The Room Where it Happens: The Indispensable Role of the Observer

_104735890_dui0ypwwoai5suoAs TIME Magazine recognizes its 2018 Person of the Year, observers, reporters, and advocates of the truth find themselves lauded among activists. The Guardians and the War on Truth were recognized as the Person of The Year for “taking great risks in pursuit of greater truths, for the imperfect but essential quest for facts that are central to civil discourse, for speaking up and speaking out.” These Guardians are being praised for their ability to hold our public officials accountable and to bring to them to the task at hand.

Similar to The Guardians, UNFCCC representatives of observer organizations hold sovereign Parties accountable for their actions. They remind Parties of their task at hand—creating international IMG_9729_0environmental policy on climate change. UNFCCC observers can do this by releasing sassy newsletters, publishing revealing emissions reports, and advocating for and commenting on text released by the Parties. As independent actors — with fewer political repercussions than Parties themselves — NGOs interact in spaces and ways that Parties cannot. Where Parties are constrained by politic mannerisms, NGOs can act bombastically, like casual vandalism,*  and subtly, like “liaising with the UNFCCC Secretariat on behalf of the business community.”

Baby-Groot-750x500UNFCCC observers act in between the spaces of international politics, diplomacy, and decision making. Their role in the negotiations of transparency, adaptation, and finance are indispensable because there is no force quite like them. So as discussions of global stock take move forward and rumblings of excluding observer organizations rise, Parties, civil society, and the people** need to defend these staunch Guardians of the Green.

 

*This is in reference to a situation where some observers were de-badged or stopped by police when entering Poland.

**This is in reference to David Attenborough’s “People’s Seat,” which encouraged civil society to be able to encourage world leaders to do more for climate action.

 


The Pre-2020 Stocktake: Disappointment and Resolve

As with any massive undertaking, practice makes better. The Global Stocktake in 2023 is no different.image1024x768
In accordance with decisions at COP21, to implement enhanced action prior to 2020, and at COP23, emphasizing that enhanced pre-2020 ambition can lay a solid foundation for post-2020 goals, this year’s COP held a two-part assessment of global progress. The first event, held on December 5th, was a Technical Review, while the second event, held on December 10th, was a High-Level meeting of the Parties. Each session was composed of two panels. Each answered predetermined questions followed by an open plenary discussion where Member Parties could intervene.
The Technical Review’s first panel, consisting of the heads of the subsidiary bodies, considered “the work of the UNFCCC process related to the mitigation efforts up to 2020.” It addressed issues such as technology transfer, capacity building, and the IPCC 15 report. The second panel, made up of financial bodies and technical experts, highlighted “efforts of the UNFCCC process to enhance climate implementation and ambition up to 2020.” It focused on ease of access to climate finance, as well as on parties’ progress towards their finance commitments.
COP24-6Today’s High-Level meeting saw two panels made up of ministers of various Developed and Developing Country Parties: Poland, Grenada, the European Commission, China, & Australia in the first session, followed by Norway, Brazil, Germany, Ethiopia, Japan, & Finland. The panels began by discussing the pre-2020 efforts of Parties to mitigate greenhouse gases & ways to enhance efforts, and the provision of support for climate efforts and enhancing efforts, respectively.
Discussions in each session forced Parties to consider their efforts to implement mitigation strategies, make climate finance more accessible, and to meet the various commitments and ambitions in the pre-2020 period. While the aim of this stocktake was to “provide a space for holistic reflection by ministers and other high-level representatives,” it raised serious questions regarding gaps between Parties’ commitments and the reality exposed by the IPCC 15 and other reports.
While Panelists focused on the positive and what had been working thus far, such as finding the right incentives to delink economic growth from emissions, doubts were raised during the plenary. Most poignant was India’s intervention: “Are these pre-2020 actions adequate? Have we addressed the task before us?”
To which, it seems, the answer is “No. Not yet.”


BURs: One Small Decision Leads to Surprising Results!

The Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) is a hot topic at COP24. At the conclusion of COP24 is the deadline for all parties to put their heads together, develop, and finalize provisions for the modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPG) of the ETF. The MPGs might supersede and replace the current transparency framework called measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV). Completion of the MPGs marks a significant milestone for the Paris Agreement. Anticipation to see the final provisions and roll out of the MPGs has already caused ripple effects when it comes to reporting.

