Koronivia Joint Work Programme News Feed

One week after the draft conclusions for the the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA) were submitted, and the subsidiary bodies concluded their independent negotiations, representatives from Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, and France addressed the media about the work done and conclusions made at the completion of KJWA’s work at COP24.

The panel had a lukewarm response to the outcome of the first “Road Map” workshop since the 4/CP.23 mandate.  The representative from Rwanda was very disappointed about the lack of “welcome” for the IPCC 1.5 Report, which he said is a joke to African countries in particular, who are living the harsh realities of climate change now.  Mr. Bassey of Nigeria emphasized the role of small scale farmers moving forward in response to our changing climate.  Agriculture that works with local knowledge, without the extensive chemical inputs commonly associated with industrial agriculture – farming that “can be done on the streets” – is how we need to move forward with farming our fields and feeding our families.

Modalities and procedures for the implementation of the KJWA were the focus of these joint SBI/SBSTA meetings.  But South Africa’s representative noted that developing Parties, particularly the Africa Group, felt that little support for implementation came to fruition, with finance remaining as the primary roadblock moving forward.  Panelists believe guidelines need to reflect a just socioeconomic basis for food security: adaptation, absolute emissions reductions, ecological integrity, and gender responsiveness.

The session concluded with a question posed by an audience member who, like myself, was unable to attend much of last week’s negotiations – “how can other organizations such as Latin American groups participate in the SBI/SBSTA joint meetings next year?”

The French panelist who promoted France’s sustainable Agroecology initiatives responded by emphasizing engagement in the KJWA workshops via the Submissions Portal.  Participation by all parts of the agricultural community, not just Parties, is key.  Screen Shot 2018-12-14 at 1.59.02 PMWe need to ask questions, offer solutions, and promote an inclusive, equitable, just future for those feeling the drastic effects of climate change already.  As the Nigerian representative concluded, “we have the wisdom, we have the knowledge. We need to share it.”  Lots of experience from the global South remains to be shared by the farmer-scientists who have the tools and must feed the way!


Looking Inside an Informal Informal Negotiation: Protecting Vulnerable Groups in COP Decisions

The tim47086760_495482350942639_1883073697342816256_ne is 10:00 am. The crowd of negotiators briskly walk into the meeting room while the observers patiently wait outside the hall, hoping for a place to sit in the negotiation. It is the third informal informal meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB). On the table is drafting the decision to the COP about the 2018 report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism (Excom). This arm of the UNFCCC is responsible for providing recommendations to the COP regarding the issue of loss and damage due to the adverse effects of climate change. As I take a seat on the floor, I can see the negotiators carefully reading the updated draft decision. Immediately, the negotiators are addressing their concerns about the updated text. However, Honduras, on behalf of the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), raised a novel concern. AILAC intervened that the issue of gender has not been brought up as a recommendation by the Excom report. Under a new section of paragraph 5 of the draft decision, AILAC proposed that a sentence addressing the issue of gender equality be included.

There was an awkward silence in the room. A majority of people’s heads nodded, including mine. I immediately thought, “Wow.” But it was not just me who thought so. Placards were flipped up and eager faces were glowing. In succession, other negotiators were agreeing: United States, European Union (EU), Canada, Australia, St. Lucia on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and Timor Leste on behalf of the Least Developed Countries (LDC). However, other negotiators did not agree. Kuwait, who arrived slightly late, missed the comment and heard of it after the co-facilitator announced that the language would be included under paragraph 5(e). Afterward, Kuwait declined to include gender quality in the decision because climate change impacts everyone equally. Therefore, it argued, the language was unnecessary.

In response, Australia, Norway, and EU cited data that support differentiated impacts of the adverse effects of climate on different groups, especially women. Women are affected more because of their traditional roles as caretakers and vulnerability to violence in stressful environments. However, China also proposed that the gender text should not be included because of the short notice of time. China believes that the issue of gender equality deserves more dedicated time to thoughtfully implement the language as well as including other vulnerable groups such as children. As a result of these contentions, the co-facilitator called for a huddle to propose new language for the issue. What came out was, “To give greater consideration to gender and vulnerable populations, including youth, in the implementation of its 5-year rolling workplan.” Tension again rose over the use of the word gender and vulnerable populations and whether it was necessary to address both at the same time. Eventually, a compromise was reached when Australia proposed the text to read, “To increase its consideration of groups vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change when implementing its five-year rolling workplan.”GAP

