Green Climate Fund Approves $1B in New Projects

Posted on October 24, 2018 by amandac

On October 21, 2018, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Board concluded its 21st meeting by approving 19 new projects, totaling $1.038 billion. This board meeting comes right after the IPCC released the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (SR1.5) (which we posted on here and here) and a little over a month before COP24. As UNFCCC Executive Secretary Patricia Espinosa told GCF Board Members at the start of their meeting, “Never has there been more need for multilateral cooperation. And never has finance played a more central role to the overall climate regime itself.”

GCF was set up by UNFCCC in 2010, as part of the Convention’s financial mechanism. When the GCF began to gather resources in 2014, developed countries, and some developing, pledged $10.3 billion. Initial mobilization lasts until 2018, while the Fund remains open for further contributions during this time from both public and private sources.

The GCF is designed to focus on climate change adaptation and mitigation, in part as a reaction to the broader mandate of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the original operating entity of the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism. “The Fund pays particular attention to the needs of societies that are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, in particular Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and African States.” Another key point GCF makes is that “[o]ur innovation is to use public investment to stimulate private finance, unlocking the power of climate-friendly investment for low emission, climate resilient development. To achieve maximum impact, GCF seeks to catalyse funds, multiplying the effect of its initial financing by opening markets to new investments. The Fund’s investments can be in the form of grants, loans, equity or guarantees.”

When addressing the importance of this most recent GCF Board meeting, Executive Secretary Espinosa underscored that its outcome will impact the outcome of COP24: “Success here means sending a clear and unmistakable message of trust to developing countries that they can have confidence in the process going forward.” Espinosa’s remarks were well taken as the GCF approved the 19 proposed projects. See the full list of approved projects and monetary breakdown here.

Her comments came after the preceding GCF Board meeting failed to deliver its mandate. This contentious July 2018 meeting resulted in the resignation of GCF Executive Director, Howard Bamseyand, and no new project approvals. Tensions ran high at this meeting for several reasons. The first two had a direct impact on the Fund’s bottom line: the United States decided in 2017 to halt $2 billion of its Obama administration $3 billion pledge and inflation rates reduced the present value of commitments made in 2014. In addition, policy gaps for prioritizing the numerous applications whose requests exceed the GCF’s capitalization hampered Board Members’ ability to make the tough selection decisions. The GCF currently has $10 billion pledged out of the $100 billion promised for 2020.

The GCF has been plagued with issues and controversy for the past year. In February 2018, GCF had a board meeting that approved $1 billion in projects. Although the willingness of GCF to approve more projects is hopeful, civil society organizations and parties saw it as problematic, given that the GCF has difficulty dispersing money for projects already approved. As of December 2017, the fund has only released roughly $150 million, or less than 6% of the nearly $3 billion it had committed up to that point. The GCF reported in the February 2018 meeting that this funding is going toward the 18 projects that are under implementation. The Board had approved of 53 projects by the February meeting. So what is taking so long for the Board to disperse funding? Who is receiving this funding? And how is the GCF now reporting that there “39 projects under implementation, worth $1.6 billion in GCF resources that are being deployed as climate finance in support of developing countries’ climate ambitions under the Paris Agreement?” The jump from 18 to 39 projects under implementation in eight months seems either overambitious or over-reported. The biggest question here is how these 39 projects are receiving their funding after the turmoil of the GCF in the past eight months. To take from Espinosa’s remarks again, “The outcome of [the October Board meeting] of the GCF will impact those negotiations in Katowice.”

Looking toward COP24: The GCF submitted a report to the UNFCCC on Sept. 17, 2018, for consideration at the upcoming COP24. Table 14 included in its Annex VII lists all projects approved by the Board to receive funding from the GCF as of July 31, 2018. In this table, the GCF does not report what has been dispersed, only the GCF funding and total project value.

China’s Effort to Limit GHGs

Posted on October 3, 2018 by amandac

China produces more carbon dioxide than any other country in the world: 10.357 million metric tons per year. To limit their impact on climate change, China includes environmental protection in their Five Year Plan (FYP). The FYP is the country’s blueprint that outlines the policy framework, priorities, economic, and social development goals for the 2016-2020 period.

In 2016, China released the 13th FYP which includes lofty goals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and increase green manufacturing. Innovation is the crux of this FYP. Innovation builds on improving manufacturing and emphasizing a cleaner, green economy. A State Council executive meeting in 2015 discussed implementing an Internet Plus Circulation program. The program expands broadband connection to more rural areas so there is more efficiency in transporting items, like new agricultural products and equipment. The program will also allow rural populations to access health care. Air pollution is a key target for the FYP. Chapter 38, Section 4, ensures that the concentration of fine particulate matter is reduced by at least 25%. The current status of smog and air pollution affects public health. China is increasing regulations for coal-fired plants while requiring low-emission technologies and eliminating outdated industrial equipment and processes.

The carbon dioxide emissions reduction targets in the FYP contribute to China’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) 2030 target. The 13th FYP even put a first nation-wide total energy cap on all energy sources: it is set at less than the equivalent of five billion tons of coal over the next five years. These goals are reflected in the INDC filed on June 30, 2015. Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, provides that “[e]ach Party shall prepare…nationally determined contributions…with the aim of achieving the objectives…” of reaching a global peak of GHG emissions as soon as possible. During COP24 in December, China may include details about innovation and policy from the 13th FYP into the NDC because it is on track to meet the 2020.

