that this is beyond the scope of the Paris Agreement.

The result was to urge both sides to act on their commitments and to refer this matter to a High Ministerial Dialogue for further discussion. In other words, onwards to 2018.

U.S. INDC Pledge Just Wishful Thinking Without CPP?

Posted on March 11, 2016 by achristian

Last year, when the U.S. made its INDC pledge to reduce net GHG emissions 26-28% below 2005 by 2025, it was built on Obama’s 2013 Climate Action Plan with the proposed Clean Power Plan (CPP) among its key elements. At the time, a range of climate policy observers, including Climate Action Tracker, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Climate Advisors, and the World Resources Institute, noted that additional policies would be needed to meet this pledge.

New information and developments compel another look at the gap:

Congress extended the 30% Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for solar and $0.23/kWh Production Tax Credit (PTC) for wind.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released its 2015 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO), and the U.S. submitted its second UNFCCC Biennial Report.
As we blogged in February, the Supreme Court issued a stay on the CPP’s implementation.

The Rhodium Group released a report in January – Taking Stock: Progress Toward Meeting U.S. Climate Goals – that accounts for the first two when analyzing if and how the U.S. can achieve its pledge. Its analysis considers various uncertainties (different paths for future economic growth, potential shifts in transportation demand, and different rates at which the cost of renewable energy and battery storage technology will decline) and integrates these with a set of climate and energy policies, including:

The Clean Power Plan
Pending methane (CH₄) emissions standards for new oil and gas sources
Pending heavy-duty vehicle (HDV) efficiency standards revisions
Pending hydroflourocarbon (HFC) phasedown efforts under the Montreal Protocol

The report also considered the sizeable uncertainty in sequestration pathways for LULUCF, as identified in the U.S.’s second Biennial Report. (The use of the “net” approach in GHG accounting indicates the inclusion of land use, land use changes, and forestry (LULUCF) as carbon sinks to offset emissions.)

The Rhodium Group concluded that emissions reductions of 10%-23% would be expected by 2025, when incorporating the Biennial Report’s wide range of uncertainty on LULUCF sequestration potential, the full range of uncertainties for economic and technology outcomes, and uncertainties in CH_4, HFCs, and HDVs reductions. To move beyond the most optimistic prediction will require building on existing policy frameworks, targeting industrial CO₂ emissions, creating additional CH₄ reduction pathways, and “enhancing the forest sink,” all within the next 5-10 years.

But, what do things look like without the CPP? While we can’t understand all the permutations, two CPP analyses (both assuming optimal implementation) help us get a glimpse. EPA, in its August 2015 Regulatory Impacts Analysis, estimates that the CPP would provide a 9-10% reduction in power sector CO₂ emissions below the 2005 level by 2025 as compared to its base case (Table 3-6). Another Rhodium Group report, co-authored with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Assessing the Final Clean Power Plan, projects a 17-18% reduction compared to its base case. A number of factors (e.g., different modeling frameworks and historical data) made EPA’s base case significantly more optimistic. Still, both calculated total power sector change from 2005 of 28-29% by 2025. Notably, these figures were derived before the recent passage of the solar and wind tax credits.Extrapolating using this range of figures, EIA historical date, and the Biennial Report for other sector reductions, the CPP would likely have a roughly 4-11% impact on overall net emissions in 2025. (There are many nuances in doing such a calculation; but, as calibration, the Rhodium Group’s Taking Stock report projects a combined 15% reduction with the CPP and the ITC/PTC.)

At a 4%-11% benefit, the CPP would provide somewhere between 15% and 40% of the reductions needed to meet the INDC pledge. Without it, the U.S.’s intention likely moves beyond optimism to just wishful thinking.

Civil Society keeps the heat on for climate ambition

Posted on December 8, 2015 by achristian

As countries seek to arrive at a mutually acceptable text for the Paris Outcome this week, there is a lot of focus on ambition to reduce emissions, and on financial support to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change. In fact, these are among the key high-level political issues that must be resolved. It is hoped that tomorrow’s new draft text from minsters will bring some clarity on these issues.

Civil society has been working hard to help move the needle in favor of stronger ambition and greater equity through action leading up to and at this COP.