Despite the effort, the gender equality was swept under an umbrella term. However, are negotiators responsible for promoting gender equality or the protection of vulnerable populations? Canada made an excellent point when stating that the gender inclusion proposal aligned with decision 3/CP.23—the establishment of a gender action plan (GAP). Under paragraph 3 of the Annex, “GAP recognizes the need for women to be represented in all aspects of the UNFCCC process and the need for gender mainstreaming through all relevant targets and goals in activities under the Convention as an important contribution to increasing their effectiveness.” Furthermore, under paragraph 10 of the Annex, “GAP aims to ensure the respect, promotion and consideration of gender equality and the empowerment of women in the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement.” As GAP is part of COP, it can be said that negotiators do have a duty to promote gender equality and not other vulnerable groups. If COP wanted to protect other vulnerable groups, it could have included those groups in the GAP decision or in another decision. On the other hand, the GAP decision text does not mandate the negotiators to take gender equality, but is more of a suggestion. Under this interpretation, protecting all vulnerable groups may be the balanced choice because then the text will incorporate women and other groups who are disparately affected by climate chance, like youth, elderly, minority, indigenous, and disabled. In the end, the acknowledgment that there is a need to protect vulnerable groups is an immense feat in moving forward on UNFCCC decisions. The fact that the negotiators agreed that more can be done to ensure these groups are protected is the future of what COP decisions will ensure – equality.


What does “progress” mean during informal consultations?

Progress appears to have a different meaning between developed and developing countries. At the end of today’s APA Agenda Item 4 meeting on Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement, one developed country Party suggested that more time should be allotted for issues not fully discussed in the meeting. This Party stated that extra allotted time is needed because no progress has been made on text agreement. A developing country Party chimed in disagreeing about progress made today and yesterday. So what does progress mean?

While the developing countries struggle with the late informal informal meeting times, their preparation shows at every meeting. Unfortunately, as an Observer, I cannot attend the informal informal consultations. It appears there was some negotiation and consensus in the informal informal last night because I did not catch an agreement on textual language during the Tuesday informal consultation. Between today and yesterday, the APA meetings have discussed around ten paragraphs. Three paragraphs have already been agreed upon and will be published in the final draft due by the end of the week. This is where the progress argument diverges.

On its face, agreement on three out of ten paragraphs does not seem like a lot of progress. This is the stance of the developed country. With three days left to produce a final text, this is definitely not the progress the developed country wanted because there are still many paragraphs to discuss. The developed country is concerned because there are some paragraphs from the last two sessions that have not been discussed in length. Parties have not presented text proposals in front of the facilitators and all Parties. This Party stressed the need to streamline paragraphs in order to reach the deadline at the end of the week. This was not surprising because the Party has been proposing streamlining for the last sessions.

On the other hand, three out of ten paragraphs over the course of two sessions, is an incredible amount of progress from the developing country’s perspective. Especially because these negotiations have been taking place over the course of almost three years. From this lens, producing a text in three days is possible. This can be achieved with the amount of time that the cofacilitators have been able to reserve for informal informals. Even though the developing countries lack resources with experts in this area, most understand how important adaptation has become. Thus, many of these countries are providing input about this text.

Where does this leave the definition of progress? In limbo. There is no concrete answer to this question. What each country needs addressed in each paragraph determines how they view progress. This conclusion is not surprising given the nature of UNFCCC negotiation sessions.


Wheels of climate change policy roll on in Bonn

trump+climate+environmentWhile angst about the pending Trump decision on the Paris Agreement (PA) remained a subtext of the annual intersessional climate meetings that wrapped up last week in Bonn, Germany, the technical work trundled on.

More than 3,300 (negotiators, observers [including a VLS delegation], plus secretariat and other agency staff) participated in:

  • the 46th sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI),
  • the 3rd part of the first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA1.3),
  • several COP-mandated companion events (e.g., indigenous peoples, climate finance reporting, capacity building), and
  • more than 90 side events.

The Earth Negotiations Bulletin gave its usual comprehensive (if dry) lowdown of the meetings. By many reports (here, here, here, and here), the negotiations moved rather smoothly. In particular, positions on APA agenda items got clarified, even though negotiating texts are still out of reach. The APA must deliver a Paris rulebook by December 2018.

Aside from the Trump question, the media coverage (e.g., here, and here) spotlighted the contentious tussle over conflict of interest (read: corporate/fossil fuel industry influence on climate policy). But that shadow side of the SBI’s imperative to “further enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders,” was not the only thing we watched.

A few of our observations:

  • APA round tables got a thumbs up for the airing and clarifying of views and could speed introduction of “contextual proposals” for PA rulebook pieces. Five will be held ahead of COP23, though observers will be excluded.