China is fully embracing their 2020 goals by implementing green community projects. On September 28, 2018, Green Climate Fund announced that the board will consider projects, including China’s Green Cities program,targeting Central Asia and Eastern Europe. This project is among 20 other proposals totaling $1.1 billion to be heard during the next board meeting this month. It will be interesting to see how these project proposals will factor into each countries’ NDC during COP24.

Don’t You Forget CGE

Posted on November 10, 2017 by VFajardo

Before Nationally Determined Contributions and Capacity-Building, there was the Consultative Group of Experts. The Consultative Group of Experts was established by the 5^th Conference of the Parties under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. The CGE is the key technical support element under the UNFCCC that assists developing country Parties in meeting their reporting obligations. It provides developing country Parties with technical advice and support to improve their national communications (NCs) and biennial update reports (BURs).

The CGE, being mandated by the UNFCCC in 1999, was supposed to terminate by 2009. After getting reconstituted once (2009 to 2012) and extended twice (2012 to 2013, 2014 to 2018), will reach the end of its mandate next year, when the Implementing Guideline for the Paris Agreement are intended to go into effect. Its Five-Year Work Programme from 2015-2018 focused on five key priorities: (1) Building the capacity of developing country Parties to facilitate implementation of Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) arrangements under the UNFCCC; (2) enhance the sustainability of the national communications of the national communications and biennial update report process; (3) enhance collaboration and cooperation with other global initiatives; (4) enhance communication and outreach; and (5) enhance availability of resources and optimal working arrangements for the operations of the CGE.

Thus far, the CGE has conducted successful regional workshops in Africa and in Asia, involving 52 non-Annex I parties in total. These workshops were organized in collaboration with the Global Support Program. The CGE has also held webinars in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee (AC), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These webinars covered a wide range of topics relevant to non-Annex I Parties’ NCs and BURs, such as the MRV Framework and climate change scenarios. The CGE also has a free e-learning course on national GHG inventory systems, mitigation assessment, and vulnerability and adaptation assessment. These projects have allowed non-Annex I Parties like Indonesia and Uruguay to submit their respective NCs and BURs to the UNFCCC Secretariat.

Yet, despite all of CGE’s good work, non-Annex I Parties—now developing country Parties under the Paris Agreement—still lack important capacities that will put them in par with the reporting capabilities of the Annex I parties. The CGE’s 2017 Survey revealed that this lower capability in non-Annex I parties is a result several factors, the most prominent of which are insufficient resources and ineffective institutional arrangements. Governments in developing countries have tight purse strings and often suffer from high turn-over rates. Moreover, they often do not have local institutions that manage the entire reporting process. Financial concerns aside, the CGE attempts to address ineffective institutional arrangements by encouraging and helping developing countries establish these institutions and train their people. For countries with very limited capacity, assistance for the CGE is invaluable.

After all the beneficial work of the CGE, does it have a role to play under the Paris Agreement? The answer to that is simple: We do not know. Once the CGE’s Five-Year Mandate ends, the CGE ceases to operate, unless it is renewed for another period.

The Paris Agreement builds on the UNFCCC and will eventually supersede it. There is no provision in the Paris Agreement that bestows a role on the CGE. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation included this issue on its provisional agenda, but ultimately decided to hold it in abeyance. Therefore, the Parties will not discuss the fate of the CGE in COP 23. Unless the Parties decide to include the role of the CGE in its agenda for SBI 48, the CGE will not be featured in the Paris Agreement’s Implementation Guidelines. Furthermore, the Paris Agreement asks Parties to submit nationally determined contributions. This means that Parties decide on what to submit and how to submit, subject to the basic requirements laid out in the Agreement. Whether the CGE evolves to serve the Parties’ needs under the Agreement depends on whether the Parties remember that the CGE exists to help them.

This does not mean that the CGE will have absolutely no hand in the Parties’ progress towards their goals. The CGE trained some of the developing country Parties. They created material that get passed on from one developing country Party administration to the next. However the CGE’s story ends, the Parties should know that the Paris Agreement would not have been as successful without it.

Wheels of climate change policy roll on in Bonn

Posted on May 25, 2017 by achristian

While angst about the pending Trump decision on the Paris Agreement (PA) remained a subtext of the annual intersessional climate meetings that wrapped up last week in Bonn, Germany, the technical work trundled on.

More than 3,300 (negotiators, observers [including a VLS delegation], plus secretariat and other agency staff) participated in:

the 46th sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI),
the 3rd part of the first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA1.3),
several COP-mandated companion events (e.g., indigenous peoples, climate finance reporting, capacity building), and
more than 90 side events.

Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth

The Earth Negotiations Bulletin gave its usual comprehensive (if dry) lowdown of the meetings. By many reports (here, here, here, and here), the negotiations moved rather smoothly. In particular, positions on APA agenda items got clarified, even though negotiating texts are still out of reach. The APA must deliver a Paris rulebook by December 2018.

