Two New UNFCCC Reports Emphasize Using Cooperative Initiatives and Non-Parties to Boost Ambition in NDC’s

Posted on November 29, 2018 by christashute

Two more reports with dire warnings and cautious optimism were issued last week from the UNFCCC. They illustrate that not enough is being done to slow the growth of GHG emissions and suggest that collective participation through cooperative initiatives and non-party work is necessary to boost the ambition of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

On November 20th, the UNFCCC issued the Talanoa Synthesis Report. The Talanoa Synthesis Report summarizes the preparatory phase of the Talanoa Dialogue which was initiated at COP23 and provides a basis for upcoming political phase at COP24 and beyond. Based on a series of reports submitted under the Talanoa Dialogue, not only do ‘NDCs fall well short’ but even ‘their full implementation would lead to a median increase in global temperatures of about 3.2 C by 2100’(2.2.1). However, many of the reports submitted also expressed the opinion that everyone has something to contribute and the importance of multilateralism (2.3).

Also on November 20th, the UNFCCC issued the Yearbook for Global Climate Action 2018 under the Marrackech Partnership. The report highlights that climate action is growing globally and that cooperative initiatives are increasingly delivering outputs in low or middle-income countries. The report emphasizes that NDCs alone cannot meet the Paris Agreement goal. We need non-party stakeholders to drive change and help push ambition on NDCs. We need the success of these cooperative initiatives.

The Talanoa purpose is to share stories and build empathy in order to make wise decisions for the collective good. We must reach out to others to put the puzzle pieces together. As the Parties are set to meet in Katowice, Poland for COP24 it is no wonder that both reports emphasize the absolute necessity of cooperation and collective action as well as more ambitious NDCs to achieve success.

Adapting the Adaptation Fund under the Paris Agreement

Posted on November 28, 2018 by achristian

The future of the Adaptation Fund (AF) is among the dicey climate finance issues to watch as Parties seek to complete negotiations on the Paris Agreement Rulebook over the upcoming 2 weeks. While it is small, with total cumulative receipts of only $737 million, the AF is highly regarded and widely celebrated for the “relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of its work” and its “contribut[ion] to transformational change.”

The AF was created under the Kyoto Protocol, and thus subject to the CMP, not the COP. The requisite decision to have it serve the Paris Agreement came in 2017 at CMP13.

On the eve of the Katowice climate change conference, concerns remain about whether, in its new life, the AF will retain the unique and innovative features that have made it so vitally important to developing countries. In particular, developing countries want to preserve:

Direct access (not having to access funds through multilateral institutions)
Grants-based funding
Full cost accounting of country-driven projects/programmes, and
A developing country majority on the AF board.

Negotiators have been grappling with two divisive issues that will impact these characteristics: 1) the AF board composition, and 2) how the Fund will be resourced.

The 16-member AF board currently includes 2 representatives from the 5 UN regional groups, 1 each from the small island developing states (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and 2 each from the UNFCCC’s Annex I Parties and non-Annex-I Parties.

A proposal to eliminate the differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties and expand donor country representation on the board emerged during APA 1-6 in Bangkok in September. Developing country Parties want the make-up to remain unchanged and are pushing back hard. They fear undue donor country influence not only on funding decisions, but also on multiple other important aspects of governance and operations.

As for resources, a percentage of proceeds from the marketable emission reduction credits of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) initially funded the AF. With CDM proceeds drying up in recent years, the Fund has had to seek voluntary contributions – not a sustainable mode. Currently, the Fund has only ½ of the resources needed to meet the amount requested in the most recent round.

While, across the board, Parties support establishing new innovative mechanisms to serve as revenue sources, most developing countries also want to continue the original model and link AF resourcing to the Article 6 international crediting mechanism(s) that will emerge from negotiations. Developed country Parties, don’t want to give up any value of the credits they secure from funding mitigation projects in other countries, and some have wondered why the Adaptation Fund should be continued at all, given that the Green Climate Fund provides adaptation financing. That perspective has little traction, and we are likely to see some rich engagement about resourcing.

Two just-released publications will certainly impact any climate finance negotiations: 1) the 2018 Biennial Assessment (BA) and Overview of Climate Finance Flows * (from the Standing Committee on Finance), and 2) the 2018 Emissions Gap Report of the UN Environment Program (Executive Summary is here).

According to the BA, climate finance flows to non-Annex I Parties reached a new high of $74.5 billion in 2016, still far short of the $100 billion per year by 2020 developed countries committed to provide and mobilize. Characteristically, too, adaptation funding remained less than 40% of that for mitigation in public climate finance flows for 2015-2016, with adaptation funding a rarity in private finance.

The emissions gap is the difference between the GHG emission levels needed to keep global temperature rise below 2°C or 1.5°C in 2100 (compared to pre-industrial levels) and the global GHG emission level the NDCs are expected to achieve if fully implemented by 2020.

Two of the many key messages from the Emissions Gap Report giving the climate community pause are that:

The “gap has increased significantly in comparison with previous estimates” and
“Global greenhouse gas emissions show no signs of peaking.”