  • Parties are determined to understand, manage and capitalize on the linkages between Paris Agreement articles, and between the APA work and PA work of the subsidiary bodies. This is important and rich ground for cohesiveness.
  • More frequent interventions are coming from the new “coalition” of 3
    3K1A3741

    Marcia Levaggi, Argentina, speaking on behalf of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth)

    contiguous South American countries – Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. They constitute 3 of the 4 members of Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, which is on track to a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association. We’ve known them as part of multiple different negotiating groups: G77+China (all 3); Coalition of Rainforest Nations (Argentina, Uruguay); BASIC (Brazil); Like-minded Developing Countries (Argentina); and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). We’ll be keeping an eye on this development.

  • The Long Term Climate Finance workshops (LTF) may catalyze concrete COP consideration of strategies to address the confusing
    3K1A6693

    Breakout during LTF event. (Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth)

    multi-lateral climate finance architecture and developing countries’ challenges in accessing finance. (See the World Resources Institute new pub out on this issue.)

  • The SBSTA’s agriculture agenda item hopped on a rollercoaster, disrupting the 4-year stalemate between developed and developing countries over adaptation vs mitigation. The excitement generated by delegates’ Week 1 mantras (“very substantive dialogue,” “feels like a family”) landed with a thud in the end. No mature elements moved forward to the SBI; nor was an agriculture work programme recommended. We do see slightly positive prospects looking ahead, given the Co-Facilitators’ non-paper. Stay tuned for our deeper dive on this.
  • The Gender Action Plan workshop wasn’t covered by anyone, but you’ll get the in-depth story with our next post.

Next up? Thank you, Carbon Brief, for the chart of steps toward COP23.Screen Shot 2017-05-25 at 1.11.43 PM

 


Approving Decisions on a WIM

After many late night negotiations the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Science and Technological Advice (SBSTA), came to a surprising agreement on both issues related to the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts in their 45th sessions. The main agenda items related to Loss and Damage (L&D) for SBI45 and SBSTA45 were item 11 and 5 respectively, but since these items were originally to be considered by a joint session of the SBs, they resulted in the same draft conclusions proposed by the Chair of the SBI, Tomasz Chruszczow, and the Chair of the SBSTA, Carlos Fuller.

Chair of the SBSTA, Carlos Fuller

Chair of the SBSTA, Carlos Fuller

The first issue established the indicative framework for the WIM’s five-year rolling workplan to include a strategic work stream to guide the WIM in enhancing action and support through finance, technology, and capacity building. This step is crucial to understand L&D and provide the COP with a range of strategic activities as it goes beyond the initial 20-year workplan. This decision also extends an input invitation to, not just parties, but also “relevant organizations.” However, this decision alone falls short of the SB’s directive. In decision 2/CP.19, the COP called for a review of the WIM at COP22. This aspect incited contentious debate among the parties. Delegations disagreed as to the terms of reference to be used during the WIM review. Through the dedicated leadership of the co-facilitators, Alf Willis from South Africa and Beth Lavender of Canada, the parties eventually reached a decision on the draft conclusion to be recommended to COP22. If the COP accepts the draft, the WIM will be periodically reviewed no more than five years apart with the next review to be in 2019. The terms of reference for each review will be determined no later than six months before the review.


Global Goal on Adaptation: work has begun

The next in our series of posts on SB44/APA1adaptation mosaic

Work on the Paris Agreement’s (PA) global goal on adaptation was launched by the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) and Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) in Bonn in May. We reported earlier on the global goal here and here.

The APA, SBTA and SBI agendas contained three items directly addressing elements of the PA’s Article 7 (Adaptation) and Article 9 (Finance) in support of this important qualitative goal:

  1. Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication referred to in Art. 7.10 and 7.11 (APA)
  2. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Art. 7.12 (SBI)
  3. Modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Art. 9.7 (SBSTA)

Consideration of these occurred in contact groups and informal consultations, supplemented by bi-lateral meetings.Screen Shot 2016-06-28 at 2.34.09 PM

There was also work on capacity building, technology development and transfer, and transparency of action and support under the PA, all of which relate to adaptation planning, financing, implementation, and reporting. Beyond that, the SBs addressed existing Convention components and programmes that will ultimately serve the global goal on adaptation, including national adaptation plans and the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. Capping it off during week 2 was the Technical Expert Meeting on “enhancing the implementation of adaptation action.”