As we reported earlier (here and here), among its contributions to the conversation is a recent report by a powerhouse group of NGOs in climate change work – Fair Shares: A Civil Society Equity Review of INDCs. INDCs are countries’ intended nationally determined contributions, statements of planned actions for mitigation (and, in some cases, adaptation) covering the next 10 or 15 years, that they voluntarily submitted prior to COP21, in keeping with COP Decision 1/CP.19 in 2013 and 1/CP.20 in 2014. (See our last week’s and previous posts related to INDCs)

With negotiations on “level of ambition” in a seemingly precarious state, we thought it helpful to reiterate the stark reality of the shortcoming of the INDCs. These pledges represent wide-ranging levels of commitment that together, according to UNEP and others, won’t achieve the emissions reductions essential for a habitable planet. There is, in fact, a deeply alarming gap. The Fair Shares report is not alone in stating that, “even if all countries meet their INDC commitments, the world is likely to warm by a devastating 3°C or more.”

The report’s assessment is based on the maximum carbon we can have in the atmosphere to provide the world “a minimal chance of keeping warming below 1.5°C and a 66% chance of keeping it below 2°C.” Its INDC analysis utilizes 2 parameters: 1) historical responsibility (based on the cumulative emissions of a country); and 2) capacity (based on national income “over what is needed to provide basic living standards”) – with these given equal weight in the calculation. The methodology appropriately accounts for “a breadth of perspectives” related to income and time benchmark complexities.

Key findings for the 10 countries covered in the report are that Russia is not contributing at all to its fair share, and that Japan, the U.S., and the EU are all falling short at levels of just 10%, 20%, and slightly more than 20% of their fair shares, respectively. Conversely, the mitigation pledges of most developing countries “exceed or broadly meet their fair share,” even though the pledges of many of those are conditional.

Enter climate finance! Notably, the “fair shares” of many of the wealthy countries are beyond what they can achieve domestically. To ‘balance the books,’ so to speak, developed countries could ramp up actions to meet their own fair share, and make clear commitments to aid developing countries in achieving theirs.

It will take scaled-up and fair cooperation among countries to address the inequitable distribution across countries’ emission reduction pledges and close the emissions reduction gap. It is uncertain if COP21 Parties will achieve this.

Thankfully, civil society is keeping the pressure on.

Are State INDC Mitigation Pledges Strong Enough?

Posted on December 7, 2015 by catie

Today at COP21, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) hosted a joint presentation on the 2015 UNEP Emissions Gap Report. This sixth Emissions Gap Report was published in November 2015. The report assesses country mitigation commitments based off their submitted INDCs. Then it compares the resulting emission levels for 2030 with what scientific studies require in order for the world to be on track to stay within the maximum global temperature increase goal of 2°C. Many of the report’s authors attended the presentation and the official presenters of the report included:

Achim Steiner, UNEP Executive Director and Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations;
Halldor Thorgeirsson, UNFCCC Director for Strategy; and
Jacqueline McGlade, Chief Scientist of UNEP;

Mr. Steiner explained that based on current INDCs, GHG emissions would decrease 25% by 2030. While this reduction shows progress, it is still not sufficient to achieve the goal of limiting the global temperature increase to 2°C by 2100. As the INDCs stand today, accounting for both conditional and unconditional mitigation pledges, the COP is 50% of the way to achieving a GHG reduction of 42 GtCO2e, the amount needed to stay within 2°C. The fact that current INDCs are halfway to their reduction goals indicates that significant further mitigation efforts are required. Mr. Steiner stressed that the Parties have not run out of time to reach their goal, but the longer they wait the less cost-effective and more difficult it becomes to successfully achieve these mitigation goals. Mitigation action over the next four years, or during the pre-2020 timeframe, is material to staying within the 2°C threshold. With each passing year, the risk of inequity grows exponentially between developed countries and countries most vulnerable to climate change; this inequity is unacceptable because many vulnerable State Parties are already paying a higher price as they suffer more and more extreme weather events caused by climate change.