Given the prospects ahead, poorer countries are expected to be unwavering on a strong funding foothold for the Adaptation Fund and a path to grow it.

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Photo credits: 1) https://www.adaptation-fund.org/; 2) Leolintang/iStock by Getty Images; 3) http://www.famu.edu/index.cfm?PreMed&ADVISORYBOARD; 4) https://www.customtermpapers.org/free-term-papers/term-paper-emissions-trading/; 5) https://indicaonline.com/blog/ways-marijuana-dispensaries-save-money/; 6) https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018. Featured image: https://grist.org/climate-change/2011-08-25-neoliberalism-and-climate-change-adaptation/

(*The 2018 BA is a complex compilation that covers climate finance flows in 2015 and 2016, examines trends from 2011-2014, explores gains in measurement, reporting and verification of these flows, and considers the implications for global goals and efforts.)

Show Us The Money!

Posted on November 1, 2018 by achristian

Tension in the global climate finance community is mounting as the Katowice climate change conference approaches. The September effort to advance the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP) exposed deep historic divides on climate finance (reported here, here and here). And though the Green Climate Fund Board thankfully “righted its ship” a bit in October (see our close look here), the relief did not ease the larger systemic angst.

At its core, climate finance is a highly political issue. For the most part, rich societies are suffering far less from climate change impacts than poorer ones, and have far more resources with which to respond to those impacts. Poor countries need substantial help from the developed world to do the same. Yet, many developed countries are not inclined to make the enormous financial investments required to address global climate change for outcomes that won’t be realized until the distant future and that will mostly benefit other countries. We get a glimpse of this reality in Climate Scoreboard’s just released Global Report #8, on which we reported yesterday.

Since the adoption of the UNFCCC, developed countries have committed to and provided some, but not nearly enough, climate finance to help developing countries meet the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change. Their collective target of $100 billion/year by 2020, established in the 2009 Copenhagen Accords and reiterated in the Paris Agreement decision (1/CP.21), falls hundreds of billions short of predicted needs for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. (Numbers are hard to come by, but the World Economic Forum projected a few years ago that $700 billion/year in climate investment will be required by 2020, while UNEP has estimated annual adaptation costs alone could reach $500 billion by 2050.) Additionally, many are questioning the likelihood that even the $100 billion/year by 2020 will be realized (see here, here and here).

All of this adds up to a lot at stake for climate finance in Katowice in December, where Parties have promised to bring the Paris Agreement implementation guidelines across the finish line.

One of the most contentious climate finance issues we have been tracking is whether Article 9.5 will be fully operationalized. It stipulates that developed country Parties, and others as they can, “shall” communicate, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, financial resources they intend to provide to developing country Parties (ex ante support). However, decision 1/CP.21 calls only for identifying the information Parties will report, and not the modalities to be used in accounting of those resources.

Some feel this was an oversight in the rush to adopt the Paris Agreement back in December 2015, since it is unusual for a COP to decide what Parties are to report without also deciding how the information will be reported and used. For instance, for Article 9.7, decision 1/CP.21 sets in motion identifying both the what and how Parties will report on financial resources they have provided and mobilized through public intervention (ex post support).

Developed country Parties contend that Article 9.5 is sufficiently clear and that no action is required. They want to use the existing general guidelines from 3/CP.19 for the biennial submissions they were requested to make on “scaling up climate finance from 2014-2020.” Notably, only 7 Parties and the EU made such submissions.

Developing country Parties assert that predictability and transparency are at the heart of Article 9.5 and that it must be fully operationalized by also specifying accounting modalities. In particular, Parties should decide how the information will be compiled, made publicly available, transmitted to the global stocktake, and be subject to technical review, none of which is addressed by the earlier general guidance on reporting ex ante support.

Currently, the battle for and against establishing modalities for Article 9.5 is being played out under agenda item 8a of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA).

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Stay tuned for more posts on climate finance issues for COP 24/CMA 1-3. And, may all Parties show up rich in political will.

Green Climate Fund Approves $1B in New Projects

Posted on October 24, 2018 by amandac

On October 21, 2018, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Board concluded its 21st meeting by approving 19 new projects, totaling $1.038 billion. This board meeting comes right after the IPCC released the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5) (which we posted on here and here) and a little over a month before COP24. As UNFCCC Executive Secretary Patricia Espinosa told GCF Board Members at the start of their meeting, “Never has there been more need for multilateral cooperation. And never has finance played a more central role to the overall climate regime itself.”

GCF was set up by UNFCCC in 2010, as part of the Convention’s financial mechanism. When the GCF began to gather resources in 2014, developed countries, and some developing, pledged $10.3 billion. Initial mobilization lasts until 2018, while the Fund remains open for further contributions during this time from both public and private sources.

The GCF is designed to focus on climate change adaptation and mitigation, in part as a reaction to the broader mandate of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the original operating entity of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism. “The Fund pays particular attention to the needs of societies that are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, in particular Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and African States.” Another key point GCF makes is that “[o]ur innovation is to use public investment to stimulate private finance, unlocking the power of climate-friendly investment for low emission, climate resilient development. To achieve maximum impact, GCF seeks to catalyse funds, multiplying the effect of its initial financing by opening markets to new investments. The Fund’s investments can be in the form of grants, loans, equity or guarantees.”