Aside from the Trump question, the media coverage (e.g., here, and here) spotlighted the contentious tussle over conflict of interest (read: corporate/fossil fuel industry influence on climate policy). But that shadow side of the SBI’s imperative to “further enhance the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders,” was not the only thing we watched.

A few of our observations:

APA round table. (Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth)

APA round tables got a thumbs up for the airing and clarifying of views and could speed introduction of “contextual proposals” for PA rulebook pieces. Five will be held ahead of COP23, though observers will be excluded.

Parties are determined to understand, manage and capitalize on the linkages between Paris Agreement articles, and between the APA work and PA work of the subsidiary bodies. This is important and rich ground for cohesiveness.

More frequent interventions are coming from the new “coalition” of 3
Marcia Levaggi, Argentina, speaking on behalf of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth)

contiguous South American countries – Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. They constitute 3 of the 4 members of Mercosur, the Southern Common Market, which is on track to a free trade agreement with the European Free Trade Association. We’ve known them as part of multiple different negotiating groups: G77+China (all 3); Coalition of Rainforest Nations (Argentina, Uruguay); BASIC (Brazil); Like-minded Developing Countries (Argentina); and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). We’ll be keeping an eye on this development.
The Long Term Climate Finance workshops (LTF) may catalyze concrete COP consideration of strategies to address the confusing
Breakout during LTF event. (Photo by IISD/ENB | Kiara Worth)

multi-lateral climate finance architecture and developing countries’ challenges in accessing finance. (See the World Resources Institute new pub out on this issue.)
The SBSTA’s agriculture agenda item hopped on a rollercoaster, disrupting the 4-year stalemate between developed and developing countries over adaptation vs mitigation. The excitement generated by delegates’ Week 1 mantras (“very substantive dialogue,” “feels like a family”) landed with a thud in the end. No mature elements moved forward to the SBI; nor was an agriculture work programme recommended. We do see slightly positive prospects looking ahead, given the Co-Facilitators’ non-paper. Stay tuned for our deeper dive on this.

The Gender Action Plan workshop wasn’t covered by anyone, but you’ll get the in-depth story with our next post.

Next up? Thank you, Carbon Brief, for the chart of steps toward COP23.

A Numbers “Crunch” – Trump & The UNFCCC

Posted on November 17, 2016 by achristian

Like most every other institution around the globe, for a while now, the UNFCCC has been called on to do more with less. This is clearly reflected in the Executive Secretary’s recent budget presentations that report contributions to UNFCCC trust funds have declined significantly for at least the last 5 years. In fact, 2016 contributions are just 43% of the 2012 level. And all the while, the COP has added new tasks, including, most recently, the raft of work associated with the 2015 Paris Agreement.

At a COP22 informal session on November 11, Espinosa shared that the Secretariat, with its mandated zero-growth budget, will be unable to fully deliver on its current mandates. So, all countries are being called on to meet their full commitments and to increase their voluntary contributions.

It just so happens that the U.S. is a big piece of this budget picture, contributing (as of October 21) more than 20% of the total $30.3 mill* in 2016 receipts for the 3 non-Kyoto Protocol related funds. These include the Trust Fund for the Core Budget (with country-specific contribution levels based on UN-determined proportions) and two voluntary funds: Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities and Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process (the latter to help developing country Parties attend COPs and other meetings).

And, of course, there is the ongoing U.S. climate funding via appropriations from Congress, development finance, and export credit, which totaled $2.6 billion in 2015. That was before $500 million was transmitted to the Green Climate Fund earlier this year in partial fulfillment of the $3 billion U.S. promise (that constitutes 30% of that fund’s total pledges). All of it adds up to a very big number in the climate finance world.

Then, on November 8, from stage right: enter President-elect Trump.

While the potential impact on the climate regime is about more than money (check out our Monday story), the finance implications are indeed great. Considering Mr. Trump’s campaign pledges, the Republican Party’s platform position, and the Transition Team’s recent statements, when it comes to climate funding, those calculators only subtract.

Many negotiators and high-level ministers attending COP22 from around the world have been cautioning against hasty speculation on U.S. policy post-January 20, 2017. Behind the scenes, however, and certainly within the Secretariat, the number crunching has doubtless turned to nail biting.

* Based on 11/17/16 EUR-USD exchange rate

(Image credits: Calculator = seocopywriting.com; Diverging costs/revenue= smallbiztrends.com; Scissors & currency= neatoday.org)

Is Time Running Out?

Posted on November 16, 2016 by jenny

COP 22 hourglass display representing the limited time left to avoid irreversible climate change before the year 2100.

Referencing the response to climate change at today’s COP 22, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry presented the issue in terms of time. He stated, “The question is not whether we will transition to a clean energy economy. The question is whether we will have the will power to make the transition in time. Time is not on our side.” He was speaking to a group in Marrakech, but his question was really to the world.

Secretary of State John Kerry in Marrakech, Morocco for the COP 22 Climate negotiations.