While this was a robust intersessional for action related to the global goal on adaptation, it was not all smooth sailing. (See our upcoming coverage on items #2 and #3 above.) For instance, further guidance on adaptation communications (item #1 above) was added to the APA agenda during week 1 following objections from G-77/China that the original provisional agenda did not follow the PA and its implementing decision. Additionally, spirited discussions on this item in open-ended informal consultations honed in on what adaptation communicatiohom1ns are intended to achieve, and the nature and scope of the guidance for those that should be developed. Developing countries asserted the need for flexibility in communications (highlighting differentiation), while most countries supported at least some common minimal communications parameters in order to achieve the critical linkages with the transparency and stocktaking components of the PA. It was a good first step, even with historic geo-political lines still visible.

The conclusion adopted on this agenda item calls for Parties to submit their views on adaptation communications by September 30, in order for the APA Co-Chairs to prepare for further work at the resumed first meeting during COP22 in Marrakesh in November. We will be watching those submittals and the next meeting, given that adaptation communications bear significantly on the success of the Paris Agreement.


SB44 – Next Steps After Paris

IMG_1518During the last two weeks of May, the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gathered in Bonn, Germany for their regular midyear meeting.  This session is called SB44, which simply means the 44th meeting of the climate change convention’s subbodies, which include two standing groups, the SBI (Subsidiary Body for Implementation) and SBSTA (Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice) and one temporary one, the APA (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement).  SB44 is the place where the rubber meets the road.  Few world leaders attend and even fewer members of the media.  Instead, career diplomats who focus on international environmental law in general and climate change specifically come to Bonn to work out the technical realities of translating treaty words into governmental actions.

At SB44, the Parties continued work on climate change mitigation and adaptation programs initiated under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol (KP).  But it’s fair to say that this work was perpetually overshadowed by the future impacts of the Paris Agreement (PA).  IMG_1517What would happen to pre-2020 commitments under the KP’s Second Commitment Period if the Paris Agreement entered into force early? How do the NDCs or nationally determined contributions required under the Paris Agreement relate to the pre-2020 Cancun pledges? How will existing governance mechanisms under the UNFCCC and KP, like the KP’s CDM (Clean Development Mechanism) Executive Board, UNFCCC’s Standing Committee on Finance and Adaptation Committee, and the COP19-created Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage, serve the Paris Agreement?  Will we simply learn from their track records of what (and what not) to do when creating new governance structures under the PA?

IMG_1520The Paris Agreement seized the center stage for at least a third of SB44’s agenda, given the number of tasks assigned by COP21for moving into implementation. While on the surface, this work has the appearance of being technical, in reality it is rooted deeply in international politics.  Hence the first week of the APA’s SB44 work was held up while the Parties disputed their agenda for the midyear session.  The G77+China — the largest negotiating group in the UNFCCC negotiations — filed a request before the opening plenaries with concrete suggestions for “balancing” the agenda so that it was less mitigation-centric — a hangover from the UNFCCC and KP’s work programme foci.  Through these agenda corrections, the G77 also sought to launch the next phase of work using the precise language that Parties forged last December when agreeing by consensus on the COP21 decisions.

Forging North American relations at a biergarten on the Rhein.

Forging North American relations at a biergarten on the Rhein.

The APA agenda dispute (and to a lesser extent, those in SBSTA and SBI) served as the opening salvo of a consistent campaign to address the constructive ambiguity that Parties had built into the Paris Agreement’s provisions very carefully. The art of compromise on display in Paris does not transition easily to the technical exercise in Bonn of translating those words into action. This difficulty stood out most strikingly for me on two agenda items: Paris Agreement Article 6 (“cooperative approaches”) and its relation to Article 5 (forests and other land use) and transparency and global stocktaking under Articles 13 and 14, including on finance.  More to come soon on these specific topics.


How “well below 2°C” flew well-below the radar

Screen Shot 2016-03-19 at 10.09.47 PMOn December 12, when the Paris Agreement was adopted by consensus, it contained bold new language on the long-term global temperature goal. Article 2 reads:

“Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels…” (Article 2.1(a))

But, from where did this language come?

All through Screen Shot 2016-03-18 at 3.59.10 PMthe ADP’s final year of negotiations, from Lima to Geneva to Bonn and back to Bonn, it never appeared in the successive drafts. The “well below 2°C” finally emerged in brackets at the last negotiating session before COP21, on the final day of ADP2-11.Photo-SBs June2015-Bonn

The likely source? Something called the structured expert dialogue (SED).

The story begins back at COP16 in 2010, when Parties agreed to reduce emissions so that global temperature would not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. They also agreed to periodically review this goal to determine whether it was sufficient to meet the UNFCCC’s objective, and whether the Parties were achieving it. Importantly, the Parties decided at COP16 to consider strengthening the 2°C goal, “including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C.”