The UNFCCC cannot help but celebrate the ongoing progress in transparency. The UNFCCC is observing the fruits of all party’s efforts, despite some resistancbur1_552e, through increase rates of party participation in submitting annual reports, specifically Biennial Update Reports (BURs). The BUR was the brain child of PA parties committed to climate change at COP17 in 2012. BURs are reports submitted by non-Annex I parties. BURs generally contain updates to GHG inventories, mitigation actions, status, needs and support. BURs should be submitted every two years at the time of the first submittal. Least developed country parties (LDC) have the flexibility to submit their first BUR at their discretion. The BURs are purely collaborative and peer-reviewed by international consultation and analysis (ICA). The ICA is made up of teams of experts that consist of PA parties.

Although BURs on their face may not appear to be an exciting process, parties’ implementation, feedback and lessons learned have exciting benefits. At COP24, the UNFCCC hosted a side event which showed the progress of BURs and featured case studies from Brazil and China.

As of today, the UNFCC has received a total of 66 BUR reports. Recent submissions from Brazil and China help serve as ideal case studies for other non-Annex I parties.

When Brazil started preparing its BUR report, little did it know that the BUR would significantly enhance government workflow and increase environmental awareness. Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs led the BUR report and quickly learned the logistical nightmare and resources needed to complete the report. Brazil’s BUR report took about a year to complete. However, after the report was submitted, Brazil conducted a lessons learned exercise and found surprising results. Brazil learned that preparation of the BUR improved communication and exchange between ministries. Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) engaged with energy and agriculture agencies, which were unfamiliar with the UNFCCC and the BUR. The MOFA encouraged these officials to participate in BUR workshops and in turn the agencies spurred investigation and internal discussion adopting environmental initiatives in their respective agencies.

China’s BUR had similar benefits compared to Brazil. Lessons learned after China’s first BUR submission revealed adoption of procedures that heightened internal quality assurance and control. Additionally, China started building a national system to archive environmental and climate change data. Even more impressive, China pushed past its reluctant disposition and started sharing emission factor data and best practices with the ICA. China is in progress in submitting its second BUR report and is excited to see the differences from its first report.

The BURs play a key role in helping developing countries establish environmental reporting procedures. BURs can also have the indirect effect of facilitating government cohesion between agencies and pushing countries down a greener path.


As COP24 Approaches, Negotiators Attempt to Narrow Their Focus

GST at UNIn the months leading up to the COP, Parties are in constant discussion. On September 27th, the incoming COP24 Presidency organized an informal consultation in New York, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly. The COP23 Presidency, UNFCCC Executive Secretary, and presiding officers all attended, along with thirty-three member states. The Parties’ lead negotiators met to discuss four elements of the potential COP24 outcome in Katowice, Poland: the NDCs process, adaptation, finance, and transparency. As the report of this meeting indicates, one of the issues addressed was “How do we manage the transition from the current transparency system to a future one, while ensuring flexibility for the countries in light of their capabilities?”

In Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, all Parties agreed to an enhanced transparency framework for action and support. This framework has built-in flexibility that accounts for Parties’ different capabilities and circumstances. Article 13.1 announces explicitly that “in order to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective implementation, an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with built-in flexibility which takes into account Parties’ different capacities and builds upon collective experience is hereby established.”  Article 13.2 adds that “the transparency framework shall provide flexibility in the implementation of the provisions of this Article to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities. The modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article shall reflect such flexibility.” The Parties have been negotiating the exact content of these modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) since 2015 and have designated COP24 as the deadline for agreeing on them.

A key part of these negotiations is recognizing that some Parties require additional funding toCBIT achieve their reporting and transparency goals. To this end, the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) was established. CBIT’s goal is to strengthen the institutional and technical capabilities of developing countries for collecting and reporting data on progress made on their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).  This data will then be used to inform the global stocktake (GST), which is a collective assessment of all Parties’ progress on their NDCs toward the Paris Agreement’s Article 2 objective of keeping atmospheric warming to “well below” 2C. The Paris Agreement requested that the Global Environment Facility (GEF) support the establishment of CBIT through voluntary contributions and build donor support. As of December 2017, $61 million had been pledged to the CBIT Trust Fund and $53 million of it had been dedicated to the first 41 projects in 39 countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean.  Through this support, CBIT has established a Global Coordination Platform that helps and encourages Parties to engage in multilateral and bilateral capacity building initiatives. Parties agree that CBIT is necessary for ensuring a smooth transition to a new transparency system. However, not all Parties agreed on what form the new system should take.