The UNFCCC Director of Strategy, Mr. Thorgeirsson, furthered the discussion on INDCs with three interesting, and mostly optimistic, reflections. First, he explained that the 2°C and 1.5°C temperature goals, which are often called long-term goals, are not necessarily at odds with one another. According to Mr. Thorgeirsson, the 2°C limit would serve as “a guardrail or defense line,” meaning that at bare minimum Parties’ mitigation efforts would limit the global temperature increase to 2°C, but this guardrail would be supplemented with the aspirational goal of limiting the temperature increase to 1.5°C. Ultimately, Mr. Thorgersson believes the two temperature goals should converge to create a joint narrative.

In his second reflective thought, Mr. Thorgeirsson encouraged the audience to not be disheartened by the submitted INDCs because the mitigation commitments in these documents reflect current realities based on current technologies and political situations. Therefore as technologies and political situations evolve so will mitigation pledges.

Lastly, Mr. Thorgersoon declared that answering the question of whether the Parties are on the right track in their mitigation efforts is an impossible question to address. States across the globe are in the process of transitioning from a fossil-fuel economy to economies based on different assumptions. These new types of economies contain many unknown factors that make it difficult to definitively know the effect of the Party’s mitigation pledges.

Ms. Jacqueline McGlade, Chief Scientist for UNEP, was the final presenter of the 2015 UNEP Emissions Gap Report. In her presentation, Ms. McGlade explained that the UNEP report has been released in various stages in order to capture and present more accurate carbon emissions data as more Parties submit their INDCs to the UNFCCC. This drafting difficulty is an on-going dilemma. Ms. McGlade explained that over 40 INDCs have been submitted since the latest stage of the UNEP report was released. She then assured the crowd that after COP21 concluded she and her team would resume updating their study to reflect the new mitigation pledges.

Ms. McGlade concluded the presentation with a final call to action, explaining that under the current INDC mitigation pledges there is a 66% chance of the global temperature increasing 3-4°C by 2100. A temperature increase of 3-4°C would result in catastrophic effects, but with focus and action the 1.5-2°C goals can still be reached. The COP21 process has revealed an unprecedented level of engagement in addressing climate change as an international issue. This engagement is a promising indicator that the Parties’ are committed to successfully fulfilling their long-term mitigation goal of limiting the temperature increase to 1.5-2°C.

Past as Prologue? Joint Implementation and the Future for Flexibility Mechanisms

Posted on October 3, 2015 by mjames

A recent report by the Stockholm Environmental Institute (SEI) raises some serious questions about the integrity of the Joint Implementation (JI) program, one of the Kyoto Protocol’s main flexibility mechanisms. Since flexibility mechanisms are a core part of Geneva Negotiating Text, this report raises the question of how the UNFCCC will learn from its past mistakes as it enters into the new, post-2020 agreement.

JI is one of three flexibility mechanisms created under the Kyoto Protocol (KP) to assist Annex I Parties in meeting their emission reduction targets. JI allows Annex I countries to meet their targets by purchasing emission reduction units (ERUs) countries. The JI program design is a creature of the changing political landscape of Europe in the early 1990s. Most JI projects transferred ERUs from Economies in Transition (EIT) countries to other Annex 1 countries in Europe. EITs were the Russian Federation and the former Soviet bloc countries emerging from communism in the early 1990s.

The KP built special exemptions into the JI program to help EITs in their transition to a market-based economic system. Decades of central planning left the EITs with inefficient and outdated manufacturing and energy production facilities that could not compete in the EU marketplace. To give the EITs an advantage, the KP let them set their emission baselines at or before 1990 levels. Since their pre-1990 emissions were significantly higher than their post-1990 emissions, the EITs immediately had a surplus of ERUs to sell into the JI market. As of March 2015, almost 872 million ERUs have been transferred through the JI program with four countries – Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and Germany – accounting for 94% of ERUs issued.

The SEI report indicates “significant environmental integrity concerns” for 80% of the ERUs from Ukraine and Russia. What are these concerns? The main concern is the faulty determination of a JI project’s “newness” of emission reductions. One of JI’s key requirements is additionality, which means that the emissions reduction would not have occurred without the project. The SEI report revealed that additionality claims were not plausible for 43% of the projects and 73% of the ERUs. For example, seventy-eight projects received credits for preventing the spontaneous combustion of coal waste piles, projects that cannot plausibly produce additional emissions reductions. The report estimates that unqualified JI projects resulted in an extra 600 million t CO₂e of global GHG emissions from 2008-12, the first commitment period of the Protocol. How did this happen? One main reason given was that host countries established their own lenient rules, without international oversight, for approving projects and ERUs.