This mandated review happened between June 2013 and February 2015 at a Joint SBSTA/SBI meeting. It was supported by a structured expert dialogue (SED) to “ensure the scientific integrity of the review through a focused exchange of views, information and ideas.” The SED involved more than 70 experts and Parties over 4 sessions. The group released its final report last May for all UNFCCC Parties to consider it at the 42nd session of the subsidiary bodies in June.

Two of the SED’s key messages were:

  • “The world is not on track to achieve the long-term global goal, but successful mitigation policies are known and must be scaled up urgently.” (Message 8)
  • “While science on the 1.5°C warming limit is less robust [making it difficult to compare differences between 2°C and 1.5°C], efforts should be made to push the defence line as low as possible.” (Message 10)

Message 10 also suggested that Parties consider a precautionary path: “aiming for limiting global warming as far below 2°C as possible, reaffirming the notion of a defence line or even a buffer zone keeping warming well below 2°C.”

While not offering the exact language on 1.5°C found in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, the SED report clearly articulates climate change impacts already being experienced, limits to adaptation, and certain and non-linear increases in those impacts expected between 1.5 and 2°C.1.5DegC

Both IISD’s Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) and the Third World Network (TWN) reported strong differences at the June UNFCCC meeting about what action Parties should take on the Review and SED report. AOSIS, the LDCs and others pushed for sending a draft decision to COP21 for a new long-term global temperature goal of “limiting warming to below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.” Saudi Arabia and China were both firmly against changing the long-term goal, and sought language simply acknowledging and appreciating the work/report. Though most Parties supported crafting a substantive conclusion and decision, the lack of consensus on content meant postponement to the SB43 (December 1-4) meeting in Paris. With Saudi Arabia and China (joined by Oman) continuing to block action at SB43, the COP Presidency was ultimately called on to shepherd its direct consideration by the COP.

On the ADP front, the Review and SED report found no apparent foothold in June. By Paris, though, its “well below 2°C” was in the draft and part of the hot debate on long-term temperature goal. The LDCs, AOSIS, the Africa Group and the 40+ country-strong Climate Vulnerable Forum (on which we’ve reported), fought hard for the goal to reference only 1.5°C. The “High Ambition Coalition” (on which we reported here), which included the EU and the U.S., offered strong support. The Saudis, backed by India and China, and unchallenged by the rest of OPEC, firmly blocked it, along with any reference to the SED report. The final compromise language was, in the end, a big step toward acknowledging the climate change dangers already present and the peril posed by a 2°C change.

COP21 did close with a decision (10/CP.21 para 4) that referenced the Review, “took note of the work of the structured expert dialogue,” and offered appreciation for those who participated in it. It also stated the new long-term temperature goal utilized in the Paris Agreement’s Article 2.1(a). “Well below 2°C” is well beyond what could have been.images


REDD+ Recap

At COP 20, SBSTA made no progress on the Warsaw REDD+ framework on safeguards.  Philippines, Sudan, the EU, Bolivia and the US spoke in favor of developing further guidance on safeguards. The Africa Group said that further guidance is not needed, but that additional review of REDD+ in coming years should evaluate that question. Panama, on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, said that now is the time for the implementation of REDD+, not to develop further guidelines.

Also this week, the International Tribunal on the Rights of Nature convened in Lima on December 5 and 6th. Cases ranged from fracking in Bolivia, mining in Ecuador, the BP Gulf Oil spill to… REDD+. Parties presenting their case against REDD+ alleged that the program is inherently flawed, as it is a commodification of nature. Further, Ninawa Kaxinawá, president of the Huni Kui people in Acre, Brazil claimed that REDD+ violates ILO 169, as the program has relentlessly failed to engage indigenous people in the decision-making process.

Ninawa Kaxinawá, President of the Huni Kui

Cassandra Smithie, a translator and interpreter, and Ivonne Yanez of Oilwatch presented evidence that REDD+ results in land-grabbing in the global south, by developed countries, who wish to offset their pollution. In other words, REDD+ allows companies to continue business as usual at the (further) expense of indigenous people elsewhere.

There is clear dissonance when one juxtaposes the lack of progress at COP 20 to the testimony presented at this weekend’s tribunal as well as evidence presented by CIFOR and others at the COP. It is clear that the integration of public participation principles is essential in order for REDD+ to offer non-carbon benefits, and indeed for it to accomplish its goal of curbing both deforestation and emissions. The principles of free, prior and informed consent must be integrated into the REDD+ framework under SBSTA. Now that the first monetary goal for the Green Climate Fund has been met, REDD+ projects are already lining up around the block for funding. The question remains whether safeguards and methodological guidelines will be put in place at Paris to ensure that projects are ethical and effective.