When addressing the importance of this most recent GCF Board meeting, Executive Secretary Espinosa underscored that its outcome will impact the outcome of COP24: “Success here means sending a clear and unmistakable message of trust to developing countries that they can have confidence in the process going forward.” Espinosa’s remarks were well taken as the GCF approved the 19 proposed projects. See the full list of approved projects and monetary breakdown here.

Her comments came after the preceding GCF Board meeting failed to deliver its mandate. This contentious July 2018 meeting resulted in the resignation of GCF Executive Director, Howard Bamseyand, and no new project approvals. Tensions ran high at this meeting for several reasons. The first two had a direct impact on the Fund’s bottom line: the United States decided in 2017 to halt $2 billion of its Obama administration $3 billion pledge and inflation rates reduced the present value of commitments made in 2014. In addition, policy gaps for prioritizing the numerous applications whose requests exceed the GCF’s capitalization hampered Board Members’ ability to make the tough selection decisions. The GCF currently has $10 billion pledged out of the $100 billion promised for 2020.

The GCF has been plagued with issues and controversy for the past year. In February 2018, GCF had a board meeting that approved $1 billion in projects. Although the willingness of GCF to approve more projects is hopeful, civil society organizations and parties saw it as problematic, given that the GCF has difficulty dispersing money for projects already approved. As of December 2017, the fund has only released roughly $150 million, or less than 6% of the nearly $3 billion it had committed up to that point. The GCF reported in the February 2018 meeting that this funding is going toward the 18 projects that are under implementation. The Board had approved of 53 projects by the February meeting. So what is taking so long for the Board to disperse funding? Who is receiving this funding? And how is the GCF now reporting that there “39 projects under implementation, worth $1.6 billion in GCF resources that are being deployed as climate finance in support of developing countries’ climate ambitions under the Paris Agreement?” The jump from 18 to 39 projects under implementation in eight months seems either overambitious or over-reported. The biggest question here is how these 39 projects are receiving their funding after the turmoil of the GCF in the past eight months. To take from Espinosa’s remarks again, “The outcome of [the October Board meeting] of the GCF will impact those negotiations in Katowice.”

Looking toward COP24: The GCF submitted a report to the UNFCCC on Sept. 17, 2018, for consideration at the upcoming COP24. Table 14 included in its Annex VII lists all projects approved by the Board to receive funding from the GCF as of July 31, 2018. In this table, the GCF does not report what has been dispersed, only the GCF funding and total project value.

RE100 Businesses Pave the Way for Transitioning to Renewable Energy

Posted on October 5, 2018 by charliekuo

Ambition, pace, scale—these are the themes in shifting to an economy recognizing climate change. Companies pioneering this economic shift incorporated climate change as an significant factor in conducting business.

One of the leading organizations spearheading this movement is RE100. RE100 is a collaborative movement uniting over 150 well recognized companies across the world to commit to using 100% renewable energy. What is even more impressive is that these companies have acted on their own in addressing climate change, ahead of government direction. Remarkably, these corporations were able to shift to 100% renewable electricity, which garnered a competitive advantage enabling them to financially outpace their competitors.

A study by RE100 and Capgemini compared RE100 companies to non-RE100 companies by sector. It concluded that RE100 companies earn an average profit of 7.7% more than their competitors. Admittedly, the report’s analysis in no way suggests that switching to 100% renewable electricity is the sole cause of the profit difference. However, it is compelling that all RE100 companies have consistently outperformed the competition in their respective industries. Thus, it would suggest a strong correlation between switching to renewable electricity and above-average financial performance.

The switch to renewable electricity is done using multiple mechanisms simultaneously. Companies utilize a combination of energy power purchase agreements (PPA) and self-generated renewable electricity technology. Moreover, RE100 companies have developed new management structures, such as silo model, centralized model, and global model, to coordinate renewable electricity sourcing and efficient use infrastructure. The benefits of transitioning are significant.

For example, General Motors harnessed renewable energy sources from landfill gas, solar arrays, and wind farms. This combination has lowered operation costs by $80 million. The cost savings result largely from improved, cost-effective renewable technologies and government incentives. Landfill gas allows companies to lock into long-term prices that are cheaper and more stable than fluctuating natural gas prices. GM strategically built their own solar arrays and benefited from government feed-in-tariff programs. Finally, GM built wind projects in Mexico and Texas that generate over 34 MW, enough to power five manufacturing facilities.

Anheuser-Busch, another RE100 company, has procured PPAs for onshore wind projects to offset its dependence on traditional energy sources. Anheuser-Busch is in line to become the largest purchaser of renewable electricity and one of the forerunners in advertising renewable energy. The beer manufacturer uses its brand influence in its renewable electricity symbol campaign, where every pack of Budweiser will carry the symbol to celebrate its commitment to brew with 100% renewable energy.

The trend toward renewable energy is now gaining traction, and signals a tipping point to mass renewable. Since RE100’s inception, companies partnered through renewable energy purchase agreements have created 100% renewable energy demand of more than 184.6 TWh—enough energy to power Poland. Moreover, RE100 company surveys yielded that renewable energy costs have reduced significantly where it has been cost competitive against fossil fuels. Therefore the RE100 momentum would suggest that this trend is welcomed with open arms and significantly contributing to how other companies shape their tactics to address climate change.

China’s Effort to Limit GHGs

Posted on October 3, 2018 by amandac

China produces more carbon dioxide than any other country in the world: 10.357 million metric tons per year. To limit their impact on climate change, China includes environmental protection in their Five Year Plan (FYP). The FYP is the country’s blueprint that outlines the policy framework, priorities, economic, and social development goals for the 2016-2020 period.

In 2016, China released the 13th FYP which includes lofty goals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and increase green manufacturing. Innovation is the crux of this FYP. Innovation builds on improving manufacturing and emphasizing a cleaner, green economy. A State Council executive meeting in 2015 discussed implementing an Internet Plus Circulation program. The program expands broadband connection to more rural areas so there is more efficiency in transporting items, like new agricultural products and equipment. The program will also allow rural populations to access health care. Air pollution is a key target for the FYP. Chapter 38, Section 4, ensures that the concentration of fine particulate matter is reduced by at least 25%. The current status of smog and air pollution affects public health. China is increasing regulations for coal-fired plants while requiring low-emission technologies and eliminating outdated industrial equipment and processes.

The carbon dioxide emissions reduction targets in the FYP contribute to China’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) 2030 target. The 13th FYP even put a first nation-wide total energy cap on all energy sources: it is set at less than the equivalent of five billion tons of coal over the next five years. These goals are reflected in the INDC filed on June 30, 2015. Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, provides that “[e]ach Party shall prepare…nationally determined contributions…with the aim of achieving the objectives…” of reaching a global peak of GHG emissions as soon as possible. During COP24 in December, China may include details about innovation and policy from the 13th FYP into the NDC because it is on track to meet the 2020.

China is fully embracing their 2020 goals by implementing green community projects. On September 28, 2018, Green Climate Fund announced that the board will consider projects, including China’s Green Cities program,targeting Central Asia and Eastern Europe. This project is among 20 other proposals totaling $1.1 billion to be heard during the next board meeting this month. It will be interesting to see how these project proposals will factor into each countries’ NDC during COP24.

The Paris Agreement and the Green Economy

Posted on September 28, 2018 by charliekuo

The adverse impacts of climate change are no secret. We are constantly reminded of the gloomy consequences that will arise at our continued rate of consumption without significant intervention. It is predicted that growing wage gaps combined with climate change will cause over 100 million people to fall into poverty. Moreover, this alarming statistic could impact the well being of children in Africa and Asia, causing 120 million to suffer from malnourishment by 2030. Current projections indicate that our urban footprint will likely triple, demand for food will increase by 35%, and the world’s water needs are expected to rise by 40%.The adverse effects of climate change are not exclusive to impoverished and marginalized communities. By 2030 global economic loss is expected to reach 3.2%, indicating that even the private sector is not immune.

With the Paris Agreement, the paradigm shifted to place international focus on the transition from a traditional economy to a green economy ̶ meaning one that recognizes the relationship between environmental sustainability, economic development, and climate change. Under the Paris Agreement, countries must submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to mitigating global climate change while operating within their national environmental and economic objectives. These NDCs set national targets by utilizing mitigation and adaptation mechanisms. Cumulatively, the commitments established by each country aim to meet the Paris Agreement’s objective of holding the increase in global temperature to “well below 2⁰C.” The implementation of mitigation and adaptation mechanisms require funding and corporate involvement to perform the work. In this manner, the Paris Agreement has propelled the green economy forward. As United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres recently stated, “Those that will be betting on the implementation of the Paris Agreement, on the green economy, will be the ones that have a leading role in the economy of the 21st century.”

The International Labor Organization (ILO) announced in its annual report, World Employment and Social Outlook 2018: Greening with Jobs, that 24 million new “green” jobs will be created globally by 2030. Likewise, within the same timeframe, the green economy is anticipated to offset predicted economic losses in traditional industries. The drastic advancements in renewable energy technology and innovation also support this assertion. For instance, more development in solar and hydroelectric energy technology reduced the demand for coal-based energy in many countries. In addition to this, industry leaders such as Microsoft and Amazon developed cloud-based computing services that enable small companies to reduce 90% of their CO₂ footprint. What is even more impressive is that the green economy’s net-worth now exceeds that of the fossil fuel sector (6% of the global stock market), according to a report by FTSE Russel. All of which lends credence to the words of ILO Deputy Director-General, Deborah Greenfield, who insisted that the green economy “can enable millions more people to overcome poverty and deliver improved livelihoods.”

Without a doubt, the green economy’s momentum shows no signs of stopping and has grown to exceed $1 trillion USD. However, this raises the question of how well-prepared are countries to handle the transition to a low-carbon economy. It is important to note even the green economy must be properly guided with the right policies. The aggregate collaboration from countries committed to the Paris Agreement is promising, and could provide the impetus for such guidance and direction for a sustainable economic shift. Only time will tell.

How Does a 2⁰C Increase in Global Temperature Impact Food Security?

Posted on September 26, 2018 by elizabethm

821 million people.

Nearly 821 million people across the world are food insecure, according to the 2018 State of Food Insecurity (SOFI) report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). This means that they do not have adequate access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy life. Evidence indicates that this number will likely increase if the global atmospheric temperature continues to rise.

The Guardian recently reported on a study by the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A on the impacts of allowable temperature rise of 1.5⁰C and 2⁰C. It found that vulnerability to food insecurity increases more at 2°C global warming than at 1.5°C, due to climate-induced drought and precipitation changes. Of all natural hazards, the SOFI report highlights that “floods, droughts and tropical storms affect food production the most. Drought causes more than 80 percent of the total damage and losses in agriculture.”

Maximum temperature, the percentage of days with extreme daily temperatures, the number of consecutive dry days, and the maximum rainfall in a 5-day period were measured to reach temperature impact conclusions. At a 2°C warmer world, the land areas mostly warm by more than 2°C. In some regions, like North America, China, and Europe, the daily high temperature increases could be double that of the globe on average. Southern Africa, the Mediterranean, Australia and northeast South America are projected to have increased dry spell lengths. Rainfall is projected to increase over many regions including parts of southeast Asia, northern Australia and the east coast of the USA.

The impacts on food security at an increase of 1.5°C global temperature are smaller than at 2°C. Drought and flooding are more extreme at an increase in global temperature of 2°C. The SOFI report noted the number of extreme climate-related disasters has doubled since the early 1990s. These disasters harm agricultural productivity contributing to shortfalls in food availability, hiked up food prices, and the loss of income reducing people’s access to food.

Why are these temperatures important? The Paris Agreement’s goal is to keep the global temperature rise this century “well below 2⁰C” above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5⁰C. This goal is outlined in Art 2 of the PA and aligns with the UNFCCC’s Art 2 objective to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”

Current IPCC reports model proposed mitigation pathways on limiting warming to 2°C. In early October, the IPCC will publish a report that remodels needed mitigation outcomes based on a 1.5°C limit. FAO has sounded the alarm for why less warming is critical to our food security and underscored why this new IPCC report is needed. At COP24, Parties will be faced with this new evidence as they negotiate the rules for implementing the Paris Agreement.

Is Insurance Betting on a Green Future?

Posted on November 18, 2017 by serena

The insurance industry is now one of the many actors in the private sector that are adapting to climate change. Insurance companies like Alianz or Prudential are taking actions to adjust. These big insurance companies work with groups like ClimateWise to navigate the financial world in light of climate change. But as climate change progresses, it is still uncertain whether this big insurance money will benefit or deter environmentalists’ efforts against climate change.

Traditionally, insurance companies do not like to invest in risky business. Their business model is sustained through pooling funds, investing to grow funds, and paying out funds only when necessary. To invest and to grow, insurance companies price their clients based on their behavior. They consider what to charge clients based on how often these clients would have to be compensated. Insurance companies rely heavily on data and statistics to determine the options of their customers. For example, data has shown that most auto accidents involve young drivers. So the pricing model for teenagers is much higher than the average 25+ year old. In health insurance, smokers are charged higher rates than non-smokers.

‘It’s standard procedure. Your rates will come down after a few years in the risk pool.

From an insurance company’s perspective, this practice is merely smart business. It is simply charging the riskier clients a higher premium to compensate for the higher likelihood of a pay out. In one way, this business model looks like insurance companies penalize certain client groups due to cold studies and statistics. Conversely though, insurance companies can use their pricing model to encourage certain behaviors. Their pricing models are tiered to prefer some customers over others. This subtle encouragement can shift behaviors to reduce the risk pool.

Insurance companies like Allianz are already practicing this scheme with climate change in mind by offering their clients “Green Solutions”. Their Green Solutions model charges clients based on three main elements. The first is to facilitate and promote green technology. The second is to mitigate climate change and conserve the environment. And the third is to help customers adapt to, and protect against, increasing environmental risk. Considering Allianz’s second element, behavior that is “environmentally friendly” is seemingly financially encouraged. green_solutions__288x200

Alternatively, other companies like Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. are getting involved within climate change by instigating litigation against the government. After extreme storms in 2013, sewer water flooded many of their customers. Illinois Farmers sued the “greater Chicago, Cook County, the City of Chicago and numerous other cities, towns, and villages” for the costs of its increased pay outs. Under the claims of negligent maintenance liability, failure to remedy known dangerous conditions, and takings without just compensation, Illinois Famers Insurance sued for just remedies.

chicago+riverwalk+flooded+4+thumb Within their complaint, they cite negligent action being taken in the face of climate action. They accuse the government for failing to “implement reasonable stormwater management practices and increase stormwater capacity.” They alleged that the government knew of the city’s limitations for rainwater overflow despite knowing the consistent yearly precipitation increase. They claim that the government’s negligence on climate change adaptation resulted in higher costs to private insurers. So rather than sue polluting companies for contributing to climate change, Illinois Farmers Insurance used its litigation to bring attention to the lack of adaptation action by the government.

In their desire to reduce risk and costs, insurance companies are reacting to climate change with more speed than governments. From encouraging climate friendly behavior to discouraging negligence, it is interesting to note the ways that the insurance industry can shape the response to climate change. Because money talks, the insurance industry could be an ally for environmentalism.

Nefarious Nets: Private Insurance in the Public Sector?

Posted on November 17, 2017 by serena

At the end of the day, the insurance industry is a business. But they are also a risk pool. So while they may be companies with stockholders and CEOs with a bottom line, they are still risk shares that are meant to minimize damage impacts amongst their insured customers. But as the insurance industry becomes savvier with personalized data about who to insure and how much to charge them – customers should ask themselves whether they can really trust their insurance company to be less of a capitalizing business and more of a safety net against damage.

As climate change damages rise, big insurance companies have begun to calculate risk costs with extreme weather events in mind. This calculation development has put insurers like Munich Re and Willis Re on the forefront of early action planning and early risk warning conversations at COP23. These two insurance companies are currently in partnership with InsuResilience. InsuResilience is a recently launched UN initiative that operates as a financial mechanism to buoy those who are vulnerable to climate change.

As a financial mechanism, InsuResilience will operate as a climate risk insurance provider to vulnerable people groups. This could occur directly with smallholder farmers or governments themselves. They have multiple programs and insurance plans that can provide service for small countries or service for small farmers. InsuResilience says that their plans will have the means to provide for “rapid emergency assistance and reconstruction, as it can very quickly disburse cash to the insured party.” The website claims that they will provide an effective and proactive approach to extreme weather events compared to the reactive measures taken by humanitarian charity efforts. Their unique position to act quickly could “save lives, protect[] livelihoods and assets, and safeguard[] development gains.”

As it affects developing countries and their campaign to receive compensation for climate change loss and damages, InsuResilience is a boon. InsuResilience allows developing and vulnerable countries to minimize the detrimental effects of climate change. In that way, InsuResilience follows a basic risk pooling example as countries pool their resources to protect and rebuild after an extreme event. For example, Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Tonga, Samoa, and Vanuatu have pooled their resources into the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) Insurance. PCRAFI proved itself to be a successful program when Tropical Cyclone Pam hit Vanuatu in 2015. Because of PCRAFI, Vanuatu was able to receive a US$1.9 million cash pay out. Vanuatu received its funds within one week of Tropical Cyclone Pam and Vanuatu was able to use those funds to support their recovery process by mobilizing nurses into the affected provinces. 150316073014-01-cyclone-pam-0316-super-169 PCRAFI is just one of the regional programs that InsuResilience supports. InsuResilience works with African Risk Capacity (ARC), Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF), India, Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), and more. 2cb97666-2c50-4fb7-a0c4-d0dfade57163 But PCRAFI is also being “complemented by reinsurance provided by Sompo Japan Nipponkoa Insurance, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance, Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance, Swiss Re, and Munich Re.” PCRAFI is not unique in that its funds are being complemented by private insurers. Granted, this position is not unique – but private insurers are taking a larger role in Climate Change than just reinsurance.

So while PCRAFI, its counterparts, and InsuResilience are providing vulnerable people groups safety nets against the financial costs of climate change damages – it is still being funding by private insurers. While private insurers are not inherently “nefarious”, the capitalist goals behind their operation provide a shadow of whether developing countries can trust these insurance companies to be less of a capitalizing business and more of a safety net against climate change damage.

Using an Interactive Simulation Model to Educate Students on our Climate Future

Posted on November 17, 2017 by luckie

C-ROADS stands for “Climate Rapid Overview and Decision Support Simulator.” It is a computer simulation tool developed by the non-profit think tank, Climate Interactive, to educate people on how to achieve climate change goals through interactive experiences. Here at COP23, C-ROADS was the focal point of the side event, “NVF: Using Decision-Maker Tools & Climate Education to Build Momentum on Climate Change.” As an award-winning computer simulator that helps people understand the long-term climate impacts of actions that reduce greenhouse gas emissions, C-ROADS focuses on an interactive experience that enables users actually to test their thinking on strategies for reducing emissions.

The C-ROADS simulation tool allows the user to manipulate factors similar to those that climate change negotiators face at the COP. These factors include, but are not limited to, country categories, emissions per year, the beginning reduction year, and an annual reduction rate. The user can play around with the data, entering different figures for the respective factors and watch the temperature (by 2100) change accordingly.

Panelist Andrew Jones of Climate Interactive, creator of C-ROADS, harkened on the point that, “research shows that showing people research doesn’t work.” Jones took this mantra to create what he calls is a “visceral, interactive experiences that get people actually to test their thinking.” Panelist Florian Kapmeier, of Reutlingen University, used C-ROADS to introduce students, of many age cohorts, to the roles of climate change negotiators. Kapmeier emphasized that students thought lectures were boring and C-ROADS, through interactive learning, was a way to get them engaged. Through its use, Jones hopes to demonstrate that there is no “silver bullet” in climate change mitigation, but educating people on the effects of climate change might help build better climate decision-makers of the future.