While discussing the scope a new transparency system at the September 27th meeting, Parties suggested that all Parties have the same the submission date for the first biennial transparency report (BTR). Others proposed to have different submission dates for developed and developing Parties. This would reflect the timing each Party required under their CBDRRC. Additionally, while building flexibility into the system, the Parties split into two camps. One side suggested that flexibility be general in nature and by each Party’s national circumstances and capacities, while the other maintained that they be specific and limited to a small number of issues.

preCOPThe next discussion is on October 24th in Krakow at the close of the “pre-COP” meeting hosted by the COP24 Presidency. The suggestions made in New York will be explored and expanded upon by the Parties continuously until the COP. The enhanced transparency network covering mitigation, adaptation, and support is paramount within the PA to informing the GST and allowing parties to aggregate their efforts towards our global goal.


The Progress of Global Stocktake in the final APA Informal Sessions.

With Global Stocktake’s expected beginning date in 2023 and pressure from the heads of the APA, there is a race for an informal working document on the Modalities Guidelines and Procedures (MPGs) of the Agenda Item 6 of the APA. Global stocktake is an effort to continuously monitor the collective progress towards achieving the purpose and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.

On November 12, the APA released the “Revised building blocks for APA item 6 (GST).” These building blocks capture the key elements and commonalities of the proposals made by Parties under Agenda Item 6. This new document contains a table with headings on the left and details on the right. The building blocks contained the headings “Modalities” and “Sources of Input.” Under modalities, the overarching elements provided for “equity regarding process and themes.” However, the term “equity” is never defined in the document. Moreover, the document prescribed an overall process for the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement  (CMA) to implement for GST. This new method includes a preparatory phase (Activity A), a technical phase (Activity B), and a political phase (Activity C). Lastly, the new document prescribes sources of input, which is the information to provide in the GST.
melting_time_of_earth___zemgus_zaharans
While these simple building blocks were a good start, parties made clear their frustrations with the ambiguity of the text. There were three main concerns. First, individuals were concerned that the table did not reflect more of the information submitted by the parties. Parties felt since this is a working paper,  the paper should reveal more of their inputs. Also, individuals wanted more reference to the Paris Agreement, specifically Articles 8 and 2. Lastly, some parties raised concerns on the silence of issues on Mitigation and Loss & Damage.

Second, the term “equity” is not defined. Some parties understood equity to mean equity in outputs and time to provide and assess resources.  A lot of parties wanted equity defined or were confused on what equity was referencing. Further, there was concern about how equity was going to be integrated into the GST reporting mechanisms.

Third, the starting date of Activity A was also a concern. In the informal table, Activity A starts in 2021 or 2022 to ensure the adequate and timely consideration of the input from AR6 of the IPCC. India specifically raised concerns about the idea of kick-starting the process in 2021 because 2018 is supposed to be an assessment of what is happening pre-2020, GST is supposed to be an assessment what is happening the after 2020 period. Iran proposed options to the date requirement where there is a choice between 2021 and 2022.

Going forward, these revised building blocks have a lot of strides to go, clarity-wise to be ready for the APA chairs.


Transparency Framework Update

Throughout this first week of COP22, I have followed the progress of the enhanced transparency framework (TF). The Paris Agreement created this TF through articles 13, 14, and 15. Because the TF is new, the discussions started out slowly. However, the Parties agreed that there is a sense of urgency in developing the modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) of implementing the new TF, as the Paris Agreement was ratified earlier than expected.