Loss and Damage Mechanism still unresolved

131206_loss_and_damageOn Friday, December 5, the SBSTA and SBI issued a combined recommendation to the COP on the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (LDM). This Mechanism, established at COP19 last year, is one we’ve been watching here at COP20. The UNFCCC Parties’ gave themselves a deadline in Warsaw for finalizing the Mechanism’s Executive Committee and two-year workplan in Lima.

Over the past year, both of these mandates have occupied the attention of the Parties most vulnerable to loss and damage and the international development agencies and others working to assist them. Millions of people around the globe will experience the kind of certain and permanent losses that surpass adaptation efforts. Case studies have already documented loss and damage by households in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Kenya, Micronesia, Mozambique and Nepal. The LDCs report that the 2°C limit in global temperature rise (over historical levels) now being targeted by the UNFCCC will increase water stress for 350 to 600 million people, and threaten up to 15% of Sub-Saharan ecosystem species with extinction. Earlier this year, according to The Guardian, Kiribati (the first nation to take such an action) bought land in Fiji for its anticipated climate refugees. Clearly, the COP20 outcomes on the LDM are highly significant. (For more specifics on LDM, read this earlier blog post.)src.adapt.960.high.1381848848761

Here’s what we know so far:

Executive Committee make-up. The SBSTA/SBI document contains proposed language retaining the current interim Executive Committee and charging it with implementing the submitted workplan. The recommended draft decision also stipulates that the permanent Committee be elected and in place no later than March 2015.

As of Friday, the question about the size and makeup of the permanent Committee was still unresolved, perhaps because of the concerns raised about the interim Committee’s membership. Eight of the ten members are not from developing and most vulnerable countries, for which the LDM is designed.

The recommended draft decision provides one option and two alternates, all with the “aim of achieving a fair, equitable and balanced representation.”

Option 1 – 16 members:

  • Two from each of the 5 UN regional groups.
  • One from a SID state
  • One from an LDC
  • Two from Annex I Parties
  • Two from non-Annex I Parties

Alternate 1 stipulates 10+ members, balanced between developed and developing countries, with two representatives each from the Adaptation Committee, Least Developed Countries Expert Group, Standing Committee on Finance, Technology Executive Committee, and Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from non-Annex I countries. Additionally, the Committee would include one member from an as yet to be determined list of international organizations. This composition represents the initial 10-member interim Committee, augmented with representation from international organizations.

Alternate 2 provides for 12 members “with equal representation between developed countries and developing countries.”

Closed consultations have been held since last Friday to sort out this matter. We are waiting now for release of the results, which according to the COP 20 website were concluded last night. Stay tuned.

Two-Year Workplan. It is notable that the draft decision language from the SBSTA/SBI approves the initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee, despite the anticipated struggle to reach agreement on its content. Party submittals this fall highlighted gaps in the draft workplan, including the absence of a long-term strategic vision and concrete deliverables on finance, technology transfer, and calosspacity building.

Perhaps the larger issue  — not found in either of these two Mechanism matters — is the place of loss and damage within the larger COP context: will it achieve a level of visibility and prominence alongside adaptation (not tucked within it) as many hope? With this COP’s focus (beyond the ADP work) on the intersection of sustainable development and climate change, we might well see some strong advancement on this issue.


Ad Hoc REDD+ Projects: Warning that REDD+ May be Broken

Today, a panel of experts from CIFOR and the European Forest Institute presented on the importance of including local people in REDD+ projects. The panel reviewed REDD+ initiatives created ad hoc in the absence of a fully functioning international program. These are regional, state, or local—rather than national— initiatives. Crucially, they offer lessons for the future implementation of REDD+.

The panel discussed how these initiatives were all contract-based: private agreements between two parties. For forest communities, unequal bargaining power between those parties creates huge equity risks, since there are no concrete ethical guidelines or safeguards in place. This point informed the panel’s broader discussion about how these initiatives demonstrate that. REDD+, if not properly implemented, can result in more burdens than benefits for communities. The panel therefore focused on tactics for implementing REDD+ within a framework of community participation and local community control.