Justice Not Charity: It’s Just Compensation

Posted on November 16, 2017 by serena

Article 8 of the Paris Agreement was monumental for advocates of Loss and Damage. But the first draft of Article 8 reveals the concessions and compromises developing countries made to get it. Notably struck from the final version are the words and concepts of “compensation.” In the early draft, “compensation” was referred to as a “regime” for developing countries to receive support – specifically “LDCs, SIDS, and countries in Africa affected by slow onset events.” Without this clause, developing countries are left to the ambiguity of the current Article 8. Ever since, there has been financial tension between developed and developing countries to provide for the tragic loss and damage costs climate change has incurred.

Without the context of “compensation” in the Paris Agreement (and without any formal agreements afterwards), many developing countries are left with a seemingly lack of avenues to finance their recovery efforts. Fortunately, not all these avenues have closed against them. Formal litigation efforts for climate change damages is one burgeoning justice avenue developing countries may use to collect remedies from historically polluting countries. As climate change litigation gains traction, advocates should pay attention to framing loss and damage issues as a matter of justice rather than a matter of humanitarian aid. As Sabine Minigner of Brot for die Welt said on Tuesday (11/14/2017), climate change compensation is not charity but justice. Developing countries should not be penalized for carbon emissions they did not emit.

This burgeoning legal environmental justice concept can be seen in U.S. courts of common law. For example, the monumental case of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil began with a vulnerable people’s group in Alaska. The eventual plaintiff-appellants alleged that many fossil fuel giants (oil, coal, electric utilities, etc.) had contributed to global warming. Under tort law they sued for remedies of $400 million under public nuisance. The case was unfortunately dismissed for judicial doctrinal reasons. But even though the plaintiffs in Kivalina did not succeed, their litigation proves an important stepping stone as U.S. courts grapple with justice for those impacted by climate justice.

The U.S. is not unique in its litigation – many other countries are establishing legal avenues through plaintiff actions to bring polluters to justice. But the Kivalina case is still unique in that the plaintiffs were not seeking injunctive or immediate action, but reactive after-the-fact measures to bring them to their previous status quo. This was not litigation with goals for unjust enrichment. It was a matter of loss and damages and how a plaintiff can get a tortfeasor to compensate them for such. In that sense, climate change litigation parallels concepts of tort litigation.

And in most, if not all, tort casebooks the themes of justice, equity, and fairness are featured. The basic concept being that if one person hurts another, the tortfeasor (the one hurt) should be held liable in court to restore that person as far as they have damaged them. With this in mind, climate change litigation – as an arm of justice – may operate similarly. Maybe climate change litigation will gain more traction as those without, sue those who have and courts get more comfortable with climate science within their courts. So even though the Warsaw Implementation Mechanism will wait for another Excom to determine its finance arm, vulnerable people groups may have another avenue to recover incurred climate change damages from polluters. And really they should, it would just be justice taking form in compensation.

G77 + China: Perspectivas de la COP23

Posted on November 16, 2017 by mariapaula

Compuesto por 130 países, el G77 + China representa el grupo negociador más grande en la Convención Marco sobre el Cambio Climático (CMCC). El día de hoy durante su conferencia de prensa, la señora María Fernanda Espinoza en nombre del grupo, expresó los retos y debilidades de la COP23, así como los resultados positivos de las negociaciones sostenidas durante las últimas dos semanas en Bonn, Alemania.

En cuanto a los resultados positivos, el grupo resaltó la creación de la plataforma para las comunidades locales y los pueblos indígenas , la cual busca reforzar los conocimientos, las tecnologías, las prácticas y los esfuerzos de las comunidades locales y los pueblos indígenas para hacer frente al cambio climático.

Igualmente, destacó el trabajo que se ha realizado en el área de las pérdidas y daños con ocasión a los efectos de cambio climático en la que se están cuantificando los mismos para así definir los recursos necesarios para mitigación y adaptación y sobretodo recuperación después de un evento de cambio climático como los vividos en los últimos meses (Huracanes Irma y María).

Por otro lado, en lo que tiene que ver con las debilidades y los retos a los que todavía se enfrenta el grupo, Espinoza señaló que aún no está claro cómo las Partes van a cumplir con sus compromisos de adaptación y mitigación, en especial por los problemas de acceso a financiamiento y recursos, transferencias de tecnologías y el fortalecimiento de capacidades de los países.

En cuanto al financiamiento, resaltó que ocho años después de su creación el Fondo Verde Climático no ha recaudado el monto determinado para cada año y el acceso a este se hace cada vez más difícil, lo que pone en desventaja a los países menos desarrollados.

¿Qué está haciendo el G77 y China para mejorar el acceso al financiamiento y que las Partes puedan cumplir con sus metas de mitigación y adaptación?

El grupo presentó una propuesta ante la Conferencia de las Partes-COP23, en la que además de solicitar que el procedimiento para acceder a los recursos económicos sea más sencillo, se está solicitando un acceso real y consistente a los recursos que se necesitan por parte de los países.