Sec. Kerry confirmed that the global community is more united than ever and taking real action this year, as evidenced in such historic global agreements as the Paris Agreement, the ICAO Agreement and the Kigali Agreement. Sec. Kerry reassured his listeners that despite the uncertainty that is coming from recent election results, climate change is not a partisan issue. The majority of Americans, scientists, military leaders, intelligence community, state and city leaders, business leaders, advocacy groups and community organizers are committed to fighting against the problems that contribute to climate change. The Secretary emphasized that although he would not speculate on the incoming administration’s policies regarding the Paris Agreement, he took heart because “issues look very different on the campaign trail than when you are actually in office.” In fact, the U.S. is on its way to meet its Paris Agreement goals based on market forces and state regulations already in place. Investing in clean energy makes good market sense because as the Secretary said, “you can do good and do well at the same time.”

Following the Growth of Loss & Damage through the First Week of COP22

Posted on November 12, 2016 by Beth Bootz

Loss and damage (L&D) has come a long way since the Bali Action Plan and the Cancun Agreements. Last year at COP21, L&D received its own article under the Paris Agreement, Article 8. But what happens next? For the first week of COP22, L&D was on the agenda under SBI agenda item 11 and SBSTA agenda item 5, so the chairs of both subsidiary bodies created a joint informal consultation to discuss the following two issues. First, the informal consultation was tasked with consider the recommendations in the WIM Executive Committee’s (Excom’s) 2016 Report, especially as it relates to its framework proposal for its five-year workplan. Second, the parties at the informal were asked to undertake the review of the WIM, as mandated by the mechanism’s creation in 2/CP.19.

Since the beginning of the week, the parties have been working toward agreements on both agenda items. Led by Beth Lavender of Canada and Alf Willis of South Africa, the parties are beginning to come to agreements on each of their two agenda items. One agreement the parties came to was there needed to be two separate decisions on each agenda item to present to the subsidiary bodies. For the Excom Report, the co-facilitators circulated draft conclusions on Wednesday to begin discussions on the topic. One sticking point on these conclusions was whether the decisions should invite parties to make submissions on the financial placeholder in the five-year workplan framework from the Excom Report.

The issue of financial support for L&D is still an issue with all parties involved in this process. When the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) first brought up the concept of L&D in 1991, its goal was to create a compensation fund in order to compensate those countries who would be harmed by sea-level rise from climate change. From this point on, the idea of compensation has been hotly contested, especially by developed countries like the United States. This idea was also debated in Paris, but ultimately, the parties agreed that Article 8 did not “involve or provide a basis for any liability compensation.” Despite this, many developing countries still need financial support from the developed world to deal with L&D.

Late Friday night, the co-facilitators and the parties issued a second version of the draft conclusions text. This version of the text included a paragraph specifically asking parties to make submissions on the various placeholders in the framework workplan, including finance. Presumably, this new text signifies a compromise between the parties and that this text will be approved and sent to the subsidiary bodies for approval by the COP.

On the second agenda item, the parties were still discussing how and when they should conduct the review. Some believed that the review of the WIM needed to be completed by the end of COP22, while others thought that the parties needed time for party submissions on various issues before the review could conclude so the actually review should not be finalized until COP23. In order to help bridge this gap, the co-facilitators drafted questions with inputs from the parties and these questions would help guide the review process. The parties have yet to come to an agreement on the issues, but they need to do so before the COP closes for the weekend on Saturday night.

Reviewing the WIM is important, especially following questions in Paris as to whether the WIM was going to continue to be the L&D mechanism under the Paris Agreement. Because the parties decided to continue the mechanism, the review is especially important to ensure it performs all of its mandated functions from the past as well as to ensure that it is well-equipped to perform its future duties under the Paris Agreement.

Approving the Excom Report is also important for the future of the WIM under the Paris Agreement because it includes approving and strengthening the WIM’s five-year workplan, which dictates how the WIM will operate moving forward. Inviting party submissions on financial matters may seem like a small issue but there is no financial mandate for L&D in the Paris Agreement, making any information about financial support extremely important for developing countries. L&D is not a remote issue to be addressed in the future. The effects of L&D are affecting countries now. The strides made in the first week at COP22 may seem small when compared to the growth witnessed in Paris, but these developments are extremely important to ensure that the WIM is adequately equipped to address L&D now and in the future.

UN University Announces Nepal Loss & Damage Case Study

Posted on November 9, 2016 by Beth Bootz

Yesterday, the United Nations University announced a case study on loss and damage (L&D) that it conducted in Nepal following the 2014 landslide. Overall, the landslides had a devastating effect on the community at large, blocking a highway, causing power outages, and killing more than 150 people; however, this study focused less on the overall effects and more on the individual community members’ coping mechanisms for the L&D caused before and after the landslide. The increased focus on lesser-known, community-level techniques is a great opportunity for governments and international groups to learn about smaller-scale L&D solutions.

The panel, moderated by David Hewitt from UN Univeristy, included two presenters from UN University, Dr. Kees van der Geest and Dr. Robert Oaks, as well as Raju Pandit Chetri, who works for Nepal’s Climate Change Council. To begin the announcement, Dr. Geest presented on the study and emphasized that the goal of the study was to show the effects of L&D on the ground. In the study, researchers gathered evidence on what types of measures the landslide victims implemented before the landslide to prevent L&D as well as what the victims did after the landslide to restore their lives. Overall, the study found that the victims employed more reactionary efforts to clean up after the L&D but that more could be done to prevent and reduce L&D but these efforts lack “people-centered strategies.” Dr. Geest ended his presentation on the study by emphasizing that many people implement measures on the ground to address L&D but that these measures are not widely discussed. Perhaps this study can help shift the focus to these on-the-ground measures and bring them to the forefront as viable L&D mechanisms.