This happened because KP rules allow JI projects to be approved under two very different tracks. Track 1 allows host countries approve and issue ERUs and determine if the reductions meet the additionality requirement. Track 2 gives the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee, an UNFCCC body, the power to review projects and requests for ERU issuance and to certify JI auditors. 97% of the ERUs have been issued under Track 1, demonstrating the JI program design incentivizes countries to self-approve non-additional reductions.

Flexibility mechanisms are going to be a crucial element in getting Parties to agree to a post-2020 agreement in Paris, but they need to change how they measure and verify reductions. The SEI report lists a number of options to improve reporting and measurement practices including improving the program’s transparency by making all documentation publicly available, implementing an internationally accepted verification methodology, and banning the practice of retroactively crediting projects. These recommendations need to be implemented in the post-2020 agreement. The past doesn’t need to be the prologue for Paris and beyond.

Looming deadlines – for INDCs and the Earth

Posted on September 29, 2015 by tbach

With the October 1 deadline for all State Parties’ Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) looming, the UNFCCC submission portal for them has been heating up. As of this writing, 82 State Parties have filed.

Switzerland, the EU, Norway, Mexico, and the United States were the first five in the door, submitting before the first quarter 2015 deadline for developed countries. By the close of June, the world’s highest emitter, China, filed its 18-page INDC complete with mitigation, adaptation, and finance goals as well as detailed description of the national and subnational initiatives to reach them. It joined 10 other countries who submitted INDCs during the second quarter of 2015. This group included Russia and Australia. Since then, 66 more countries who are UNFCCC State Parties have submitted INDCs, representing a wide variety of other developing and developed countries on every continent. Now that Brazil and Indonesia have filed their INDCs, all but one of the top emitting countries – whether measured from 1850 or 1990 – have now publicly pledged actions at home and abroad to keep global warming to within the 2C limit announced at COP16 in Cancun, Mexico. India is the lone hold out.

But have they announced contributions that will keep us below 2C? All along, Climate Action Tracker has assessed the pledges in terms of what they do and don’t achieve in terms of GHG emissions mitigation and the global goal. CAT rates each country in terms of sufficiency of pledges on a scale from “inadequate” to “role model.” Thus far, no developed countries have earned the top title. Only a handful have earned the white ribbon label of “medium,” along with specific direction on how to increase the ambition of their pledges. Totaling INDCs filed by June 30, CAT concludes that if countries should do what they pledge, global warming would rise to 2.9 – 3.1C by 2100. While this is an improvement over the business-as-usual (BAU) prediction of 4.1 – 4.8C and projections made on climate change mitigation policies currently in place of 3.6 – 4.2C, it still exceeds 2C and the 1.5C preferred by low lying island states threatened now by rising sea levels.

Yesterday’s New York Times echoed this theme under the headline “Limited Progress Seen Even as More Nations Step Up on Climate Change.” It reports that Climate Interactive has released a scoreboard analyzing pledges made through September 29th. The result? Very similar to CAT’s thermometer reading above: 3.5C or half way between the pledges and the current policy trends medians. (Full disclosure: we’re darned proud and not at all unduly influenced to learn that Climate Interactive, which operates out of MIT, was founded by members of Norwich, Vermont-based Donella Meadows Institute.) U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is quoted as saying on Sunday “that Paris must be the floor, not the ceiling, for collective ambition.” Gavin A. Schmidt of NASA put it more colloquially. Looking back on the last 40 years of environmental cleanup, he opined that “by the time people get 10, 15 years of actually trying to do something, that’s going to lead to greater expertise, better technology, more experience, people will then say, ‘Oh, you know what? We can commit to do more.’”

Oh, and the NYT closed with India’s environment minister, Prakash Javadekar, promising its INDC on Oct. 1 — the day before the country’s national celebration of Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday.