Adaptation and Gender Issues

Posted on December 11, 2018 by Isabelle Blouin

Article 7 of the Paris Agreement sets the global goal of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response to climate change.

Section 7.5 of the Paris Agreement further clarifies that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based, on local knowledge systems, among other things, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions.

Today at COP24, two side events—Advancing Gender Equality through National Adaptation Plan processes: A straightforward consideration or a complex challenge? and The Global Adaptation Goal and the Importance of Gender Transformative Resilience Finance—emphasized that National Adaptation Plan (“NAP”) processes need to be developed and implemented in a gender responsible manner, pursuant to the Paris Agreement.

In 2017-2018, the NAP Global Network prepared a report entitled Towards Gender-Responsive National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Processes: Progress and Recommendations for the Way Forward, in the general context of having a better understanding of how developing countries are integrating gender considerations in the NAP processes (the “NAP Global Network Report”).

In its report, the NAP Global Network reiterated the recent decisions under the UNFCCC that have emphasized the significant linkages between climate action and gender equality (e.g. the 2014 Lima Work Programme on Gender and Climate Change). In 2015-2016, the UNFCCC recognized that the NAP process is an opportunity to integrate gender consideration. More generally, it further highlighted that gender equality is recognized as a universal human right and is at the center of the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030.

It is important that NAP processes integrate socio-cultural issues such as gender in order to be effective. As pointed out by the NAP Global Network Report, work has been done on that front in many countries, but there are still many challenges in order to be able to do so successfully.

More specifically, the Report indicates that many countries have made an effort to integrate gender considerations in their NAP documents. However, certain obstacles in integrating gender issues in adaptation measures exist, such as institutional barriers which can limit dialogue and collaboration between gender and climate adaptation actors; information gaps, including sex-disaggregated data related to climate impacts and adaptation needs; and gender analysis of adaptation options, barriers and opportunities.

The NAP Global Network made a series of recommendations to stakeholders who are called to develop and implement NAPs including:

Committing to a gender-responsive NAP process going forward
Using the NAP process to enhance institutional linkages between climate change adaptation and gender equality
Improving gender balance in NAP-related institutional arrangements
Undertaking gender-balanced and inclusive stakeholder engagement for NAP processes
Using gender analysis and stakeholders’ inputs efficiently

The NAP Global Network Report also underlines that investments in country capacity building on gender adaptation need to be more significant.

Adapting the Adaptation Fund under the Paris Agreement

Posted on November 28, 2018 by achristian

The future of the Adaptation Fund (AF) is among the dicey climate finance issues to watch as Parties seek to complete negotiations on the Paris Agreement Rulebook over the upcoming 2 weeks. While it is small, with total cumulative receipts of only $737 million, the AF is highly regarded and widely celebrated for the “relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of its work” and its “contribut[ion] to transformational change.”

The AF was created under the Kyoto Protocol, and thus subject to the CMP, not the COP. The requisite decision to have it serve the Paris Agreement came in 2017 at CMP13.

On the eve of the Katowice climate change conference, concerns remain about whether, in its new life, the AF will retain the unique and innovative features that have made it so vitally important to developing countries. In particular, developing countries want to preserve:

Direct access (not having to access funds through multilateral institutions)
Grants-based funding
Full cost accounting of country-driven projects/programmes, and
A developing country majority on the AF board.

Negotiators have been grappling with two divisive issues that will impact these characteristics: 1) the AF board composition, and 2) how the Fund will be resourced.

The 16-member AF board currently includes 2 representatives from the 5 UN regional groups, 1 each from the small island developing states (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and 2 each from the UNFCCC’s Annex I Parties and non-Annex-I Parties.

A proposal to eliminate the differentiation between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties and expand donor country representation on the board emerged during APA 1-6 in Bangkok in September. Developing country Parties want the make-up to remain unchanged and are pushing back hard. They fear undue donor country influence not only on funding decisions, but also on multiple other important aspects of governance and operations.

As for resources, a percentage of proceeds from the marketable emission reduction credits of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) initially funded the AF. With CDM proceeds drying up in recent years, the Fund has had to seek voluntary contributions – not a sustainable mode. Currently, the Fund has only ½ of the resources needed to meet the amount requested in the most recent round.

While, across the board, Parties support establishing new innovative mechanisms to serve as revenue sources, most developing countries also want to continue the original model and link AF resourcing to the Article 6 international crediting mechanism(s) that will emerge from negotiations. Developed country Parties, don’t want to give up any value of the credits they secure from funding mitigation projects in other countries, and some have wondered why the Adaptation Fund should be continued at all, given that the Green Climate Fund provides adaptation financing. That perspective has little traction, and we are likely to see some rich engagement about resourcing.

Two just-released publications will certainly impact any climate finance negotiations: 1) the 2018 Biennial Assessment (BA) and Overview of Climate Finance Flows * (from the Standing Committee on Finance), and 2) the 2018 Emissions Gap Report of the UN Environment Program (Executive Summary is here).

According to the BA, climate finance flows to non-Annex I Parties reached a new high of $74.5 billion in 2016, still far short of the $100 billion per year by 2020 developed countries committed to provide and mobilize. Characteristically, too, adaptation funding remained less than 40% of that for mitigation in public climate finance flows for 2015-2016, with adaptation funding a rarity in private finance.

The emissions gap is the difference between the GHG emission levels needed to keep global temperature rise below 2°C or 1.5°C in 2100 (compared to pre-industrial levels) and the global GHG emission level the NDCs are expected to achieve if fully implemented by 2020.

Two of the many key messages from the Emissions Gap Report giving the climate community pause are that:

The “gap has increased significantly in comparison with previous estimates” and
“Global greenhouse gas emissions show no signs of peaking.”

Given the prospects ahead, poorer countries are expected to be unwavering on a strong funding foothold for the Adaptation Fund and a path to grow it.

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Photo credits: 1) https://www.adaptation-fund.org/; 2) Leolintang/iStock by Getty Images; 3) http://www.famu.edu/index.cfm?PreMed&ADVISORYBOARD; 4) https://www.customtermpapers.org/free-term-papers/term-paper-emissions-trading/; 5) https://indicaonline.com/blog/ways-marijuana-dispensaries-save-money/; 6) https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018. Featured image: https://grist.org/climate-change/2011-08-25-neoliberalism-and-climate-change-adaptation/

(*The 2018 BA is a complex compilation that covers climate finance flows in 2015 and 2016, examines trends from 2011-2014, explores gains in measurement, reporting and verification of these flows, and considers the implications for global goals and efforts.)

Show Us The Money!

Posted on November 1, 2018 by achristian

Tension in the global climate finance community is mounting as the Katowice climate change conference approaches. The September effort to advance the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP) exposed deep historic divides on climate finance (reported here, here and here). And though the Green Climate Fund Board thankfully “righted its ship” a bit in October (see our close look here), the relief did not ease the larger systemic angst.

At its core, climate finance is a highly political issue. For the most part, rich societies are suffering far less from climate change impacts than poorer ones, and have far more resources with which to respond to those impacts. Poor countries need substantial help from the developed world to do the same. Yet, many developed countries are not inclined to make the enormous financial investments required to address global climate change for outcomes that won’t be realized until the distant future and that will mostly benefit other countries. We get a glimpse of this reality in Climate Scoreboard’s just released Global Report #8, on which we reported yesterday.

Since the adoption of the UNFCCC, developed countries have committed to and provided some, but not nearly enough, climate finance to help developing countries meet the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change. Their collective target of $100 billion/year by 2020, established in the 2009 Copenhagen Accords and reiterated in the Paris Agreement decision (1/CP.21), falls hundreds of billions short of predicted needs for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. (Numbers are hard to come by, but the World Economic Forum projected a few years ago that $700 billion/year in climate investment will be required by 2020, while UNEP has estimated annual adaptation costs alone could reach $500 billion by 2050.) Additionally, many are questioning the likelihood that even the $100 billion/year by 2020 will be realized (see here, here and here).

All of this adds up to a lot at stake for climate finance in Katowice in December, where Parties have promised to bring the Paris Agreement implementation guidelines across the finish line.

One of the most contentious climate finance issues we have been tracking is whether Article 9.5 will be fully operationalized. It stipulates that developed country Parties, and others as they can, “shall” communicate, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, financial resources they intend to provide to developing country Parties (ex ante support). However, decision 1/CP.21 calls only for identifying the information Parties will report, and not the modalities to be used in accounting of those resources.

Some feel this was an oversight in the rush to adopt the Paris Agreement back in December 2015, since it is unusual for a COP to decide what Parties are to report without also deciding how the information will be reported and used. For instance, for Article 9.7, decision 1/CP.21 sets in motion identifying both the what and how Parties will report on financial resources they have provided and mobilized through public intervention (ex post support).

Developed country Parties contend that Article 9.5 is sufficiently clear and that no action is required. They want to use the existing general guidelines from 3/CP.19 for the biennial submissions they were requested to make on “scaling up climate finance from 2014-2020.” Notably, only 7 Parties and the EU made such submissions.

Developing country Parties assert that predictability and transparency are at the heart of Article 9.5 and that it must be fully operationalized by also specifying accounting modalities. In particular, Parties should decide how the information will be compiled, made publicly available, transmitted to the global stocktake, and be subject to technical review, none of which is addressed by the earlier general guidance on reporting ex ante support.

Currently, the battle for and against establishing modalities for Article 9.5 is being played out under agenda item 8a of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA).

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Stay tuned for more posts on climate finance issues for COP 24/CMA 1-3. And, may all Parties show up rich in political will.

As COP24 Approaches, Negotiators Attempt to Narrow Their Focus

Posted on October 18, 2018 by bencanellys

In the months leading up to the COP, Parties are in constant discussion. On September 27^th, the incoming COP24 Presidency organized an informal consultation in New York, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. The COP23 Presidency, UNFCCC Executive Secretary, and presiding officers all attended, along with thirty-three member states. The Parties’ lead negotiators met to discuss four elements of the potential COP24 outcome in Katowice, Poland: the NDCs process, adaptation, finance, and transparency. As the report of this meeting indicates, one of the issues addressed was “How do we manage the transition from the current transparency system to a future one, while ensuring flexibility for the countries in light of their capabilities?”

In Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, all Parties agreed to an enhanced transparency framework for action and support. This framework has built-in flexibility that accounts for Parties’ different capabilities and circumstances. Article 13.1 announces explicitly that “in order to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation, an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with built-in flexibility which takes into account Parties’ different capacities and builds upon collective experience is hereby established.” Article 13.2 adds that “the transparency framework shall provide flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of this Article to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities. The modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article shall reflect such flexibility.” The Parties have been negotiating the exact content of these modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) since 2015 and have designated COP24 as the deadline for agreeing on them.

A key part of these negotiations is recognizing that some Parties require additional funding to achieve their reporting and transparency goals. To this end, the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) was established. CBIT’s goal is to strengthen the institutional and technical capabilities of developing countries for collecting and reporting data on progress made on their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This data will then be used to inform the global stocktake (GST), which is a collective assessment of all Parties’ progress on their NDCs toward the Paris Agreement’s Article 2 objective of keeping atmospheric warming to “well below” 2C. The Paris Agreement requested that the Global Environment Facility (GEF) support the establishment of CBIT through voluntary contributions and build donor support. As of December 2017, $61 million had been pledged to the CBIT Trust Fund and $53 million of it had been dedicated to the first 41 projects in 39 countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Through this support, CBIT has established a Global Coordination Platform that helps and encourages Parties to engage in multilateral and bilateral capacity building initiatives. Parties agree that CBIT is necessary for ensuring a smooth transition to a new transparency system. However, not all Parties agreed on what form the new system should take.

While discussing the scope a new transparency system at the September 27^th meeting, Parties suggested that all Parties have the same the submission date for the first biennial transparency report (BTR). Others proposed to have different submission dates for developed and developing Parties. This would reflect the timing each Party required under their CBDRRC. Additionally, while building flexibility into the system, the Parties split into two camps. One side suggested that flexibility be general in nature and by each Party’s national circumstances and capacities, while the other maintained that they be specific and limited to a small number of issues.

The next discussion is on October 24^th in Krakow at the close of the “pre-COP” meeting hosted by the COP24 Presidency. The suggestions made in New York will be explored and expanded upon by the Parties continuously until the COP. The enhanced transparency network covering mitigation, adaptation, and support is paramount within the PA to informing the GST and allowing parties to aggregate their efforts towards our global goal.

Energy Justice: Mitigation, Adaptation, AND Sustainable Development Goals in the IPCC Special Report

Posted on October 14, 2018 by christashute

Over three billion people rely on wood, charcoal or dung for cooking, with primarily women spending 15-30 hours per week collecting these resources. Household Air Pollution (HAP) results in over 4 million deaths a year. The second most impactful climate change pollutant is black carbon and HAP contributes 25% of black carbon. Clearly, we can integrate mitigation, adaptation, AND sustainable development.

The first sentence of the Global Warming of 1.5°C IPCC Special Report references the Paris Agreement’s enhanced objective “to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.” (Article 2) The IPCC report references and builds on the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approved and adopted by national leaders in September 2015. The SDGs consist of 17 goals and 169 targets developed as a sustainability framework. Top goals include the elimination of poverty and hunger; an increase in health, education, and gender equality; and access to clean water, sanitation and affordable energy. Additional goals address economic growth, industry, innovation and infrastructure, sustainable cities and responsible consumption, life below water and on land, climate action, peace, justice and strong institutions, and partnerships for the goals.

The IPCC report highlights one of the largest differences between 1.5°C and 2°C as the disproportionate impact on poor and vulnerable populations, furthering inequities. However, addressing these inequities through sustainable development can also become a positive. One bright spot in an otherwise dire report is the potential for significant synergies between sustainable development with mitigation and adaptation strategies. But ONLY IF we think about the issues holistically and find mechanisms to cooperate internationally. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement recognizes “the importance of integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches” and mentions supporting and promoting sustainable development in Paragraphs 1,2,4, and 9. A failure to consider mitigation and adaptation strategies in the context of sustainable development and the SDGs could result in the opposite effect of creating long term negative impacts on the health and survival of those populations that contributed the least to the problem and have extremely limited resources to weather the consequences.

Let’s strengthen our sustainable development goals through enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions and provide some accountability with some teeth in Katowice.

China’s Effort to Limit GHGs

Posted on October 3, 2018 by amandac

China produces more carbon dioxide than any other country in the world: 10.357 million metric tons per year. To limit their impact on climate change, China includes environmental protection in their Five Year Plan (FYP). The FYP is the country’s blueprint that outlines the policy framework, priorities, economic, and social development goals for the 2016-2020 period.

In 2016, China released the 13th FYP which includes lofty goals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and increase green manufacturing. Innovation is the crux of this FYP. Innovation builds on improving manufacturing and emphasizing a cleaner, green economy. A State Council executive meeting in 2015 discussed implementing an Internet Plus Circulation program. The program expands broadband connection to more rural areas so there is more efficiency in transporting items, like new agricultural products and equipment. The program will also allow rural populations to access health care. Air pollution is a key target for the FYP. Chapter 38, Section 4, ensures that the concentration of fine particulate matter is reduced by at least 25%. The current status of smog and air pollution affects public health. China is increasing regulations for coal-fired plants while requiring low-emission technologies and eliminating outdated industrial equipment and processes.

The carbon dioxide emissions reduction targets in the FYP contribute to China’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) 2030 target. The 13th FYP even put a first nation-wide total energy cap on all energy sources: it is set at less than the equivalent of five billion tons of coal over the next five years. These goals are reflected in the INDC filed on June 30, 2015. Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, provides that “[e]ach Party shall prepare…nationally determined contributions…with the aim of achieving the objectives…” of reaching a global peak of GHG emissions as soon as possible. During COP24 in December, China may include details about innovation and policy from the 13th FYP into the NDC because it is on track to meet the 2020.

China is fully embracing their 2020 goals by implementing green community projects. On September 28, 2018, Green Climate Fund announced that the board will consider projects, including China’s Green Cities program,targeting Central Asia and Eastern Europe. This project is among 20 other proposals totaling $1.1 billion to be heard during the next board meeting this month. It will be interesting to see how these project proposals will factor into each countries’ NDC during COP24.

How Does a 2⁰C Increase in Global Temperature Impact Food Security?

Posted on September 26, 2018 by elizabethm

821 million people.

Nearly 821 million people across the world are food insecure, according to the 2018 State of Food Insecurity (SOFI) report by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). This means that they do not have adequate access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy life. Evidence indicates that this number will likely increase if the global atmospheric temperature continues to rise.

The Guardian recently reported on a study by the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A on the impacts of allowable temperature rise of 1.5⁰C and 2⁰C. It found that vulnerability to food insecurity increases more at 2°C global warming than at 1.5°C, due to climate-induced drought and precipitation changes. Of all natural hazards, the SOFI report highlights that “floods, droughts and tropical storms affect food production the most. Drought causes more than 80 percent of the total damage and losses in agriculture.”

Maximum temperature, the percentage of days with extreme daily temperatures, the number of consecutive dry days, and the maximum rainfall in a 5-day period were measured to reach temperature impact conclusions. At a 2°C warmer world, the land areas mostly warm by more than 2°C. In some regions, like North America, China, and Europe, the daily high temperature increases could be double that of the globe on average. Southern Africa, the Mediterranean, Australia and northeast South America are projected to have increased dry spell lengths. Rainfall is projected to increase over many regions including parts of southeast Asia, northern Australia and the east coast of the USA.

The impacts on food security at an increase of 1.5°C global temperature are smaller than at 2°C. Drought and flooding are more extreme at an increase in global temperature of 2°C. The SOFI report noted the number of extreme climate-related disasters has doubled since the early 1990s. These disasters harm agricultural productivity contributing to shortfalls in food availability, hiked up food prices, and the loss of income reducing people’s access to food.

Why are these temperatures important? The Paris Agreement’s goal is to keep the global temperature rise this century “well below 2⁰C” above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5⁰C. This goal is outlined in Art 2 of the PA and aligns with the UNFCCC’s Art 2 objective to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”

Current IPCC reports model proposed mitigation pathways on limiting warming to 2°C. In early October, the IPCC will publish a report that remodels needed mitigation outcomes based on a 1.5°C limit. FAO has sounded the alarm for why less warming is critical to our food security and underscored why this new IPCC report is needed. At COP24, Parties will be faced with this new evidence as they negotiate the rules for implementing the Paris Agreement.

“Replace NAFTA Don´t Let Trade “TRUMP” Climate: #TransformTrade”

Posted on November 13, 2017 by mariapaula

“Find the Justice now, Keep it in the Ground, … not in this town, we will fight this NAFTA now and replace it next round.” That is the song that a group of young people from Canada and the U.S. sang in the Bonn Zone of the COP23 today.

According to the Sierra Club, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has empowered corporate polluters and locked in fossil fuel dependency, “boosting destructive mining in Mexico and contributing to the rise of Canada´s toxic tar sands industry.”

President Trump signed an executive order to renegotiate NAFTA to grow the U.S economy. Even though it was not intended, the Sierra Club believes that this renegotiation could be an opportunity to incorporate and enforce the climate goals in the Paris Agreement.

For these young people, the trade agreements are more binding than the climate agreements. Transforming NAFTA limiting fossil fuel activities and improving workers lives, will enhance the protection of workers rights, communities and the planet.

As noted by Anthony Torres from the Sierra Club, “corporate trade agreements like NAFTA have undermined the Paris Agreement´s core objective of tackling climate change. Instead leading environmentalists across North America have called for a NAFTA replacement that incorporates and enforces the Paris Agreement´s climate goals.”

Likewise, Maia Wikler from SustainUS and a Vancouver, BC resident said: “My government has an opportunity and a responsibility to ensure that NAFTA´s replacement enforces the Paris climate goals rather than undermining them. So far, our trade and climate agreements have gone in opposite directions- a huge gap not being addressed at this conference.”

Everyday we get to see more young people clamoring for decision makers to improve climate actions. #TransformTrade is one more. Hopefully, if the governments involved in NAFTA follow their petitions, and don´t let trade “trump” climate, the renegotiation of NAFTA will incorporate the Paris climate goals.

Don’t You Forget CGE

Posted on November 10, 2017 by VFajardo

Before Nationally Determined Contributions and Capacity-Building, there was the Consultative Group of Experts. The Consultative Group of Experts was established by the 5^th Conference of the Parties under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. The CGE is the key technical support element under the UNFCCC that assists developing country Parties in meeting their reporting obligations. It provides developing country Parties with technical advice and support to improve their national communications (NCs) and biennial update reports (BURs).

The CGE, being mandated by the UNFCCC in 1999, was supposed to terminate by 2009. After getting reconstituted once (2009 to 2012) and extended twice (2012 to 2013, 2014 to 2018), will reach the end of its mandate next year, when the Implementing Guideline for the Paris Agreement are intended to go into effect. Its Five-Year Work Programme from 2015-2018 focused on five key priorities: (1) Building the capacity of developing country Parties to facilitate implementation of Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) arrangements under the UNFCCC; (2) enhance the sustainability of the national communications of the national communications and biennial update report process; (3) enhance collaboration and cooperation with other global initiatives; (4) enhance communication and outreach; and (5) enhance availability of resources and optimal working arrangements for the operations of the CGE.

Thus far, the CGE has conducted successful regional workshops in Africa and in Asia, involving 52 non-Annex I parties in total. These workshops were organized in collaboration with the Global Support Program. The CGE has also held webinars in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee (AC), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These webinars covered a wide range of topics relevant to non-Annex I Parties’ NCs and BURs, such as the MRV Framework and climate change scenarios. The CGE also has a free e-learning course on national GHG inventory systems, mitigation assessment, and vulnerability and adaptation assessment. These projects have allowed non-Annex I Parties like Indonesia and Uruguay to submit their respective NCs and BURs to the UNFCCC Secretariat.

Yet, despite all of CGE’s good work, non-Annex I Parties—now developing country Parties under the Paris Agreement—still lack important capacities that will put them in par with the reporting capabilities of the Annex I parties. The CGE’s 2017 Survey revealed that this lower capability in non-Annex I parties is a result several factors, the most prominent of which are insufficient resources and ineffective institutional arrangements. Governments in developing countries have tight purse strings and often suffer from high turn-over rates. Moreover, they often do not have local institutions that manage the entire reporting process. Financial concerns aside, the CGE attempts to address ineffective institutional arrangements by encouraging and helping developing countries establish these institutions and train their people. For countries with very limited capacity, assistance for the CGE is invaluable.

After all the beneficial work of the CGE, does it have a role to play under the Paris Agreement? The answer to that is simple: We do not know. Once the CGE’s Five-Year Mandate ends, the CGE ceases to operate, unless it is renewed for another period.

The Paris Agreement builds on the UNFCCC and will eventually supersede it. There is no provision in the Paris Agreement that bestows a role on the CGE. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation included this issue on its provisional agenda, but ultimately decided to hold it in abeyance. Therefore, the Parties will not discuss the fate of the CGE in COP 23. Unless the Parties decide to include the role of the CGE in its agenda for SBI 48, the CGE will not be featured in the Paris Agreement’s Implementation Guidelines. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement asks Parties to submit nationally determined contributions. This means that Parties decide on what to submit and how to submit, subject to the basic requirements laid out in the Agreement. Whether the CGE evolves to serve the Parties’ needs under the Agreement depends on whether the Parties remember that the CGE exists to help them.

This does not mean that the CGE will have absolutely no hand in the Parties’ progress towards their goals. The CGE trained some of the developing country Parties. They created material that get passed on from one developing country Party administration to the next. However the CGE’s story ends, the Parties should know that the Paris Agreement would not have been as successful without it.

Wheels of climate change policy roll on in Bonn

Posted on May 25, 2017 by achristian

While angst about the pending Trump decision on the Paris Agreement (PA) remained a subtext of the annual intersessional climate meetings that wrapped up last week in Bonn, Germany, the technical work trundled on.

More than 3,300 (negotiators, observers [including a VLS delegation], plus secretariat and other agency staff) participated in:

the 46th sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI),
the 3rd part of the first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA1.3),
several COP-mandated companion events (e.g., indigenous peoples, climate finance reporting, capacity building), and
more than 90 side events.

Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth

The Earth Negotiations Bulletin gave its usual comprehensive (if dry) lowdown of the meetings. By many reports (here, here, here, and here), the negotiations moved rather smoothly. In particular, positions on APA agenda items got clarified, even though negotiating texts are still out of reach. The APA must deliver a Paris rulebook by December 2018.

Aside from the Trump question, the media coverage (e.g., here, and here) spotlighted the contentious tussle over conflict of interest (read: corporate/fossil fuel industry influence on climate policy). But that shadow side of the SBI’s imperative to “further enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders,” was not the only thing we watched.

A few of our observations:

APA round table. (Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth)

APA round tables got a thumbs up for the airing and clarifying of views and could speed introduction of “contextual proposals” for PA rulebook pieces. Five will be held ahead of COP23, though observers will be excluded.

Parties are determined to understand, manage and capitalize on the linkages between Paris Agreement articles, and between the APA work and PA work of the subsidiary bodies. This is important and rich ground for cohesiveness.

More frequent interventions are coming from the new “coalition” of 3
Marcia Levaggi, Argentina, speaking on behalf of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth)

contiguous South American countries – Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. They constitute 3 of the 4 members of Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, which is on track to a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association. We’ve known them as part of multiple different negotiating groups: G77+China (all 3); Coalition of Rainforest Nations (Argentina, Uruguay); BASIC (Brazil); Like-minded Developing Countries (Argentina); and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). We’ll be keeping an eye on this development.
The Long Term Climate Finance workshops (LTF) may catalyze concrete COP consideration of strategies to address the confusing
Breakout during LTF event. (Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth)

multi-lateral climate finance architecture and developing countries’ challenges in accessing finance. (See the World Resources Institute new pub out on this issue.)
The SBSTA’s agriculture agenda item hopped on a rollercoaster, disrupting the 4-year stalemate between developed and developing countries over adaptation vs mitigation. The excitement generated by delegates’ Week 1 mantras (“very substantive dialogue,” “feels like a family”) landed with a thud in the end. No mature elements moved forward to the SBI; nor was an agriculture work programme recommended. We do see slightly positive prospects looking ahead, given the Co-Facilitators’ non-paper. Stay tuned for our deeper dive on this.

The Gender Action Plan workshop wasn’t covered by anyone, but you’ll get the in-depth story with our next post.

Next up? Thank you, Carbon Brief, for the chart of steps toward COP23.

Adaptation and Climate Resilience – Help Wanted

Posted on December 21, 2016 by achristian

A recent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) half-day seminar – Climate Change Adaptation Investments and Measuring Effectiveness – considered a pressing suite of interrelated issues. As Timmons Roberts of Brown University (one of the moderators) stated, “[t]his seminar is not an academic exercise.” Developing countries urgently need climate change adaptation help and they want and need to know if the commitments from developed countries are being met.

Their concerns go back to a key premise for the Paris Agreement (PA) – developing countries agreeing to compromise their own fossil fuel industrialization (a faster, less expensive path toward poverty reduction than leaping over it into renewables) in exchange for the promise of greater support for both mitigation and adaptation. This weighed heavily last month in Marrakech, especially with release of the controversial Climate Finance “Roadmap” by a subset of OECD countries just before the climate conference. In addition to objections to the Roadmap’s methodology (we touched on this here), the much greater support documented so far for mitigation over adaptation flew directly in the face of the balance between the two that had served as another “ground rule” for achieving PA consensus.

With that backdrop, this NAS seminar featured academic, investment, agency, and civil society perspectives from around the world that explored:

How adaptation action is counted, financed and evaluated, including in the context of climate resilient development;
The challenges of adaptation investment decision-making within competing and sometimes overlapping contexts (e.g., the relationships of strict criteria to vulnerability reduction to resilience building, and of adaptation finance to climate finance to development finance); and
How the effectiveness of adaptation activities and resilience building can and should be measured.

The discussion helped illuminate an evolution of terminology, concepts and experience at the intersection of adaptation science, practice and policy. The response to climate change is no longer just about mitigation and adaptation. The PA’s purpose (laid out in Article 2) clearly broadens that response to include climate resilience, while also omitting “adaptation” from the language on finance flows (i.e., making them “consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”).

This evolution is confounding decision-making around support and evaluation, which is in turn impacting the accounting of adaptation finance and the capacity of on-the-ground communities to adequately deal with climate change.

These are a few of the key takeaways drawn from the robust presentations and discussion:

The ultimate goal is that of reducing vulnerability, and the strategy is to build dynamic climate resilience (not just resilience to a certain set of conditions). Thus, resilience, as a goal, should be embedded into adaptation interventions/projects of every kind, with regular reviews tied to the results of resilience building activities.
A shared system of resiliency principles is needed to guide financial support and implementation, as opposed to a unified definition of adaptation (as crafted by a cadre of multi-lateral development banks) or a host of different definitions (currently being utilized by a broad set of agencies).
There is no convergence across the wide-ranging landscape of indicators of success and their associated metrics; but tapping other fields (e.g., evaluation) and establishing linkages between developers and implementers can significantly address this issue.
Lessons to date point to adopting flexible adaptation pathways and success indicators that: a) account for all system resources (economic and non-), and b) rely on iterative, stakeholder-sensitive decisions over time (built-in learning, decision-making under uncertainty).

Let’s hope these and other lessons rapidly translate into credible, applicable guidance capable of assuring finance support accountability and long-term effectiveness of on-the-ground interventions. Developing countries need both.

LDCs – Concern, yet hope, entering Week 2 of COP22

Posted on November 15, 2016 by achristian

At the end of the first week, many were expressing concern that Marrakech’s purported COP of Action wasn’t measuring up for the world’s most vulnerable countries. Yesterday morning, Least Developed Countries (LDC) Chair, Tosi Mpanu Mpanu, identified troubles on key issues of ambition, adaptation / loss & damage, and climate finance. In particular, he noted that:

The Paris Agreement rulebook development is being stymied and strong action on pre2020 commitments is not materializing.

Adaptation needs of the most vulnerable, exploding as a result of inadequate mitigation by developed countries for decades, are not being addressed in a balanced manner, with even the adaptation registry being complicated. And, foot dragging on other seemingly simple decisions, such as the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), is eroding trust and confidence that the global community will concretely respond to the very real and devastating losses and damages increasingly suffered by poor countries on the front lines of climate change impacts.

Developed countries have been blocking the Paris-mandated inclusion of the Adaptation Fund in the Paris Agreement rulebook, and the developed country recent “roadmap” to reach the promised $100 billion/year by 2020 lacks credibility – – unfortunate circumstances in the face of developing countries’ low-carbon climate resilient development needs now estimated to collectively exceed $4 trillion.

Work did continue yesterday, while heads of state and ministers arrived for the high-level segment. By the end of the day, among some positive developments were two improved draft decisions on the WIM (here and here). (More on these to come.) Additionally, the Green Climate Fund expedited grants for Liberia’s and Nepal’s National Adaptation Plans. Climate finance remains a hot topic on this week’s COP22 agenda, in particular, the upcoming High-Level Ministerial Dialogue on Climate Finance; so, hope remains for new and encouraging news on that front. (Check back with us on this, too!)

Photo credits: Action Time courtesy www.afd/fr; Informal negotiations courtesy iisd enb

Transparency Framework Update

Posted on November 12, 2016 by tori

Throughout this first week of COP22, I have followed the progress of the enhanced transparency framework (TF). The Paris Agreement created this TF through articles 13, 14, and 15. Because the TF is new, the discussions started out slowly. However, the Parties agreed that there is a sense of urgency in developing the modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) of implementing the new TF, as the Paris Agreement was ratified earlier than expected.

The Parties of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Paris Agreement (APA) met several times this week to discuss agenda item 5, relating to the TF in article 13 of the Paris Agreement. The co-facilitators, Andrew Rakestraw (US) and Xiang Gao (China) focused discussions on (1) transparency; (2) flexibility; and (3) national capacity. They presented the Parties with a draft work plan, which includes elements on organization of the work plan (balanced and logical manner that addresses elements of article 13), modalities for the work plan (submissions, technical paper, and workshops), and next steps. Most of the Parties welcomed the work plan. They agreed on a number of next steps: targeted submissions of Parties, and an intersessional workshop that will be forwarded to the co-chairs. The co-facilitators will post an updated work plan this evening, and will meet in a final informal consultation on Monday, Nov. 14, to receive Party reflections on the note.

The APA group met to discuss item 6, the global stocktake (GST) in article 14 of the Paris Agreement, several times this week. Co-facilitators Nagmeldin Elhassan (Sudan) and Ilze Prūse (Latvia) summarized Party inputs on the GST in an informal note. Many Parties requested a technical workshop and a technical paper by the Secretariat, however some Parties did not believe they were ready for technical papers. These Parties would prefer more conceptual work guided by the focused submission. Thus, the co-facilitators are working on incorporating the views of the Parties on next steps in a revised informal note. They will release a revised paper to share at the last meeting on Monday, Nov. 14.

Finally, the APA group met to discuss item 7, article 15 of the Paris agreement several times this week as well. Earlier this week, co-facilitators Peter Horne (Australia) and Janine Felson (Belize) released a set of guiding questions for the Parties. These focus areas included: (1) Scope; (2) capacity and national circumstance; (3) trigger mechanisms; (4) relationship with existing bodies; (5) enabling party participation; and (6) next steps. The co-facilitators then released a short summary of the conversations, and offered guidance for working forward. Today, co-facilitators invited the Parties to submit proposals on (but not limited to): specifying the modalities and procedures in paragraph 102, 103 of 1/CP.21, elaborating the elements the mandate, and sharing views on how to take work further such that it is in line with 1/CP.21. The purpose of these focus questions was to help the Parties develop the concrete details of the mandate; the co-facilitators have appreciated the rich exchange on conceptual ideas, however it is now critical to get down to the concrete details so that it is prepared for the CMA by 2018. The Parties were not prepared to answer these questions today. They may, however, offer recommendations at their final consultation next Monday, Nov. 14.

Following the Growth of Loss & Damage through the First Week of COP22

Posted on November 12, 2016 by Beth Bootz

Loss and damage (L&D) has come a long way since the Bali Action Plan and the Cancun Agreements. Last year at COP21, L&D received its own article under the Paris Agreement, Article 8. But what happens next? For the first week of COP22, L&D was on the agenda under SBI agenda item 11 and SBSTA agenda item 5, so the chairs of both subsidiary bodies created a joint informal consultation to discuss the following two issues. First, the informal consultation was tasked with consider the recommendations in the WIM Executive Committee’s (Excom’s) 2016 Report, especially as it relates to its framework proposal for its five-year workplan. Second, the parties at the informal were asked to undertake the review of the WIM, as mandated by the mechanism’s creation in 2/CP.19.

Since the beginning of the week, the parties have been working toward agreements on both agenda items. Led by Beth Lavender of Canada and Alf Willis of South Africa, the parties are beginning to come to agreements on each of their two agenda items. One agreement the parties came to was there needed to be two separate decisions on each agenda item to present to the subsidiary bodies. For the Excom Report, the co-facilitators circulated draft conclusions on Wednesday to begin discussions on the topic. One sticking point on these conclusions was whether the decisions should invite parties to make submissions on the financial placeholder in the five-year workplan framework from the Excom Report.

The issue of financial support for L&D is still an issue with all parties involved in this process. When the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) first brought up the concept of L&D in 1991, its goal was to create a compensation fund in order to compensate those countries who would be harmed by sea-level rise from climate change. From this point on, the idea of compensation has been hotly contested, especially by developed countries like the United States. This idea was also debated in Paris, but ultimately, the parties agreed that Article 8 did not “involve or provide a basis for any liability compensation.” Despite this, many developing countries still need financial support from the developed world to deal with L&D.

Late Friday night, the co-facilitators and the parties issued a second version of the draft conclusions text. This version of the text included a paragraph specifically asking parties to make submissions on the various placeholders in the framework workplan, including finance. Presumably, this new text signifies a compromise between the parties and that this text will be approved and sent to the subsidiary bodies for approval by the COP.

On the second agenda item, the parties were still discussing how and when they should conduct the review. Some believed that the review of the WIM needed to be completed by the end of COP22, while others thought that the parties needed time for party submissions on various issues before the review could conclude so the actually review should not be finalized until COP23. In order to help bridge this gap, the co-facilitators drafted questions with inputs from the parties and these questions would help guide the review process. The parties have yet to come to an agreement on the issues, but they need to do so before the COP closes for the weekend on Saturday night.

Reviewing the WIM is important, especially following questions in Paris as to whether the WIM was going to continue to be the L&D mechanism under the Paris Agreement. Because the parties decided to continue the mechanism, the review is especially important to ensure it performs all of its mandated functions from the past as well as to ensure that it is well-equipped to perform its future duties under the Paris Agreement.

Approving the Excom Report is also important for the future of the WIM under the Paris Agreement because it includes approving and strengthening the WIM’s five-year workplan, which dictates how the WIM will operate moving forward. Inviting party submissions on financial matters may seem like a small issue but there is no financial mandate for L&D in the Paris Agreement, making any information about financial support extremely important for developing countries. L&D is not a remote issue to be addressed in the future. The effects of L&D are affecting countries now. The strides made in the first week at COP22 may seem small when compared to the growth witnessed in Paris, but these developments are extremely important to ensure that the WIM is adequately equipped to address L&D now and in the future.

Human Mobility in the Face of Climate Change

Posted on November 11, 2016 by Beth Bootz

Human mobility in the face of climate change is an issue that is closely linked to Loss and Damage (L&D). Under Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, L&D includes extreme weather events as well as slow-onset events. Both extreme weather and slow-onset events could necessitate human mobility or displacement, whether it be rising sea levels displacing coastal communities and entire islands or increasing hurricane and tsunami threats that cause communities to move inland.

In the face of these threats, the COP has taken action. At the end of COP21, decision 1/CP.21 requested that the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for L&D create a task force on displacement “to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.” Since the COP issued this decision last December, the Executive Committee (Excom) of the WIM has published its 2016 Report to give an update on its progress over the last year, including information on the displacement task force. In the report, the Excom stated that it initiated the task force at its latest meeting and requested that the task force deliver its findings on displacement by COP24.

Keeping in line with this increasing focus on human mobility and displacement due to climate change, Thursday featured three side events on this topic. The first event discussed human mobility in the context of organizations and frameworks outside of the UNFCCC and in some instances, how those organizations and frameworks intersect with mechanisms under the UNFCCC. For example, Dina Ionesco with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) discussed a technical meeting and workshop on human mobility that occurred recently in Casablanca, Morocco, with the WIM in order to discuss capacity building, and action and implementation under the WIM. The WIM continues the call for expert advice from UN organizations and other expert bodies on the topic as part of action area six in its initial two-year workplan, further emphasizing the importance of human mobility and displacement under the WIM.

Another side event focused on the impact and importance of human mobility and displacement in especially vulnerable countries with a focus on a rights-based approach to displacement. This side event featured speakers from APMDD, COAST Trust, LDC Watch, and Friends of the Earth Africa and included discussions on what types of terminology is appropriate—migration or displacement—when discussing human mobility and climate change. Terminology in the context is important because they have set definitions in international law and these definitions don’t always conform with the context under which some human mobility occurs.

The final event from yesterday focused on cultural and heritage losses associated with human mobility and displacement. This event grounded the discussion in the noneconomic loss felt by many communities who voluntarily migrate or who are forced to leave their home behind in the face of repeated natural disasters or rising sea levels. Noneconomic losses are often overlooked when discussing human mobility because it’s difficult to assess these losses when conducting a cost-benefit analysis on whether to uproot communities. However, determining noneconomic losses, like loss of culture, are important to ensure any voluntary migrations are successful. The impacts are real and felt by all of the community members who are forced to leave their homes and sometimes livelihoods behind. Attending to and understanding these communities’ cultural wellbeing in addition to their physical wellbeing is a vital part of the conversation when discussing human mobility and displacement. With the new task force on displacement under the WIM, the above concerns should be taken into account in order to ensure the success of the program in understanding the full range of issues associated with human mobility and displacement due to climate change.