The Parties of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Paris Agreement (APA) met several times this week to discuss agenda item 5, relating to the TF in article 13 of the Paris Agreement. The co-facilitators, Andrew Rakestraw (US) and Xiang Gao (China) focused discussions on (1) transparency; (2) flexibility; and (3) national capacity. They presented the Parties with a draft work plan, which includes elements on organization of the work plan (balanced and logical manner that addresses elements of article 13), modalities for the work plan (submissions, technical paper, and workshops), and next steps. Most of the Parties welcomed the work plan. They agreed on a number of next steps: targeted submissions of Parties, and an intersessional workshop that will be forwarded to the co-chairs. The co-facilitators will post an updated work plan this evening, and will meet in a final informal consultation on Monday, Nov. 14, to receive Party reflections on the note.IMG_3806

The APA group met to discuss item 6, the global stocktake (GST) in article 14 of the Paris Agreement, several times this week. Co-facilitators Nagmeldin Elhassan (Sudan) and Ilze Prūse (Latvia) summarized Party inputs on the GST in an informal note. Many Parties requested a technical workshop and a technical paper by the Secretariat, however some Parties did not believe they were ready for technical papers. These Parties would prefer more conceptual work guided by the focused submission. Thus, the co-facilitators are working on incorporating the views of the Parties on next steps in a revised informal note. They will release a revised paper to share at the last meeting on Monday, Nov. 14.

Finally, the APA group met to discuss item 7, article 15 of the Paris agreement several times this week as well. Earlier this week, co-facilitators Peter Horne (Australia) and Janine Felson (Belize) released a set of guiding questions for the Parties. These focus areas included: (1) Scope; (2) capacity and national circumstance; (3) trigger mechanisms; (4) relationship with existing bodies; (5) enabling party participation; and (6) next steps. The co-facilitators then released a short summary of the conversations, and offered guidance for working forward. Today, co-facilitators invited the Parties to submit proposals on (but not limited to): specifying the modalities and procedures in paragraph 102, 103 of 1/CP.21, elaborating the elements the mandate, and sharing views on how to take work further such that it is in line with 1/CP.21. The purpose of these focus questions was to help the Parties develop the concrete details of the mandate; the co-facilitators have appreciated the rich exchange on conceptual ideas, however it is now critical to get down to the concrete details so that it is prepared for the CMA by 2018. The Parties were not prepared to answer these questions today. They may, however, offer recommendations at their final consultation next Monday, Nov. 14.


Nations in ‘Glass Houses’: The Rules of Transparency

glass houseWhile not as publicly flashy as the issue of ambition, transparency received a good deal of attention during the negotiations that brought us to the Final Agreement in Paris on Saturday. Parties had to come to a consensus about how exposed their internal policies and actions would be to scrutiny. This is a key point, each Party is a sovereign nation yet they are subjected to evaluation by an outside group. The Transparency framework therefore must be implemented in “a facilitative, non-intrusive, and non-punitive manner respectful of national sovereignty.” (Art. 13.1) Essentially, they have moved into “glass houses”. Equality in Transparency requirements attempts to prevent stone throwing.

 

Why is transparency so important? Parties need to be able to see what each other is doing in order to build confidence and trust in the system (Art. 13.1). The framework for Transparency is constructed around both actions and support, therefore affecting all other sections of the Final Agreement. Transparency requirements apply to Parties’ mitigation efforts, adaptation projects and policies, technology transfers, capacity-building, and financial support. Parties are more likely to act in furthering their efforts in mitigation and implementing their NDC plans if they can clearly see that others are doing so as well. Further, developed country Parties, other Parties in a position to do so, and private investors are more likely to provide resources to the developing countries Parties if they can account for the monetary flows and technology transfer.

 

Of course, the cross-cutting issue of differentiation plays a large role in Transparency as well. During the negotiations, recognition that some Parties would have different capacities to assess and then report progress towards full implementation of the Agreement was a sticking point. Ultimately, the “older” system of “Common But Differentiated Responsibility” or “CBDR” was replaced in the Transparency section with “flexibility” considering the respective capacities of the Parties (Art. 13.2).  This is more akin to a sliding scale of ability rather than the older systems of bifurcation. There remains special consideration for LDCs and SIDS in the establishment of the transparency framework (Art. 13.3).

Each Party will report on emissions and removals according to methodologies accepted by the IPCC, information relating to the Party’s NDC, and climate change impacts (Art. 13.7). These wipe cleanreports are to be submitted biennially, with an exception for LDCs and SIDS. The technical expert review of the information submitted will undergo a facilitative, multilateral consideration of their progress. For developing Parties, this review shall include assistance in identifying capacity-building needs (Art. 13.11). Support for the implementation of this and all other requirements of this Article shall be provided on a continuing basis. (Art. 13.14 and 13.15).

Living in a “glass house” requires that Parties keep to their promises made in Paris and that they help others with their housekeeping to clear the view of activities and support. A cleaner world will be our reward.

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