Adicionalmente, se solicitó que estos recursos sean nuevos, predecibles y sostenibles en el tiempo para que se puedan financiar las actividades por medio de las cuales se busca cumplir con los compromisos adquiridos bajo el Acuerdo de París.

Así las cosas, y aunque se cumplieron algunos de los objetivos que se tenían para la COP23, los medios de implementación y en especial el acceso al financiamiento y los recursos sigue siendo “la pata débil” de las negociaciones.

Se espera que con la petición efectuada por el G77 y China, la COP continúe negociando y se llegue a un consenso para mejor el financiamiento que requieren los países menos desarrollados para cumplir con las metas propuestas bajo el Acuerdo de París.

Who is representing the US at COP23?

Posted on November 15, 2017 by yasin

You are on your way to COP23, the place to be for everything climate change. You walk through the doors and find yourself among hundreds of people from all over the world, running from one session to the other, with a quick stop perhaps for a cup of coffee. You attend negotiations and presentations, and develop an understanding of what is important to a country or a block of countries as they attempt to reverse the alarming rise in the planet’s temperature.

After a day or two, the chaos becomes normal and all the different languages you overhear start having a familiar tone. You begin to appreciate the setting: located by the Rhine and intersected by a city park, dotted with ponds where ducks, geese, and swans keep residence. It is beautiful. Then, as you are waiting for an electric car/bus to take you between the Bula and Bonn Zones, you notice a white dome shaped building to the side. Curious, you head there and find a sign for the U.S. Climate Action Center. Peppered throughout the place is the hash tag #wearestillin.

You feel surprised because the U.S. declared its intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. But a list of this Center’s events shows these presenters: Al Gore, Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland, Governor Jerry Brown of California, Governor Kate Brown of Oregon, and Governor Jay Inslee of Washington. In other words, a collection of American environmental rock stars and members of the U.S. Climate Alliance fill the place.

But then you notice that the U.S. delegation is hosting a “side event” titled The Role of Cleaner and More Efficient Fossil Fuels and Nuclear Power in Climate Mitigation. Unlike events held at the U.S. Climate Action Center, which attracted many attendees, this event drew protests. So who is representing the United States?

A closer look at the U.S. Climate Action Center shows that it as an effort by California Governor Jerry Brown that is funded by former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg. It has attracted a collection of states, counties and municipalities; colleges and universities; businesses; non-profit organizations; faith organizations; and ordinary citizens. All told, the U.S. Climate Action Center spans all fifty states, 127 million Americans, and $6.2 trillion, all intent on honoring continued U.S. commitment to the Paris Agreement. A delegation called the People’s Delegation at COP23 pledged to the UNFCCC that “we are still in.”

The U.S. delegation, with representatives from the State Department and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is the delegation of record. It, and only it, has the authority to negotiate on behalf of the U.S. (at least till the U.S. projected exit in 2020). But I believe the delegation that can effectuate the goals of the Paris Agreement has the upper hand. If “we are still in” manages to reduce GHG emissions in the U.S., then they are the delegation of record!

Stories of Loss and Damage: Non-Economic Loss

Posted on November 15, 2017 by serena

Non-Economic Loss (NELs) can be – simply – understood as loss that is not economic and “not commonly traded within the market.” It is complex and its worth can be misunderstood because it has no commercial value. But that does not mean it is any less harmful for a country or vulnerable people group to incur a non-economic loss. NELs can destroy or undermine an entire society or culture. So although they are abstract, their place within Loss and Damage (L&D) conversation should not be forgotten.

Most of the L&D negotiation sessions that have taken place at COP23 have focused on matters of finance, but after an inspiring conversation with Koko Warner of the U.N, I have realized that L&D negotiations need to tell the stories of loss. The classic tension between developed countries and their neglect to pa climate change damage to developing countries is an institutional story that dehumanizes the issues of L&D. L&D is more than just a compensation mechanism for developing countries, it is the story of vulnerable people who have been impacted by climate change. In the future of negotiations, the narrative of NEL within L&D should not be forgotten. So, readers should please consider a few narratives of NEL.

First, is the story of the Italian farmer – Ms. Guidobaldi – and her “children.” As climate change rises average temperatures, farmers in the Mediterranean have noticed inconsistencies within their crops. Crop loss and inconsistent yield would be a simple economic loss, but the impact of losing an eight generation farm and business due to climate change has consequences. A loss of identity, culture, or lifestyle can easily be categorized as a NEL. This specific type of loss is what happens to many people groups impacted by climate change. They often find themselves displaced or forced into an alternative culture where the costs of assimilating are high.

The second story is that of the Quechua in the glacial Andes. The Quechua face a NEL in that as the glaciers recede, their religious doctrine decree the world’s end. On top of that – and maybe more importantly – the glaciers serve the Quechua as a water source. With a receding water source and a religious belief in retribution, the Quechua face a unique choice of evils.

As climate change disasters become more consistent and temperatures higher, neither the Quechua’s or Ms. Guidobaldi’s problems will easily disappear. In fact, they will likely exacerbate with the changes in climate. For these reasons, it is important that negotiators humanize L&D and remember that behind bland conversations of shall and should there are victims whose entire livelihoods and realities have been completely upended.