Panelists explained that ad hoc REDD+ initiatives have demonstrated that non-monetary benefits are key to the success of these programs. In other words: to achieve REDD+’s concurrent goals of curbing deforestation and aiding communities, financial incentives are not enough. REDD+’s potential for capacity building, technical assistance, jobs (e.g. a newly created position working in forest monitoring), and infrastructural improvements have all proven more attractive to communities than a simple pay off. For example, 20 years ago a National Park was established in Brazil. At the time of its inception, the government claimed they had approval from local peoples. However, when an NGO and the government sought to expand the park recently, it became clear that the locals had never wanted it there. The NGO and the government tried to pay people off in order to receive permission to expand, but the communities said no. The indigenous people said they wanted their customary rights to the land recognized, and for their access to it to remain unrestricted. This example illustrates the burdens that conservation projects such as REDD+ can bring.  The panel submitted research of REDD+ leading to reduced-access to natural resources and impingements upon land tenure security. The reason for these failings? The panel cited process. When implementation processes are not legitimate, and community participation is minimal, initiatives are not effective, and more burdens than benefits are created.

Adeline Dontenville, from the EU REDD Facility, proffered two adjustments to the current REDD+ framework to increase legitimacy and improve participation. First, demystify “carbon rights.” There is often talk about who owns the carbon in the trees.  Do the local people, who clear the land for their agricultural purposes, have a right to the carbon? Or is the carbon part of the commons and therefore owned by a national or internationally entity?  Adeline suggests we decouple REDD+ issues from land-tenure issues with respect to carbon. She advocates that we do not need a REDD+ law allocating carbon rights, rather the discussion should focus on who contributes to carbon sequestration and to emissions reductions. As my blog yesterday mentioned, indigenous peoples contribute strongly in this respect. Second, Adeline and other panelists discussed the power of Local Development and Environmental Funds to improve participation in REDD+. Local Development Funds have demonstrated to offer the most advanced benefit-sharing experience. These funds, which are known to be highly participatory, restore agency into the community and are adapted to the country context based on proven experiences. Most importantly, these funds offer examples of locally controlled implementation of REDD+. While these funds do require capacity and technology that many communities don’t possess, they represent a model for restoring community agency within the REDD+ program.  These sub-national implementations of REDD+ offer the international community information about what not to do, and what must be done in order to ensure the rights of local peoples. So how about it?


The Future of REDD+: Communities a Side Note?

Today was REDD+ Day at COP 20. The COP assigns themes to certain days of the conference, in order to emphasize important issues. I have been following REDD+ during this course, and blogging on the issue, so was excited to have the opportunity to attend several meetings on REDD+ today. When looking ahead to COP 20 this fall, I thought that the Warsaw Decisions had redirected the focus of the REDD+ program to address human rights concerns and the needs of local communities. However, as Macarena’s blogs demonstrate, meetings on REDD+ at COP 20 have been about financial mechanisms far more than human rights. This trend continued today, on REDD+ day, where scientific and financial advances in the program were celebrated and safeguards were literally only a side event.

Youth Delegation Protesting REDD+

Youth Delegation Protesting REDD+ at COP 20 (C. Craig 12/8/14)

To begin, pursuant to Decision10/ CP. 19, the first voluntary meeting on the coordination of support for the implementation of REDD-plus activities convened today. During this meeting, which focused nearly entirely on procedure, parties disagreed about who should be able to take part in future meetings. Some parties interpreted the past COP decisions to exclude all stakeholders other than national entities. For example, Brazil said that if experts and communities wish to participate in the meetings, they should do so through their national entities (party delegates.) In contrast, the World Wildlife Foundation, the Indigenous Caucus, Germany and other Parties argued that all stakeholders, including observers to attend the meetings. To me, the fact that inclusion of non-party stakeholders proved contentious was grossly disappointing.  Decision 10/ CP. 19 recognizes the need to “strengthen, consolidate and enhance the sharing of relevant information, knowledge, experiences and good practices, at the international level, taking into account national experiences and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge and practices.” This portion of the Decision, as well as a good body of international law (including Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration), requires the inclusion of local communities in environmental decision-making and supports the case that inclusive participation is essential to a ethical approach to coordination of implementation of REDD+.

In the afternoon, I attended a REDD+ showcase, in which Columbia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico announced the submission of their forest reference levels. Again, I was struck by the limited mention of safeguards.

The final meeting I attended today, a side event entitled “Looking Forward: REDD+ Post 2015,” however, did point the discussion back to people and communities. The panelists discussed the importance of governance structures to empower and protect local and indigenous communities. In particular, Ms. Victoria Tauli Corpuz, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, gave an impassioned speech on the need to create governance structures that protect indigenous in the implementation of REDD+.