Following Dr. Geest’s description of the study, Chetri spoke about the study’s impact on Nepal. He first explained how there are limited scientific studies available in Nepal that help demonstrate the country’s need to go beyond adaptation measures to address L&D and this study helps to fill this void. Chetri also emphasized that events like this are likely to increase with changing and unpredictable weather patterns in the face of climate change, which makes studies like this more important in order to show countries like Nepal how to react to these types of events in the future. In the question and answer portion of the conference, the moderator asked Chetri about the link between academic studies like this case study and on the ground projects. Chetri explained that negotiations on L&D often seem abstract but that these studies demonstrate in a tangible way that L&D is happening now—not just in the future. Additionally, he explained that these studies direct governments on what types of policies and programs to put in place in order to reduce on-the-ground effects, further underscoring the study’s importance to on-the-ground application of L&D mechanisms.

The final presenter, Dr. Oaks, ended the announcement by discussing the cultural L&D climate change can cause. While admitting that cultural L&D is difficult to quantify, he underscored its importance to communities, and in some instances whole countries that may be displaced due to the effects of climate change. This further emphasizes the importance of L&D studies like this one, which could educate those working on L&D, helping them understand the individual community members’ views on displacement and ensuring that “migration with dignity” remains an option.

The views and feelings of individual community members are just as important as theoretical discussions about national or international approaches to L&D to develop comprehensive strategies to address L&D. Too often, L&D focuses on large-scale, national, or international solutions to L&D, but the real impact of L&D is felt on an individual basis in small communities across the world. This case study refocuses L&D research around these communities.

Global Goal on Adaptation: work has begun

Posted on June 28, 2016 by achristian

The next in our series of posts on SB44/APA1

Work on the Paris Agreement’s (PA) global goal on adaptation was launched by the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) and Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) in Bonn in May. We reported earlier on the global goal here and here.

The APA, SBTA and SBI agendas contained three items directly addressing elements of the PA’s Article 7 (Adaptation) and Article 9 (Finance) in support of this important qualitative goal:

Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication referred to in Art. 7.10 and 7.11 (APA)
Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Art. 7.12 (SBI)
Modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Art. 9.7 (SBSTA)

Consideration of these occurred in contact groups and informal consultations, supplemented by bi-lateral meetings.

There was also work on capacity building, technology development and transfer, and transparency of action and support under the PA, all of which relate to adaptation planning, financing, implementation, and reporting. Beyond that, the SBs addressed existing Convention components and programmes that will ultimately serve the global goal on adaptation, including national adaptation plans and the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. Capping it off during week 2 was the Technical Expert Meeting on “enhancing the implementation of adaptation action.”

While this was a robust intersessional for action related to the global goal on adaptation, it was not all smooth sailing. (See our upcoming coverage on items #2 and #3 above.) For instance, further guidance on adaptation communications (item #1 above) was added to the APA agenda during week 1 following objections from G-77/China that the original provisional agenda did not follow the PA and its implementing decision. Additionally, spirited discussions on this item in open-ended informal consultations honed in on what adaptation communications are intended to achieve, and the nature and scope of the guidance for those that should be developed. Developing countries asserted the need for flexibility in communications (highlighting differentiation), while most countries supported at least some common minimal communications parameters in order to achieve the critical linkages with the transparency and stocktaking components of the PA. It was a good first step, even with historic geo-political lines still visible.

The conclusion adopted on this agenda item calls for Parties to submit their views on adaptation communications by September 30, in order for the APA Co-Chairs to prepare for further work at the resumed first meeting during COP22 in Marrakesh in November. We will be watching those submittals and the next meeting, given that adaptation communications bear significantly on the success of the Paris Agreement.

Loss and Damage in Bonn (sort of)

Posted on June 2, 2016 by achristian

The 44^th meeting of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) and the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA), held in Bonn, Germany, May 16-26, were full of action. Our delegation report-back started earlier this week, here and here. Key work areas receiving consideration included, for example: preparation for the implementation of the Paris Agreement; adaptation planning and action (and the Adaptation Fund); capacity building in developing countries; gender and climate policy; and market and non-market mechanisms to incentivize mitigation action.

Yet, Loss and damage (L&D), what many consider the third pillar of the climate regime, got little attention in Bonn. A few observers noted they expected more than two posters and one side event on the work of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM), given the upcoming COP22 review of progress on the WIM Executive Committee (Excom) 2-year (2015-2016) workplan, and L&D now being the subject of a separate article in the Paris Agreement. Some also expressed confusion about a special event for observer delegation input on “issues related to the Warsaw International Mechanism in the lead up to and beyond COP22,” convened by the COP21 and COP22 Presidencies on May 24 (we’ll speak to this in an upcoming post).

The reason for the limited attention is that the WIM, created at COP19 to address L&D, functions under and reports to the COP independently, rather than being part of the work of the SBSTA and SBI. Additionally, though Article 8 of the Paris Agreement is devoted to the WIM, the Paris decision gave no additional instructions to the Excom for 2016 that might have tied it to the SB44. The Excom is heavily engaged in its 2-year workplan (2015-2016) through 3 meetings in 2016 (January, April, September). You can follow the work, including calls for submissions via the Excom meetings site.

The WIM L&D side event, Shining the light on non-economic losses: challenges, risks and lessons learned for addressing them, was well-crafted and well-attended. (The robust presentation can be accessed from the Side Event list, by scrolling down to the May 18 event and clicking on the “Presentations” link.) Non-economic losses, the focus of Action Area 4 of the 2-year workplan, are losses for which a monetary value cannot be readily assigned, for which there is no market price. As defined by the UNFCCC technical paper, these are losses of “life, health, displacement and human mobility, territory, cultural heritage, indigenous/local knowledge, biodiversity and ecosystem services.” These can be, of course, the greatest and worst losses of all. The side event’s key objectives were to:

Raise awareness and understanding of the nature and extent of non-economic losses;
Put a spotlight on some of the challenges and risks that non-economic losses pose to developing countries;
Highlight some of the lessons learned associated with addressing non-economic losses, including how to integrate measures to reduce the risk of non-economic losses in comprehensive approaches to address loss and damage.

An upcoming post on L&D from Bonn will cover the special event for observer input on the WIM, and a couple of exciting unofficial side events addressing the limits to adaptation and progress on climate litigation. Also stay tuned for more info on the WIM Excom.

Climate – Free Trade Policy Mismatch

Posted on May 2, 2016 by achristian

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was high on the U.S.-EU agenda last week (here and here), reigniting nagging questions about the continued disconnect between international trade policies and climate change policies that has been problematic for decades. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has acknowledged that the misalignment allows international trade policies that hinder the transition to low-carbon economies.

Two factors contribute to this climate vs trade regime conundrum. Firstly, national boundaries specifically apply for global warming emissions, but are quite porous for international trade agreements. The UNFCCC and the new Paris Agreement provide for countries to determine their own efforts to reduce emissions. (The Kyoto Protocol’s specific emissions caps for Annex I Parties were part of the reason that system failed.) International free trade instruments, on the other hand, hold that purchasers should be able to buy from whomever they want and sellers should be able to sell to whomever they want, with little hindrance in crossing those national boundaries.

As a result, countries with large economies and growing imports (e.g., the U.S.) have driven increased global warming without acknowledgement or constraint, and outsized multinational corporate influence over trade deals has been unfettered, to the climate’s detriment. Also part of the problem is the World Trade Organization (WTO), which does little to address fossil fuel subsidies that continue to incentivize extraction.

Secondly, trade deals have strong accountability provisions and consequences, whereas, the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol do not. Even the Paris Agreement, in its final form, will have to rely on “naming and shaming” to counteract Party foot dragging on current and future mitigation goals.

On the other hand, countries can and do sue other countries through WTO dispute settlements under trade deals. For instance, the U.S. sued India over its domestic solar energy industry protections designed to accelerate its economic and energy sustainability.

Additionally, an arbitration process known as Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) common in investment agreements (another form of international “trade”) allows corporations to seek damages from governments for domestic policies that limit their activities. Trans-Canada sued the U.S. over Obama’s rejection of the Keystone XL pipeline. Plus, anti-fracking bans and other measures to limit extraction of fossil fuels are subject to such claims. Multinational corporations have used the ISDS process and the threat of it with great success. (Elisabeth Jeffries explores this and more in a January 2016 feature in Nature Climate Change [subscription required].)

Granted, environmental protections within free trade and investment agreements have expanded over the years. The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), recently agreed to by 12 Pacific region countries, including the U.S., for the first time “embed[s] conservation commitments” into the main text of the agreement, ensuring they are subject to the agreement’s dispute resolution process. (The Senate has yet to ratify the TPP.) For the TTIP, the EU has proposed an alternative to the ISDS – an Investment Court System (ICS), curtainling grounds for corporate compensation, that some believe could introduce a more transparent and balanced arbitration process to trade agreements.

Environmentalists and climate change policy advocates are not swayed. In particular, the TPP is expected to undermine sovereignty and incentivize U.S. hydraulic fracking for natural gas exports. The TTIP is criticized for its failure to ensure environmental factors can moderate economic ones in the ICS, and for its broad definitions favoring investors over governments. Overall, according to prominent economist and scholar, Joseph Stiglitz, both instruments are expected to “undercut” the Paris Agreement, and “cement in place a system that treats the environment as distinct from – and subordinate to – international trade and investment.”

Aligning the global climate and international trade regimes is, apparently, unfinished business.

How “well below 2°C” flew well-below the radar

Posted on March 20, 2016 by achristian

On December 12, when the Paris Agreement was adopted by consensus, it contained bold new language on the long-term global temperature goal. Article 2 reads:

“Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels…” (Article 2.1(a))

But, from where did this language come?

All through the ADP’s final year of negotiations, from Lima to Geneva to Bonn and back to Bonn, it never appeared in the successive drafts. The “well below 2°C” finally emerged in brackets at the last negotiating session before COP21, on the final day of ADP2-11.

The likely source? Something called the structured expert dialogue (SED).

The story begins back at COP16 in 2010, when Parties agreed to reduce emissions so that global temperature would not exceed 2°C above pre-industrial levels. They also agreed to periodically review this goal to determine whether it was sufficient to meet the UNFCCC’s objective, and whether the Parties were achieving it. Importantly, the Parties decided at COP16 to consider strengthening the 2°C goal, “including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C.”

This mandated review happened between June 2013 and February 2015 at a Joint SBSTA/SBI meeting. It was supported by a structured expert dialogue (SED) to “ensure the scientific integrity of the review through a focused exchange of views, information and ideas.” The SED involved more than 70 experts and Parties over 4 sessions. The group released its final report last May for all UNFCCC Parties to consider it at the 42^nd session of the subsidiary bodies in June.

Two of the SED’s key messages were:

“The world is not on track to achieve the long-term global goal, but successful mitigation policies are known and must be scaled up urgently.” (Message 8)
“While science on the 1.5°C warming limit is less robust [making it difficult to compare differences between 2°C and 1.5°C], efforts should be made to push the defence line as low as possible.” (Message 10)

Message 10 also suggested that Parties consider a precautionary path: “aiming for limiting global warming as far below 2°C as possible, reaffirming the notion of a defence line or even a buffer zone keeping warming well below 2°C.”

While not offering the exact language on 1.5°C found in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, the SED report clearly articulates climate change impacts already being experienced, limits to adaptation, and certain and non-linear increases in those impacts expected between 1.5 and 2°C.

Both IISD’s Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) and the Third World Network (TWN) reported strong differences at the June UNFCCC meeting about what action Parties should take on the Review and SED report. AOSIS, the LDCs and others pushed for sending a draft decision to COP21 for a new long-term global temperature goal of “limiting warming to below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.” Saudi Arabia and China were both firmly against changing the long-term goal, and sought language simply acknowledging and appreciating the work/report. Though most Parties supported crafting a substantive conclusion and decision, the lack of consensus on content meant postponement to the SB43 (December 1-4) meeting in Paris. With Saudi Arabia and China (joined by Oman) continuing to block action at SB43, the COP Presidency was ultimately called on to shepherd its direct consideration by the COP.

On the ADP front, the Review and SED report found no apparent foothold in June. By Paris, though, its “well below 2°C” was in the draft and part of the hot debate on long-term temperature goal. The LDCs, AOSIS, the Africa Group and the 40+ country-strong Climate Vulnerable Forum (on which we’ve reported), fought hard for the goal to reference only 1.5°C. The “High Ambition Coalition” (on which we reported here), which included the EU and the U.S., offered strong support. The Saudis, backed by India and China, and unchallenged by the rest of OPEC, firmly blocked it, along with any reference to the SED report. The final compromise language was, in the end, a big step toward acknowledging the climate change dangers already present and the peril posed by a 2°C change.

COP21 did close with a decision (10/CP.21 para 4) that referenced the Review, “took note of the work of the structured expert dialogue,” and offered appreciation for those who participated in it. It also stated the new long-term temperature goal utilized in the Paris Agreement’s Article 2.1(a). “Well below 2°C” is well beyond what could have been.

The Power of One Word

Posted on December 12, 2015 by catie

Photo Source: International Partnership on Mitigation & MRV

In international legal commitments all the power is in the verbs. And in the most recent (and perhaps final) version of the Paris Agreement, the verbs used in Art. 4 on Mitigation strengthen the actions required by developed country Parties.

Article 4.4 is on the differentiated mitigation efforts required by all Parties to the Agreement. The text released this afternoon declares that, “[d]eveloped country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets.” Conversely, the requirement for developing country Parties is that they “should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstances.”

Even after a quick read, the power and effect of the verb “shall” compared to “should” or “are encouraged to” is instantly obvious. The language of “shall” is stronger; we’ve known this since biblical times. The commandment was “thou shalt not kill,” not thou should not kill, or thou is encouraged not to kill. Shall is an obligation, a command. Should is just an expectation.

Under the current Paris Agreement, developed country Parties have a positive obligation to lead on economy-wide GHG emission reductions. On the other hand, developing countries have no GHG emission reduction obligations under Art.4.4. Instead, developing country Parties are expected, or perhaps have a moral duty, to enhance their mitigation efforts. A statement supporting developing countries to voluntarily choose to try and move towards economy-wide GHG emission reductions furthers the expectation that they will enhance their mitigation efforts.

While differentiation between developed and developing Parties may seem intuitive, the “shall” “should” dichotomy is quite new in Art. 4.4. In the draft version distributed two days ago, on December 10, 2015, all the verbs were “should.”

The text read: “Developed country Parties should continue to take the lead. Each Party that has previously communicated absolute economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets should continue to do so, and all Parties should aim to do so in light of different national circumstances and stages of development.”

Photo Source: ThinkProgress

This previous version of the text was a conglomeration of expectations, and all Parties were expected to be doing something to mitigate GHG emissions. But, no Parties were actually obligated to perform certain actions. As negotiations have progressed over the past two days it is clear that a hierarchy of actions has developed, and this hierarchy ensures that all Parties know what the Paris Agreement requires of them. Under this hierarchy:

WHO: WHAT THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO DO:

Developed Parties Must lead on economy-wide GHG emission reduction targets
Developing Parties Expected to enhance their mitigation efforts
Developing Parties Economy-wide GHG emission reduction targets encouraged

As the final text is considered by the Parties tonight, it will be important to note whether this hierarchy of mitigation actions is preserved with “shall” and “should” or if we return to a list of “should” expectations as contained in the earlier version of the text.

***UPDATE: During the final meeting of the Comité de Paris the term “shall” was changed back to “should.” Therefore, developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets. The power of one word changed this obligation back into an expectation. The COP Presidency explained that the use of “shall” was a technical, unintended error and that the term “should” was meant to be used in the Agreement.

The Sustainable Development Mechanism AKA The New Carbon Market Mechanism

Posted on December 11, 2015 by catie

Photo Source: IBNLive

The Sustainable Development Mechanism is a new mitigation mechanism established in Art. 3 ter of the draft Paris Agreement. The purpose of this mechanism is to “promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions [in developing country Parties] while fostering sustainable development….” In order to achieve its goals, the mechanism provides incentives for successfully mitigating GHG emissions. Under this mechanism, Parties that contribute to the reduction of GHG emissions in a host country Party can benefit from their mitigation activities by using the resulting emission reductions to fulfill their own mitigation ambition requirements.

Overall, the structure of the Sustainable Development Mechanism closely resembles the Clean Development Mechanism, which is the carbon market mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon markets and offsets were created under Art. 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, which states that “…any Party included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy….” Additionally, the Clean Development Mechanism was established under Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, which provides a process for handling all of the carbon credits created under Art. 6.

Photo Source: YaleNews

Ultimately, the major difference between the new Sustainable Development Mechanism from the Clean Development Mechanism is that carbon markets will no longer be limited to developed country Parties. Instead, all Parties will be able to participate in this mechanism. Expanding the scope of a carbon market mechanism to allow all types of Parties to participate in transferring mitigation GHG reductions is unprecedented. We don’t know how all Parties will use this mechanism or how successfully it will address sustainable development issues. Therefore, a s a successful Paris Outcome appears to be on the horizon, this new carbon market mechanism is one more aspect of the Agreement that will be worth watching develop.

Will it Be a REDD+ Letter Day for Our Forests?

Posted on December 10, 2015 by catie

Photo Source: Shutterstock

Yesterday, the Parties received a “clean” version of the draft Paris Agreement, and at 8PM the Parties convened to share their first impressions on this draft Agreement. One hot topic repeatedly discussed was the status of our forests. Many Parties are advocating that the Paris Agreement establish a mechanism that incentivizes the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and promotes the conservation and sustainable management of forests and enhances forest carbon stocks in developing countries, while also enhancing the non-carbon benefits (REDD+). Currently, a formal REDD+ mechanism is missing from the draft text, and many Parties are not happy.

In the ADP 2-12 Draft Paris Agreement, Article 3 bis established a formal mechanism on REDD+, but this mechanism was removed from the most recent draft Agreement. Instead, Article 3 bis in the most recent Draft Agreement simply encourages the Parties to conserve and enhance forests, and encourages them to incentive REDD+ actions without ever directly referencing the REDD+ acronym. The language of encouragement has received a variety of reactions from the Parties and from interested NGOs.

The Union of Concerned Scientists, Conservation International, Environmental Defense Fund, Forest Trends, National Wildlife Federation, and The Nature Conservancy all issued a joint statement on Article 3 bis in the latest draft, saying:

1370267590_sumatran-orangutans_6779_600x450

Photo Source: Shields Energy Services

“This new text includes a specific provision that would send a strong political signal to support better protections for forests in developing countries and encourage developed nations to provide the financial incentives to do so.”

Additionally, the joint statement declared:

“The new draft of the Paris Agreement makes it clear that countries can increase their ambition to address climate change by using the approach of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), as an enduring tool for reducing emissions and incentivizing countries to scale up their efforts to protect forests.”

While these NGOs support the language used in the most recent Article 3 bis, many developing country Parties raised objections over the language during the Comité de Paris meeting last night.

Panama, speaking on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, explained that the Paris Agreement needs to demonstrate a collective, serious implementation of REDD+ through reinsertion of a REDD+ mechanism in Article 3 bis. Furthermore, Panama argued that no valid reason has been provided by other Parties explaining why a formal REDD+ mechanism cannot be launched in the agreement here in Paris. As a result, Panama submitted an edited version of the draft Agreement reinserting the formal REDD+ mechanism into the text to the COP Presidency. Panama closed its comments saying there must be a formal REDD+ mechanism in the Paris Agreement if the agreement is
going to truly be ambitious.

Photo Source: Coalition for Rainforest Nations

Many developing countries supported Panama’s position on REDD+. These countries include: the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Dominican Republic, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, Tanzania, and many others commonly associated with the Coalition for Rainforest Nations. As Parties continue to meet and develop the draft Paris Agreement today and tomorrow it will be important to watch Article 3 bis to note if the language promoting REDD+ remains voluntary expressed through the term “encouragement” or becomes a formalized mechanism under the UNFCCC expressed in the terms “establishing a REDD+ mechanism.” In the end, this debate over language will determine the level of commitment the Parties agree to concerning the protection of forests under the UNFCCC.