Vicki Tauli Corpuz, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

Corpuz spoke of her skepticism of the REDD+ program, but said that REDD+ has potential to simultaneously address deforestation and alleviate poverty. Further, Corpuz described how Indigenous peoples are protectors of the forest. Research has demonstrated that protection of indigenous rights is correlated with climate mitigation: between 2000-2012, deforestation in Indigenous territories in Brazil was less than 1% compared to 7% in non-indigenous territories. This side event demonstrates that while at the party-level the conversation remains stunted at procedure, the REDD+ framework (as established by the Warsaw Decisions) is far beyond that.  Perhaps because REDD+ is a market-based solution, it will always fall short of what is socially just, or perhaps some parties (e.g. Brazil) have yet to get hip to the necessary protections Corpuz and others understand are necessary.


“Last” Day at COP 19…

The UNFCCC COP 19 has wrapped up a number of issues under the SBI, SBSTA, REDD + and other areas. Three main negotiating tracks remain unresolved: the ADP, Climate Finance, and Loss and Damage. Any agreement in Warsaw will revolve around finding compromise on these three issues.

So far, the COP/CMP closing plenary has not yet begun… It will be a late night/early morning!


Day 1 of COP19/CMP9

The VLS COP19/CMP9 Observe Delegation Week1: Nora Greenglass, Taylor Smith, Heather Calderwood, Thea Reinert, Tracy Bach (L to R).

The VLS COP19/CMP9 Observe Delegation Week1: Nora Greenglass, Taylor Smith, Heather Calderwood, Thea Reinert, Tracy Bach (L to R).

Equipped with our yellow NGO observer badges, our VLS delegation ventured out two hours before the opening COP plenary, ready for long security waits.  Instead, we sailed through the well-managed lines

COP19 President Korolec.

COP19 President Korolec.

and began exploring the stadium venue.  Some of us attended several early briefing sessions with partner NGOs, then attended the COP welcome ceremony and opening plenary.  The COP18 president, His Excellency Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, gave a farewell speech in Arabic, passed the gavel to incoming COP19 president, Marcin Korolec, and Christiana Figueres (Executive Secretary UNFCCC) and Rajendra Pachauri (IPCC Chair) summarized the work at hand.  Figueres had us take a deep breath, then reminded us that in it was 400ppm of CO2. She believes that the “collective climate friendly capacity” has increased, and reminded the delegates that “what happens in this stadium is not a game.”  Pachauri began by quoting Einstein:  “Problems cannot be solved at the same level of awareness that created them.”  He then went on to recap Working Group I’s 5th assessment so that we couldn’t rest on old knowledge.  Pachauri finished his short presentation with a challenge to the group:  Given that the international scientific community now has “high confidence” in its findings on how human activity is causing global warming, and that this means a 95% or more likelihood level, why would we want to jeopardize the future of living species on this planet for a 5% chance that they are wrong?

IMG_4123COP President Korolec emphasized time management from the outset, stating that he cannot — will not — extend the UNFCCC subbodies’ work (SBI and SBSTA) past this Saturday, November 16.  He stressed the need to show productivity and flexibility, and urged delegates to make every effort to maximize meeting time.

But despite these best intentions, a meeting that was due to be combined with the CMP (for Kyoto Protocol state parties) opening plenary and completed by 1pm was still going strong at 2:30pm – without even opening the CMP!  Negotiating bloc statements took up the bulk of this time, staking out ground for the negotiating sessions to come.  The Philippines’ delegation announced that it had the “honor to speak on behalf of the resilient people of Philippines.”  (Today’s NYT estimates that at least 10,000 people have died in Tacloban alone and that Typhoon Haiyan produced winds of up to 190 mph.)

Heather congratulates Elirozz Carlie D. Labaria on her inspiring remarks.

Heather congratulates Elirozz Carlie D. Labaria on her inspiring remarks.

Only a short time was reserved for civil society statements, but it nonetheless had an impact.  A leader of a business coalition spoke first, followed by Elirozz Labaria, a youth NGO representative (YNGO) from the Philippines, who poignantly told a hushed crowd that “countries like mine bear the burden, even though we didn’t cause the problem.” She reminded negotiators that COP18 in Doha began with a similar disaster and scolded them for “discounting our future for far too long,” negotiating international climate change law not just during young people’s entire lives, but for some negotiators’ entire lives!

After a short break, we reconvened around 3pm to open the CMP, then proceed directly to the SBSTA meeting.  The latter was still going strong when our observer delegation left around 7pm.  (More on SBSTA and its full agenda later.)  A very full first day, as others in the delegation have chronicled today.  We’ve also captured it in pictures in the gallery to the left.